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Series Preface
This series is dedicated to serving the growing community of scholars
and practitioners concerned with the principles and applications of
environmental management. Each volume is a thorough treatment of
a specific topic of importance for proper management practices. A
fundamental objective of these books is to help the reader discern and
implement man's stewardship of our environment and the world's
renewable resources. For we must strive to understand the relation-
ship between man and nature, act to bring harmony to it, and nurture
an environment that is both stable and productive.
These objectives have often eluded us because the pursuit of
other individual and societal goals has diverted us from a course of
living in balance with the environment. At times, therefore, the
environmental manager may have to exert restrictive control, which
is usually best applied to man, not nature. Attempts to alter or
harness nature have often failed or backfired, as exemplified by the
results of imprudent use of herbicides, fertilizers, water, and other
agents.
Each book in this series will shed light on the fundamental and
applied aspects of environmental management. It is hoped that
each will help solve a practical and serious environmental problem.
Robert S. DeSanto
East Lyme, Connecticut
Preface
Research on risk issues has a long tradition at IIASA. In 1986 a decision
was made by the IIASA Council to strengthen the Institute's research on
technological risk. Within this framework an international group of scientists
working in the risk field met several times to discuss the nontechnological
impacts of the Chernobyl accident. Specific issues discussed were the way
in which authorities react, the role and behavior of the media system, the
decision-making structures, and the way in which international coordination
systems function. Out of these discussions emerged a set of papers dealing
with societal responses to the accident. It was decided to collect these papers
into a volume dealing with what we call the policy responses that emerged in
different European countries.
Boris Segerstdhl
Director
Research Institute of Northern Finland
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THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
is a nongovernmental research institution, bringing together scientists from around the
world to work on problems of common concern. Situated in Laxenburg, Austria, IIASA
was founded in October 1972 by the academies of science and equivalent organizations of
twelve countries. Its founders gave IIASA a unique position outside national, disciplinary,
and institutional boundaries so that it might take the broadest possible view in pursuing
its objectives:
To promote international cooperation in solving problems arising from social, economic,
technological, and environmental change
To create a network of institutions in the national member organization countries and
elsewhere for joint scientific research
To develop and formalize systems analysis and the sciences contributing to it, and promote
the use of analytical techniques needed to evaluate and address complex problems
To inform policy advisors and decision makers about the potential application of the
Institute's work to such problems
The Institute now has national member organizations in the following countries:
Austria
The Austrian Academy of Sciences
Bulgaria
The National Committee for Applied
Systems Analysis and Management
Canada
The Canadian Committee for nASA
Czechoslovakia
The Committee for nASA of the
Czechoslovak Federal Republic
Finland
The Finnish Committee for nASA
France
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Japan
The Japan Committee for IIASA
Netherlands
The Netherlands Organization for
Scientific Research, NWO
Poland
The Polish Academy of Sciences
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The Swedish Council for Planning and
Coordination of Research (FRN)
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
The Academy of Sciences of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics
United States of America
The American Academy of Arts and
Sciences
Chapter 1
Introduction
Boris Segerstdhl
Research Institute of Northern Finland
Oulu, Finland
Valery Legasov is the man who was in charge of damage control and recon-
struction after the accident at Chernobyl. He is one of the victims of this
accident. He committed suicide one year after the accident.
In his so-called "Legasov Memoirs," published in Pravda on 20 May 1987,
Academician Legasov writes, "Unfortunately we do not have enough books
about Chernobyl, all the lessons of what happened have not been fully ana-
lyzed." This statement holds true even today, several years after the accident.
It is clear that a unique and traumatic event like the accident at Chernobyl
will never be fully understood and described. Most of the reporting after the
accident concentrated on questions related to nuclear engineering and power-
plant safety. In addition, a lot of attention was paid to the health effects
of radioactive contamination. What took place in society as a whole was not
recorded with much detail. This omission cannot be corrected. Societal events
cannot be recollected with total recall after they have taken place. We try,
however, in this book to give a modest account of what happened in Western
Europe during the time after Chernobyl.
In the "Legasov Memoirs" Chernobyl is compared to significant historic
events, like the destruction of Pompeii. Today this comparison is still possible
but not very likely. As time passes, Chernobyl will be viewed in the West as
one accident of many; although it had, when it occurred, an enormous effect
on everyday life in many countries. The events that took place in Western
Europe proved, in a unique way, that well-organized societies could cope with
previously unknown and only partly understood crises. For this reason, it is
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important to put on record what happened: what was done right and what
was not.
The Chernobyl accident led to simultaneous mobilization of many soci-
etal defense mechanisms on a scale and at a speed that was unprecedented
in peacetime Europe. As a test of Europe's ability to function as a unified
continent, the result is mixed. In certain areas everything went smoothly, e.g.,
exchange of information between officials. In other areas - notably interna-
tional food trade - the accident led to inconsistent or selfish actions, including
trade constraints and subjective setting of intervention levels without founda-
tion in scientific knowledge.
The whole pattern of reactions and responses to Chernobyl is society's
policy response to the accident. A policy response is the reaction by society as
a whole to an incident or accident that cannot be confined to a narrow sector
or closed region, but which has a' broad and often uncontrollable national or
international scope. Policy responses have three rational goals:
(1) Implement measures to minimize exposure to radiation.
(2) Limit economic impact of the accident.
(3) Revise procedures to avoid future similar accidents and improve response
mechanisms if an accident occurs
This list gives too simple a view of r~ality. In a real situation, like Europe
after Chernobyl, there is a lot of confusion with many stakeholders and con-
flicting interests. This makes consistent decision making extremely difficult.
To this confusion was added the problems caused by a lack of information.
During the first days and weeks after the accident nobody knew exactly what
had happened. Predictions based on what was known were more a matter of
guessing than of knowing, as there was a complete lack of experience.
A nuclear power plant is in one fundamental way different from other com-
plex technological systems. Most nonnuclear systems can, as a consequence of
an accident, cause damages which are measurable on a fairly continuous scale
from minor leaks to catastrophic disasters like the one in Bhopal. In the case
of nuclear installations, there is a discontinuity on this scale. The discontinuity
is caused by the difference between accidents which do not cause releases of
radionuclides and accidents which do. To a certain extent, this discontinuity
is perceived and not technical. A small release of slightly contaminated water
can cause more problems for the plant's management than a substantial fire
which did not lead to any releases even if it had the potential to cause a major
accident.
This discontinuity in the level of awareness has lead to the incorrect as-
sumption that nuclear power plants are completely safe and. operate without
even minor accidents until the occasional big accidents occur. This situa-
tion is partly caused by the industry itself. There is a history of secrecy and
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unwillingness to disclose information about "minor" accidents. These minor
accidents are, however, fairly common. In West Germany at least 305 inci-
dents affecting the safety of nuclear power plants occurred in 1987. Eleven
were serious enough to be considered worthy of "rapid attention" (Charles,
1988). In the USA there were nearly 3,000 plant mishaps and 764 emergency
shutdowns in 1985, up 28% from 1984 (Flavin, 1987). Another source states
that "between 1971 and August 1984 two significant and 149 potentially signif-
icant mishaps occurred in 14 industrial nations outside the two superpowers"
(Ramberg, 1986). These facts are mentioned only to point out that nuclear
installations are as prone to malfunction as all other technological systems.
In addition fairly good statistics are available, although the industry itself is
extremely reluctant to discuss these aspects of their activities.
The probable reason for the nuclear industry's unwillingness to release
information on incidents is that it is assumed that this information would
be used in debates as arguments against nuclear power. This approach to
risk communication has backfired, as the general public has seen shattering
evidence of the fact that there is no fundamental difference between a nuclear
power plant and other human-built systems. They are all, to a varying extent,
unreliable; when they fail they sometimes cause damage to property and lives.
Every accident is followed by a debate concerning its cause. In most cases
(both nuclear and nonnuclear accidents) the main conclusion seems to be that
the accident was caused by "human error." It is common practice to distin-
guish between system failures and human errors. Whether this is a fruitful
way to approach the question is unclear. For example, one report on the
Windscale accident states that "because of the inadequate instrumentation,
the operator mistakenly thought ... " (Dunster, 1988, p. 147). In another
article it is reported that "the accident began when a faulty maneuver by an
operator ... " (Dickson, 1988, p. 556). The first version puts the primary
blame on the technical system, while the second one places it on the operator.
Davies (1986) writes:
There is nothing, when measured in terms of a strict algebra of death, dam-
ages, and injuries, that is particularly special about nuclear power. Many
other potentially hazardous installations operate worldwide, and some, in
their turn, cause serious accidents.
This statement is open to a lot of criticism. There might be certain qualitative
and quantitative aspects of the "algebra" that are very special in the case of
nuclear power. We are not going to discuss these comparative risk assessment
problems here. One point is, however, quite clear: public opinion does not
completely agree with the statement quoted above.
1.1 Other Accidents
Chernobyl was not the first nuclear power plant to suffer core damage. The
core at Three Mile Island (TMI) Unit 2 was badly damaged during its acci-
dent in 1979. The release of radioactive material from TMI was, however, very
small. The accident at Windscale was never fully documented publicly. It is
therefore difficult to say what similarities there might be between this acci-
dent and Chernobyl. There are, however, two important reasons for stating
that Chernobyl is unique. First, large populations were for the first time not
only frightened but also contaminated by radioactive fallout. Second, the bio-
logical impact through contamination spread over a whole continent, directly
involving many countries and international organizations.
One problem with reporting on nuclear accidents is that it is difficult to
get reliable and accurate information. In some cases there is almost no infor-
mation available, while in others the volume of inaccurate and contradictory
information is so huge that one could not describe accurately what really
happened.
Another important fact is that this information refers mainly to commer-
cial installations. It is difficult to obtain information on experimental reactors
or military nuclear installations. John Horan of the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency said during a workshop in 1980: "I have identified six major
accidents in the past 27 years of our industry. Only two involved commer-
cial nuclear power plants" (Lathrop, 1981, p. 14). He did not identify the
other four cases. They could be reprocessing plants, experimental reactors,
or military installations. The obvious exception to the general principle of
secrecy in the military sector is in cases of accidents in submarines and other
naval vehicles. These cases hit the headlines, not because of an anomaly in
the information policy of the military establishment but because of the fact
that these accidents are so obvious.
In addition to the "three big ones" (Windscale, Three Mile Island, and
Chernobyl), a long list of serious accidents in nuclear installations can be
compiled. A few of these are discussed below.
The accident that occurred at the Windscale Works at Sellafield, Cumber-
land, in October 1957, was the result of a deliberate release of Wigner energy
from the graphite moderator.[I] Because of inadequate instrumentation, the
operators thought the core was cooling without releasing all the energy. A sec-
ond period of heating overheated several fuel channels leading to a graphite
fire that involved some 150 channels of fuel. The fire was finally extinguished
by flooding the pile with large volumes of water. Flooding was used despite
the warning that it might ignite the whole core (Dickson, 1989).
The Windscale accident was the first major nuclear accident to be reported,
even if not accurately. It came four years after the American scientist Edward
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Teller (1953) had opened up the discussion on reactor accidents in a speech
to a group of nuclear experts. Windscale is, still today, probably the West's
worst nuclear accident. Documents released in 1988 under the 30-year rule
show convincingly that the British government for political reasons decided to
censor the report on this accident.
Kyshtym is a big nuclear industry complex in the southern part of the Ural
Mountains between the cities of Sverdlovsk and Tjeljabinsk. It is the first in-
stallation in the USSR to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. It went into
operation in 1948. The first information about an accident in this installation
came through a 1976 article in New Scientist written by Zjorjes Medvedev,
a Soviet refugee scientist. A substantial release of mostly strontium-90 took
place some time in 1957-1958 (Medvedev, 1980). No details about what caused
the accident are known. According to recently published satellite maps an area
of 250 km2 is isolated, and approximately 40 villages in the contaminated re-
gion are empty (Ny Teknik, 1988). The industrial complex in Kyshtym is still
in operation. Approximately 10,000 people are working in the plant. Fuel
from the Finnish reactors of Soviet design, which operate in the nuclear power
plant in Loviisa, is returned to this plant (Hufvudstadsbladet, 1990).
On 28 March 1979 a major accident occurred at the Three Mile Island
Unit 2 reactor. Pumps supplying water to the steam generators failed. When
the flow of water stopped, the safety system shut down the steam turbine
and steam generator. The pressure in the reactor increased, and a valve,
above the pressurizer, opened as designed to relieve the pressure. The reactor
automatically shut down within eight seconds. Emergency feedwater pumps
were started to remove heat from the reactor core. Two closed valves prevented
the water from reaching the system. The operators did not notice the problem,
and the relief valve (which was opened intentionally) did not close as intended
when the pressure in the reactor decreased. A "loss of coolant" accident was
occurring and continued for more than two hours until a backup valve was
closed. The loss of coolant accident was over when the valve was closed, but
other methods were still needed to continue to cool the core.
Some reports state that TMI was the worst nuclear accident that has hap-
pened in the West. This position should, however, be reserved for Windscale
because in the case of Three Mile Island the off-site consequences were minor
compared with those of Windscale.
1.2 The Costs
Very little can be said about the cost of nuclear accidents. This is especially
true in the case of the Chernobyl accident. Newspapers have published vary-
ing estimates of these costs. The direct cost in the Soviet Union is, according
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to one news item, four billion rubles; according to another, it is fourteen bil-
lion rubles. Ramberg (1986, p. 317) gives the figure of nearly three billion
dollars. This includes the lost electrical generation and the expense of re-
locating 135,000 people. If to this is added the indirect costs, e.g., for lost
production, then this amount can be doubled. These are of course so-called
ball-park figures. They are based on loose estimates. As there are neither
easily identifiable payers nor sufferers, these estimates remain an abstraction.
Cost estimates for Chernobyl have increased with time as more is known
about the consequences and the cost of dealing with them. Without any kind
of precision, experts today put the total cost at somewhere between fifty billion
and one hundred billion dollars.
Hamman and Parrot (1987, p. 230) give a list of items which should be
included in "the bill for Chernobyl." This list includes:
• The cost of resettlement of 135,000 people including new homes, trans-
portation, and replacement of personal belongings.
• The value of the towns of Pripyat and Chernobyl, which will remain unin-
habitable for some time.
• Lost agricultural production from contaminated lands.
• Expenses of medical treatment of Chernobyl victims.
• Expense of establishing screening and monitoring programs for the
evacuees.
• The value of lost electrical production from the Chernobyl plant.
• Lost investment in construction on the planned Unit No.5.
• The lost productive value of the human beings who were either killed by
radiation or whose lives will be shortened by exposure to it.
Hamman and Parrot estimate twenty-five billion dollars as the cost of
Chernobyl.
Only one general conclusion can be drawn from the estimates mentioned
above - nobody knows the cost of Chernobyl. Is there an answer to the
question? Is it at all possible, with the economics toolbox available today, to
assess the cost to society of an event like Chernobyl? The nearest equivalent
would be to try to calculate the cost of a small war and that has not to my
knowledge ever been done with any real credibility.
No serious scientific efforts have been made to estimate the costs incurred
by countries in Western Europe. It is obvious that only partial costs for
specific activities and losses can be estimated. A recent news item on Swedish
television (26 April 1989) gave a cost estimate of four hundred million Swedish
crowns as the cost of the accident for Sweden. Estimates like this exist in all
European countries, but they can easily vary by a factor of ten depending on
what implicit assumptions have been made. Economic impacts fall into four
main categories:
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• Costs calculated as resources diverted from other purposes.
• The cost created by disturbances in agriculture and in food trade.
• Long-term costs for the energy industry created by disturbances in nuclear
energy programs. These costs cause second-order impacts on the produc-
tion system in the affected countries.
• Costs derived from health effects.
Health-care issues are perhaps the most difficult to analyze from an eco-
nomics point of view. There cannot be any certain knowledge of what the
purely medical health impact of Chernobyl will be. A Soviet scientist (Swedish
TV, 26 April 1989) recently estimated the additional number of cancer cases
as approximately 20,000 during the next 20 years. To assess the accuracy of
this estimate, and then translate it into a monetary equivalent, is a rather
difficult, perhaps impossible, task. Obviously cleaning the power plant in
Chernobyl will create substantial costs in the health sector. More than 4,000
Estonian workers have been involved in the salvage operations. Of these four
have died, eight are permanently disabled, and 224 are seriously ill (Rahva
Hiiiil, Newspaper of the Estonian Communist party, 26 April 1989).
I conclude this discussion of costs with four simple assumptions. First, one
core meltdown with serious environmental consequences will occur for every
15,000 reactor years; second, the cost of this accident is forty-five billion dol-
lars; third, the net electrical power produced by a reactor is 600 MW; fourth,
the cost of one KWh is five cents. If the industry has to cover completely the
cost of these accidents, it would mean an increase of less than 1.5% in the
price of the electric power produced by nuclear power plants. This calculation
is of course to simple to be of any practical use except as a starting point for
discussions on ways to tackle the problem of liability and insurance.
It has been repeatedly stated that Chernobyl cannot happen elsewhere
- at least not in a Western industrialized country. A core meltdown is an
exceedingly improbable event. The whole nuclear energy program is built on
the belief that core meltdowns must not and never will happen.
It is true that the Chernobyl reactor is of a different design from those
used in the West. The fact, however, remains that the same general type of
accident could take place in any other country with nuclear reactors. Incidents
are frequent. One of the more visible of these was the accident in a reactor
near Biblis, West Germany, in December 1987. This accident was logged with
the reporting system for nuclear incidents in OECD, with a request that the
accident should be kept secret (Charles, 1988).
A few statistical estimates of the probability of future reactor accidents
have been made. Chow and Oliver (1987) have shown that the probability of
at least one partial core meltdown incident in ten years is equal to 0.75. Islam
and Lindgren (1986) have calculated a probability of 0.86 for the same type
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of incident. This is, of course, only a small fraction of the truth about the
probability of a core meltdown for specific reactor technologies and different
countries. The main point is that there is a significant statistical probability
that additional core meltdowns will occur. This does not necessarily imply that
every incident has to lead to loss of lives and environmental contamination.
What actually will happen during the next accident depends on technology,
training, and luck.
This book does not deal with nuclear reactor safety. I will, therefore,
not go into a discussion on different methodologies to assess probabilities and
consequences. The only point to be made is that nuclear catastrophes are
extremely improbable, but they are not impossible.
An accident with consequences on the scale of Chernobyl is not unthink-
able. An article titled "Barseback Can. Explode" was published on December
6, 1986, in Sweden's biggest newspaper, Dagens Nyheter. The author was Lars
Nordstrom, former head of the Swedish nuclear power inspectorate.
I am not going to discuss all assumptions - probable or improbable -
which have to be made to design a scenario like the Chernobyl accident in
another location. But let us look only at one fundamental aspect - the area of
contamination in the immediate surroundings of the plant. We will make the
assumption that an area within a radius of 30 km from the site of the accident
will be completely uninhabitable and an area within a 50 km radius will be
too heavily contaminated for any lasting human activities to take place.
Assuming that the evacuation of the population goes smoothly, an accident
of the same size as that in Chernobyl in the Swedish nuclear power plant at
Barseback would mean that Copenhagen and Malmo would cease to be part
of the national economies of Denmark and Sweden. As a consequence of this,
a population of more than 1.5 million would have to be resettled. There is
nothing special about Barseback. I use it only to illustrate what the situation
might be if an accident happens in a densely populated border area.
At this point most readers would say that this cannot be allowed. We
have to assume that an accident on this scale will not and cannot happen.
The main conclusion of a gedankenexperiment like this is that traditional tools
of risk analysis cannot easily be applied to catastrophes that have consequences
beyond the imaginable and insurable. This could be one reason why there is
no simple solution to the nuclear energy problem confronting many countries.
One fundamental question can be asked: Does a country have the right to
expose a neighbor to the risk of a catastrophe which would stop the functioning
of that country? I do not have an answer to this question. Empirical evidence
indicates that the answer is "yes" as long as the probability is low enough.
One reason for this answer could be that the question was not asked. Many
problems relating to the use and acceptability of nuclear energy - and other
Boris Segerstahl 9
high-risk technologies - are concerned with moral and ethical issues. This
makes discussions extremely difficult and in many cases impossible.
1.3 Factual Description [2]
The Chernobyl reactor installation is situated about 100 km north-northeast
of Kiev in the Ukraine on the banks of the Pripyat River, which flows into
the Dnieper. The region is relatively flat with gentle slopes down to the river
or its tributaries. Unit 4 of the nuclear power plant went into operation in
December 1983. The reactor was a heterogeneous thermal neutron channel-
type (pressure tube) reactor, in which graphite was used as the moderator,
while the coolant was light water and a steam-water mixture that circulated
through vertical channels passing through the core. The reactor core is a
cylinder with a diameter of 11.8 m and height of 7 m. The thermal power
of the reactor was 3200 MW. The mass of uranium in the fuel assembly was
114.7 kg.
On the night of 25 April 1986, 176 operational staff members and workers
were at the site. In addition, there were 268 workers working on the night
shift of the third construction stage. The core of Unit 4 contained 1,659 fuel
assemblies with an average burn-up of 10.3 MW/kg, one additional absorber,
and one unloaded channel. A shutdown for maintenance was planned for 25
April. Before shutdown, tests were to be carried out on one of the turbogen-
erators. The purpose of the experiment was to test the possibility of utilizing
the mechanical energy of the rotor to sustain the unit's power requirements
during a power failure.
On 25 April, at exactly 1:00 hours, the staff began to reduce the reactor
power. The electric power for the unit's needs was switched to one of the tur-
bogenerators. At 14:00 hours, the reactor's emergency core cooling system was
disconnected from the multiple-forced circulation circuit. Because of control
room requirements the removal of the unit from operation was delayed. Thus,
the unit continued to operate with the emergency cooling system switched
off. At 23:10 hours, the power reduction was resumed. When the automatic
control system was shut off the operator was unable to eliminate the resultant
imbalance in the measuring part of the control system quickly enough. As a
result, the power fell below 30 MWt. At 1:00 hours, on 26 April, the oper-
ator succeeded in stabilizing the reactor at 200 MWt. A further increase in
power was prevented by the small excess reactivity available, which at that
moment was substantially below regulations. At 1:03 and at 1:07 additional
main circulation pumps were switched on in addition to the six pumps already
operating.
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Since the reactor power was low and all eight circulation pumps were op-
erating, the total coolant flow rate through the reactor rose above the levels
permitted by the operating rules. The increase in water flow through the
reactor caused a reduction of steam formation, a fall in steam pressure, and
changes in other reactor parameters. The operators failed to sustain the steam
pressure and the water level in the drum separators. Both pressure and water
level dropped below the emergency level. To avoid shutting down the reactor,
the staff blocked the emergency protection signals relating to these parame-
ters. The reactivity continued to drop slowly. At 1:22:30 the operator noticed
that the available excess reactivity had reached a level that required imme-
diate shutdown of the reactor. Nevertheless, the staff decided to begin the
experiments.
At 1:23:04 the emergency regulating valves of turbogenerator No.8 shut.
The reactor continued to operate at about 200 MWt, but the reactor power
began to rise slowly. At 1:23:40 orders were given to send all control and scram
rods into the core. The rods fell, but after a few seconds a number of shocks
were felt as the absorber rods halted without plunging fully to the lower stops.
According to observers outside Unit 4, at about 1:24 hours two explosions
occurred; burning lumps of material and sparks shot into the air above the
reactor, some of which fell onto the roof of the machine room and started a
fire.
As a result of the explosion, burning graphite started fires in over 30 places.
Fires formed in the machine hall over one of the turbogenerators, in the reactor
hall, and in the adjoining, partially destroyed, buildings. These fires were
extinguished over a period of about three hours with the exception of the
main mass of the core and moderator. Actions were then taken to control the
burning mass and limit fission product release.
The damaged reactor was covered with compounds of boron, dolomite,
sand, clay, and lead, which were dropped from military helicopters. About
5,000 ton were dropped between 27 April and 10 May, mostly between 28
April and 2 May. By 6 May, the release of radioactivity had ceased to be a
major factor, having decreased to a few hundred curies (Ci), and fell to a few
tens of Ci per day by the end of May.
Three surveillance zones were established around the damaged reactor: a
special zone, a 10-km zone, and a 30-km zone. In these zones, strict dosimetric
monitoring of all transport was organized and decontamination points were
established. At the zone boundaries arrangements were made for transferring
personnel from one vehicle to another to reduce transmission of radioactive
substances.
The accident involved the release of some 50 megacuries (mCi) of condens-
able radioactive fission and transuranium activation products. This is about
5% of the total fission product inventory of the reactor core. Approximately
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Table 1.1. Released radioactivity from Chernobyl affecting the food chain.
Radionuclide
Sr-89
Sr-90
Ru-103
Ru-106
1-131
Cs-134
Cs-137
Ce-141
Ce-144
Np-239
Pu-238, etc.
Radioactive
half-life
53 days
28 years
40 days
1 year
8 days
2 years
30 years
32 days
284 days
2.4 days
13 years +
Emitted
radiation
f3+,
f3f3+,
f3f3+,
,
f3+,f3+,f3+,f3+,
8.0 X lOiS
8.0 X 1015
1.2 X 1017
6.0 X 1016
2.6 X 1017
1.9 X 1017
3.8 X 1016
1.0 X 1017
1.0 X 1017
4.2 X 1015
5.0 X 1015
(Source: Carter, 1988, p. 3.)
half of this amount relates to radionuclides of significance to the food chain
(see Table 1.1).
Radiosonde data close to the reactor indicate that the plume of released
material reached a height of up to 3 km before horizontal transport began.
About half the emission of condensable products fell in an area extending to
about 60 km from the accident site, while the rest was deposited over an area
of Europe of some 10 million km2 and beyond (Zifferero, 1988, p. 4).
The movement of the contaminated air masses throughout the period of
release is shown in Figure 1.1. From 26 to 28 April, a high-pressure area over
northeast Europe carried the plume northward, at first affecting the USSR,
then later northeast Poland and Scandinavia where radiation monitors in Swe-
den and Denmark indicated abnormally high readings. The triggering of these
monitors was the first indication in Western Europe that a significant nuclear
accident had occurred. Although some national systems and the European
Communities (EC) reporting systems for environmental radioactivity contam-
ination and food contamination went into the alert state, it was not anticipated
that much worse was to follow because, until Chernobyl, accidental releases
had been thought of as short duration events.
The most significant factor influencing the rate of contaminated fallout
from the cloud was rainfall. This is well illustrated by the fact that the con-
taminated air masses, which had passed over Luxembourg and Belgium on 2
May, gave levels of fallout that were four or five times higher in hilly areas
of the United Kingdom on 2-3 May where rainfall occurred particularly over
high ground in North Wales, the Lake District, and Scotland although these
areas were more than 2,000 kilometers from Chernobyl. A similar pattern was
seen in Austria where the low-lying area around and to the north and east of
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Saturday 26 April 1986 Monday 28 April 1986
Chernobyl
Monday 5 May 1986
Wednesday 30 April 1986
Saturday 3 May 1986
Friday 2 May 1986
Figure 1.1. Movements of contaminated air masses over Europe.
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Table 1.2. Approximate percentage of dose in the first year contributed by
individual foods.
Food
Milk
Dairy products
Cereals
Lamb
Beef
Green vegetables and fruit
Average adult
30-60
1-10
5-50
1-15
1-20
5-30
One-year-old infant
40-90
<1-15
<1-15
<1-5
<1-20
1-30
Vienna received a much lower amount of fallout than Upper Austria, despite
the fact that this area was closest to the source of the release.
Although a number of fission products were detected in the fallout, only
iodine-131 (1-131, half-life 8.1 days), cesium -134 (Cs-134, half-life 2.1 years),
and cesium-137 (Cs-137, half-life 29.7 years) made significant contributions to
the radiation dose. Figures 1.2 and 1.3 show the general pattern of deposition
of 1-131 and Cs-134+Cs-137 measured by various governments and based on
a survey carried out for the Commission of the EC by the UK National Ra-
diological Protection Board. Within this broad pattern, large local variations
exist depending on rainfall and topology.
Radiation from the fallout reached the population by a number of methods.
External irradiation from the cloud while it was passing made an insignificant
contribution to the radiation dose received by individuals, and inhalation of
radioactive materials probably contributed only around 5%. Some 15% was
derived from deposited radioactivity on the ground, and, since this effect lasts
until the deposited radioactivity decays, it is still making a minor contribution.
Between 60% and 80% of the total dose came from foodstuffs. This source
became the principal concern of most authorities, not only because it was
important but because it was the only pathway over which they could exercise
some control.
It had been a relatively cold spring, and the agricultural crops were not at a
very advanced stage. In the north cows were not yet put out to graze, so their
food, which was fodder from the previous season or compound feeding-stuffs,
was not contaminated. In the more temperate parts of Europe the grass/milk
route was the most important source of ingested radioactivity, particularly for
infants. Table 1.2 shows some estimated ranges for the European Community,
the one-year-old infant being the one with the highest calculated consumption
of milk and dairy products.
Since most processed dairy products take some time to reach the consumer,
most of the 1-131 transfer was through the ingestion of liquid milk and fresh
dairy products; the delay in consumption of the processed products allows
1-131 to decay. The cesium levels took some time to build up in milk since
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Figure 1.2. General pattern of deposition of iodine-131, Bq m2 • Values are
rounded to the nearest order of magnitude.
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Figure 1.3. General pattern of deposition of cesium, Bq m2 • Values are
rounded to the nearest order of magnitude.
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it first had to reach a biological equilibrium in the body of the cow. As the
season progressed, new herbage was growing, and, since in most lowland areas
the recycling of cesium from the soil was very low, this new grass diluted the
contaminated grass leading to a steady fall of cesium levels in milk and meat
following a peak reached three to four weeks after the initial contamination.
A second much lower peak was recorded during the winter months, when
stored fodder, which had been harvested just after Chernobyl, was fed to farm
animals.
Fruit and vegetables were affected by the fallout to a varying degree, de-
pending on their state of maturity at the time of the accident. Since con-
tamination was measured in activity per unit weight, becquerels/kilogram,
the highest levels were found in leafy vegetables, which presented a relatively
large catchment area for rainwater and had a high surface-to-weight ratio.
Spinach, for example, reached as much as 10,000 Bq/kg of 1-131 in Austria
and several thousand in southern parts of the Federal Republic of Germany
and northern Italy. Other green vegetables were contaminated but not to the
same degree. Cs-137 levels of these products were at the outset 25%-35% of
the 1-131 levels. Both Cs-137 and 1-131 levels fell rather rapidly partly due
to decay of the 1-131 but also because of new growth and some wash-off. By
the end of the third week in May, 1-131 had reached insignificant levels and
Cs-137 was 10%-15% of peak levels on these crops. Special problems were
encountered in upland regions, particularly in the UK, and contamination in
sheep persisted into 1988 at levels where control on slaughtering still had to
be exercised. Reindeer in the extreme north, some game, and wild mushrooms
also showed high levels of radioactivity; special arrangements had to be made
to process a relatively large amount of contaminated durum wheat, which af-
ter processing yielded foodstuffs within legal limits. Excessive contamination
levels in foodstuffs imported into the EC from Eastern Europe were found
mainly in live horses, nuts, tea, and herbs; all products difficult to control.
In summary, probably less than 1% of the food produced in the 1986 har-
vest in Western Europe exceeded limits where special measures were applied,
and, apart from the problems mentioned above, by 1988 contamination levels
in farm produce were beginning to approach pre-Chernobyl background.[3]
This book starts with a description of monitoring and assessment method-
ology and implementation in Europe. Franz Schonhofer was directly involved
in these activities in Austria and gives an overview of how these fundamental
activities were organized. Information on levels and types of contamination
present is not enough for decision making. The health effect of radiation is
the cornerstone of knowledge on which the immediate policy response after a
nuclear accident is based. In Chapter 3 Laszl6 Sztanyik gives an overview of
what is known about health effects of radiation.
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Exposure to radiation can, to a large extent, be controlled by regulating the
food chain. The actions taken in different countries are described in Chapter
4 by Paul Gray, who from his position at the Commission of the European
Communities (CEC) headquarters in Brussels worked with these problems
during the years after Chernobyl. In Chapter 5 Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer gives
an extensive description of how various international organizations functioned
after the Chernobyl accident. This is an important part of the international
policy response and creates the foundation for future strategies at the national
and international level.
The accident at Chernobyl was, as Hohenemser and Renn (1988) put it, the
largest uncontrolled experiment in risk perception and risk management ever
conducted. As with all uncontrolled experiments, its value to scientific studies
is limited. Whatever conclusions can be drawn and whatever assessments can
be made are, however, of value to decision makers responsible for maintaining
society's preparedness to cope with unknown emergencies. There is probably
no scientifically consistent method to analyze all impacts of Chernobyl.
The effects of the accident cover all aspects of society, and there is simply
no way to avoid compartmentalization in descriptions of various phenomena.
For this reason, media coverage has to be analyzed using one methodology,
intervention-level policies have to be described using another methodology, and
the actions taken by international organizations have to be described within
their own context. This becomes very obvious in efforts to analyze "soft"
aspects of what took place in Europe after Chernobyl.
The ways the general public acts and reacts in an emergency are described
by Bruna De Marchi and Nicoletta Tessarin in Chapter 6, while Harry Otway
in Chapter 7 gives an overview of how the press in Western Europe covered
the accident and treated the sources of information available to them. The
conclusions from the events following Chernobyl are drawn in the final chapter
by Marc Poumadere.
We have also included an Appendix giving an overview of terminology and
units.
The only way to deliver an overview of what took place in Europe after
Chernobyl is to expose the reader to these fragmented views of the total picture
hoping that he or she will be able to put the pieces together. The sheer
volume of material prevents anyone from comprehensively reporting on all
aspects of the reactions to Chernobyl, covering all countries receiving fallout.
It is, however, possible to get a fairly realistic overview of the situation by
studying groups of countries and then assuming that they are a good sample
of the whole of Europe. This approach has been taken in this book, and we
feel quite confident that the clarity of the message is not suffering from this
partial coverage.
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Notes
U] At the operating temperatures of the reactors at Windscale, the neutrons being
slowed down in the graphite caused lattice deformations. Energy was thus stored
in the graphite matrix, which could spontaneously relax leading to dangerous
overheating. This so-called Wigner energy was therefore released by periodic
controlled heating of the graphite.
[2] This description is mainly based on documentation compiled by the USSR State
Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy for the International Atomic
Energy Agency experts meeting 25-29 August 1986.
[3] The information on foodstuff contamination is based on a preliminary draft by
Paul Gray. A full account is given' in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 2
Monitoring and Assessment
Franz Schonhofer
Federal Institute for Food Control and Research
Vienna, Austria
2.1 A Historical Review
The testing of nuclear bombs in the atmosphere in the late 1950s and the
early 1960s has led to widespread contamination of air, soil, water, and the
biosphere. Many countries have started surveillance programs to monitor con-
tamination. It can be assumed that the high contamination that was found,
for instance, in the Scandinavian countries prompted efforts to enact the 1962
treaty of the ban on nuclear tests in the atmosphere. Since then the concen-
tration levels of radionuclides in the environment has declined considerably
partly due to decay and partly due to their removal to sinks where they are
strongly bound and cannot be recycled into the biosphere. The basic idea of
surveillance networks has changed from monitoring fallout, more or less as a
means to follow the decline of the artificial contamination in the environment,
to monitoring discharges from nuclear power plants and to preparing for the
possibility of widespread contamination following a severe reactor accident or
even nuclear warfare.
As levels of environmental contamination declined, so too did the interest
in monitoring. Introduction of high-resolution gamma spectrometry as a rou-
tine monitoring method made it possibile to analyze a wide range of artificial
radionuclides quickly, but costs for equipment rose considerably. Often it was
considered too expensive to modernize these networks especially considering
the low probability of severe reactor accidents and nuclear warfare.
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In order to react quickly and to implement effective countermeasures, au-
thorities require a lot of information, including aspects of detecting contam-
ination; evaluating its geographical distribution, decay, and transfer to the
food chain; and monitoring radiation dose impact on the population. This
information is only available with well-trained personnel using well-organized
monitoring networks.
2.2 Design of Monitoring Systems
The design of monitoring systems requires many parameters. In many cases
monitoring systems have not been "designed," but have grown gradually from
scientific interest in air contamination from university departments such as
meteorology and aerosol physics. Researchers in health physics became in-
volved as well. Monitoring systems have been developed that serve the needs
which may be encountered in different countries. As will be discussed later,
the mere existence and operation of monitoring equipment are not enough;
communication systems must also be established. Political interests, public
opinion, analysis of potential hazards, and financial resources to provide both
technology and personnel playa very important role. The competence, for in-
stance, of military and civil authorities might be important. Even the location
of a country will influence the requirements of a monitoring system.
In spite of the different presuppositions some common requirements can
be observed in existing monitoring systems in European countries. Radiation
protection and measuring equipment in East Europe can be regarded as good
as the equipment in West Europe.
2.2.1 Scenarios
Many possible scenarios of radioactive contamination must be considered. In
principle widespread contamination may occur by explosion of nuclear war-
heads, by a severe accident in a nuclear installation, or by reentry of satellites
bearing nuclear reactors or isotope batteries into the atmosphere.
Contamination resulting from an explosion of a nuclear warhead will be
extremely dependent on the type of weapon, the distance from the explosion
center, and local weather conditions; however, it will be completely different
from contamination resulting from other reasons regarding isotopic composi-
tion of fallout and potential health hazards.
In the case of a severe accident in a nuclear installation the impact will
depend first of all on whether it occurs in a reprocessing plant or a power
station. Only long-lived radionuclides can be emitted from a reprocessing
plant. A reactor can discharge short-lived and long-lived radionuclides, and
contamination will depend heavily on the type of accident and the type of
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reactor. This is easily demonstrated by three severe accidents that have al-
ready happened: the accident at Windscale was followed by medium-range
contamination (Dunster, 1987); the accident at Three Mile Island had only
local effects that were due to gaseous radionuclides (Gerusky, 1987); the Cher-
nobyl accident spread contamination via aerosols over almost all of Europe (a
short survey is given in Schonhofer et al., 1986) and traces of contamination
could be detected even in North America (Juzdan et al., 1988; Broadway et
al., 1988; Ministry of National Health and Welfare, 1986), Japan (Radiation
Safety Study Mission, 1986), and Taiwan (Chien and Chen-Jong, 1988).
Satellite accidents are different from nuclear ones. Either the satellite burns
completely on reentry into the atmosphere - contamination is then widespread
at high altitude and comes down slowly in the course of years - or the reactor
is broken into pieces, which then fall to earth. In the case of the satellite that
crashed in Canada in 1984, the sizes of radioactive fragments were found to
be from submillimeters to large assemblies of construction material like pipes
and beryllium rods (Meyerhof, p.c.). Because volatile radionuclides like iodine
or cesium will evaporate at high altitude, they are not considered important
in satellite accidents.
2.2.2 High elevation: "Early warning"
In the case of heavy contamination early warning is essential. Gamma radi-
ation, which in nearly all cases will be associated with radioactive material
emitted in an accident, can be easily measured. Many instrument systems
can measure dose rates caused by gamma radiation from environmental levels
(and therefore well below any critical dose rate) up to extreme high levels.
The higher the level the faster and easier it can be measured. Therefore, from
the side of instrumentation all requirements for fast early warning can be met.
Another question is the density of measuring station networks, which ob-
viously depends not solely on geographical parameters of a given country but
also on political and financial considerations. This is easily demonstrated
by the fact that Austria regarded 336 stations on 83,855 km2 as necessary
(Schonhofer et al., 1986), while in Sweden 25 were in operation on an area of
449,964 km2 at the time of the Chernobyl accident.
The combination of dose-rate measurements with meteorological parame-
ters, linkages of these data via computers to produce isolines of contamination,
and forecasts of the contamination situation are regarded by most experts not
only as easily achievable by appropriate systems, but also as absolutely neces-
sary. Experience and know-how are available from systems for remote surveil-
lance of nuclear power stations (Eder and Starke, 1987). Data transmissions
from remote sensors and linking of different parameters to give a forecast are
well-known techniques for on-line monitoring of, e.g., chemical plants (Slater,
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1987). Besides early warning this equipment can be used to follow decay of
dose rates after an accident and to achieve estimations of the doses received
by the population from external radiation.
2.2.3 Lower levels
In most countries monitoring systems exist that are capable of detecting low,
and even extremely low, concentrations of artificial radionuclides. Regulations
limit emissions from nuclear installations that have to be controlled. Possi-
ble emissions from a nuclear power station that is close to a border must
be controlled as well. Applications of radionuclides in nuclear medicine and
technology are other sources of environmental contamination.
Environmental gamma-ray dose rates may vary considerably depending
mostly on geologic parameters like uranium content in soil or rock as well
as on the contribution of cosmic rays, which varies with sea level (Tschirf et
al., 1975). Even aerosol activity measured by gross-beta-counting may vary
as much as a factor of 10 depending on meterological parameters (Kronraff,
p.c.). Dose rates and gross-activity-counting are therefore not capable of de-
tecting small elevations reliably. Moreover, even in the case of high elevations
information based solely on a rise in environmental radioactivity irrespective
of its nature is not sufficient. To determine the amount of different radionu-
clides much more sophisticated instruments must be used, which need skilled
and well-trained personnel. Measurement and sampling infrastructures must
be provided even in "normal times"; they cannot be established ad hoc in
an emergency situation. So countries having regular programs for monitoring
radioactivity were prepared for the Chernobyl accident at least with regard to
instrumentation, and there was no lack of measuring equipment.
2.2.4 Instrumentation
The results from measurement methods and instruments can be roughly clas-
sified into two categories: one group gives unspecific information ("there is
some radiation"); the other provides the type and amount of radionuclides
present.
One of the unspecific methods still employed is the above-mentioned mea-
surement of gamma-ray dose rates for the purpose of early warning and deter-
mination of external radiation dose rates. Measurement of gross- beta-activity
of aerosols is still used in some countries for early warning, but it has been
replaced in most cases by nuclide-specific analysis.
Measurement methods and equipment have gone toward highly specific
determination of radionuclides. Measurement of some unspecific radiation
quantities is not enough. To calculate the dose received by the population,
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the concentration of single radionuclides has to be determined anyway, there-
fore gross-activity measurements have been replaced in most countries gener-
ally by nuclide-specific ones. Development of germanium detectors and mod-
ern multi-channel analyzers has made fast measurements by high-resolution
gamma spectrometry possible because sample preparation is virtually unneces-
sary and data evaluation can be done automatically using personal computers.
Nevertheless, determining most beta- and alpha-emitting radionuclides is still
a laborious task because they must be purified chemically before measurement
is possible. In the course of the last 30 years little has changed in this respect,
except with the introduction of new generations ofliquid scintillation counters
that allow better control ofresults and compute rough, but very fast, estimates
of beta-activity in certain important media like milk and water (Schonhofer
and Weisz, 1987). This time discr~pancy,which is necessary to obtain results,
has led in many cases to a somewhat distorted view of planning for emergen-
cies, overemphasizing the importance of gamma-measurements and neglecting
the need for determining such important radiotoxic nuclides like Sr-89, Sr-90,
or Pu-239.
2.2.5 Media to be measured
No general "recipe" can be given of which media should be measured. Range
of distribution and amount of the different radionuclides emitted will depend
mostly on the type of accident and on meteorological conditions. If and to
what extend foodstuff will be contaminated depends also on the time of the
year.
Special cases like accidents at reprocessing plants or the crash of a satellite
will not be considered here, but interest will be focused on events that result in
widespread contamination as in the case of a severe reactor accident, especially
of the Chernobyl type, or explosion of a nuclear warhead.
In principle the possibility of warning exists, and models have been devel-
oped to calculate the distribution of aerosol activity and deposition (ApSimon
et al., 1985; van Egmond and Kesseboom, 1983; Gudiksen, 1986). The calcula-
tions that were performed after the Chernobyl accident differed considerably
in many respects from the actual contamination pattern. However, shortly
after the accident many source terms could not be identified precisely and
even after more information became available meteorological forecasts were
contradictory. In the case of a nuclear war no warning can be expected and
international meteorological networks are likely to break down. So each coun-
try must rely on its own measurements.
Provided efficient monitoring systems exist, contamination will be iden-
tified first in aerosols and deposition either directly or via the elevation of
gamma dose rates. Activity of aerosols must be measured to calculate the
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inhalation dose. Determination of gaseous 1-131 should complete the aerosol
measurements. Radioactive noble gases like Xe-133 and Kr-85 are difficult
to measure because they need special isolation and enrichment techniques;
moreover Kr-85 is a beta-emitter. The few measurements that have been per-
formed, for instance, in the Federal Republic of Germany (Weiss et al., 1986)
after the Chernobyl accident have shown that the contribution of these gases
to the overall dose was negligible.
Activity of deposition is important in several respects. First of all depo-
sition on the ground is responsible for the external dose received by the pop-
ulation; this can be calculated from gamma-radiation dose rates. However,
nearly all contamination of food results from deposition. If vegetables or cere-
als are in the fields or fruits are on the trees, then they will be contaminated
directly. Quick transfer from leaves to growing fruits occurs. Grass, which is
contaminated by direct fallout, will via the food chain cause contamination
of milk, milk products, and meat. Therefore, the contamination situation of
food will depend strongly on the time of the year. Radionuclides deposited on
soil will cause some contamination of food via root uptake, but this will, with
the exception of the forest ecosystem, have much less of an effect than direct
contamination.
In karst regions precipitation may be transferred very fast to drinking wa-
ter, therefore monitoring of drinking water in these regions should be under-
taken. Samples taken after the Chernobyl accident showed that drinking water
processed from surface water reservoirs was only slightly affected. The rea-
son for this is twofold: first, the contaminated precipitation is diluted within
days to unmeasurable concentrations even in the surface layer; second, most
radionuclides are removed in the course of processing the water (Heintschel,
1986). Since in precipitation the radionuclides are present in a concentrated
form, cistern water will be the highest contaminated consumption medium.
Consequent monitoring of single cisterns, which generally serve a small num-
ber of people, is not expected to be possible, so a general recommendation not
to use cistern water may be the only solution to this problem.
A serious problem may be the transfer of radionuclides from surface water
to fish via the food chain. The accumulation is slow, but depending on the
type of lake the contamination of certain fish species can reach extreme levels
and may persist for many years. The accumulation processes are not yet fully
understood and are a matter of extensive research (Hakanson et al., 1988).
It should be mentioned that computer codes have been developed [for
instance, ECOSYS (Paretzke and Jacob, 1987)] that attempt to estimate food
contamination depending on the time of year. Aerosol activity and dry and wet
deposition are needed as input parameters. Owing to the fact that transfer
factors may vary by several orders of magnitude under different conditions,
only very rough predictions can be expected.
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It is evident that in the very first stage of widespread contamination en-
vironmental samples are to be measured predominantly. It has to be kept
in mind, however, that for several important radionuclides (like Sr-89, Sr-
90, and Pu-239) results can only be achieved after time-consuming chemical
separations have been performed. Especially in the case of fresh fallout, sev-
eral radionuclides may disturb precise analysis of Sr-89 and Sr-90 (Hellmuth,
1987).
Since 1-131 and 1-132 (from Te-132) are transferred very quickly from pas-
ture to milk (approximately after two days a maximum is reached) control of
milk has to start very soon after contamination occurs. Owing to the short
half-life of 1-131 (8.1 days), the contribution of 1-131 to the dose can be ne-
glected after about one month. Rigorous control of milk in the first few weeks
of contamination can provide an effective, yet not-too-expensive, countermea-
sure to reduce doses delivered to the population and especially to the risk
group of children (Schonhofer et at., 1986). In most countries milk for direct
consumption amounts only to a small part of all milk produced. Less con-
taminated milk can be used for drinking while higher contaminated milk for
making cheese where not only 1-131 will decay during ripening but also Cs-134
and Cs-137 will be depleted (Lagoni et at., 1963). Radiocesium and radiostron-
tium show a maximum in milk after about two weeks; therefore measurement
of these radionuclides is not so urgent.
Transfer of 1-131 and radiocesium from fodder to meat is much slower.
Therefore monitoring of meat need not start right away. 1-131 has a short
half-life and therefore is of little importance. Sr-90 is transferred to meat only
to a negligible extent.
If direct contamination of grass occurs then surveillance of grass and hay
will be necessary to have a forecast on possible contamination of milk and
meat also for wintertime and to start countermeasures in cases where it seems
to be necessary. Care should be taken in calculating contamination because
the direct Chernobyl fallout showed transfer lower by a factor of three to four
compared with experiments with soluble cesium salts or grass contaminated
by root uptake.
Sampling of precipitation and aerosols will normally be carried out by
stationary equipment installed at positions that depend on geographical cri-
teria. For gamma-radiation dose-rate meters the same criteria will apply,
but portable equipment both for aerosol sampling and for dose-rate measure-
ments exists and might be valuable for completion. Very big Nal(TI) detec-
tors have been successfully employed for surveillance from air (Andersson and
Nyholm, 1986).
Since in "normal times" contamination of environmental media and food
are mostly below any detectable concentration, no separate sampling organi-
zation is justified, but existing ones must take over this function. European
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countries assign authorities to control and monitor the quality of drinking wa-
ter, agricultural products, and so on. Procedures to coordinate sampling and
transportation of environmental media should be developed before an accident
occurs. Also training or at least written guidelines regarding sampling tech-
niques should be provided to acquire representative and comparable samples.
The above-mentioned media must be measured from the standpoint of
radiation protection. No doubt there are many reasons to measure certain
media, Le., political, economical, and psychological reasons, for export and
import foodstuff has to be checked. From experience it can be said that if
public opinion is interested in the contamination of parsley or black currants
or strawberries or sand in playgrounds, then it will have to be measured. If
exporters or importers need a certificate stating that an item, such as Russian
vodka, caviar, salicylic acid, plastics granulate, food produced long before the
Chernobyl accident, beef from Argentine, lamb from New Zealand, is free ofra-
diocesium, then it must be measured even though it may have been impossible
for that item to be contaminated.
2.2.6 Long-term concern
Certain foods and media must be measured and studied over a long period.
In forest ecosystems Cs-137 can circulate very effectively (Schell et al., 1988),
and contamination of wild berries, mushrooms, and venison will even rise
in the years following a severe contamination (Bengtsson, 1986; Schonhofer
and Tataruch, 1988). Reindeer in parts of northern Scandinavia (Bengtsson,
1986) and sheep in Cumbria, England (Howard, 1987), are other examples
of animals that have experienced long-term contamination. In addition long-
term contamination has also been measured in fish (Hakanson et al., 1988;
Schonhofer et al., 1986).
2.3 Assessment
Achieving an overview in the situation of widespread contamination is a com-
plicated task. Much experience has been gained by studying bomb fallout,
but the fallout deposition from bombs occurs slowly and rather evenly. The
Chernobyl accident was therefore surprising because of both the quick and
the extremely nonuniform distribution. So reaction within a short time was
necessary, but a very large number of measurement data were needed to judge
the situation. Monitoring networks with enough equipment and personnel for
measuring are a presupposition, but the data acquired have to be collected,
checked for their plausibility, and combined to form a rough overview. On
this basis feedback has to influence monitoring in order to refine knowledge of
the situation. Then decisions on countermeasures can be made. The effect of
I
I
I
I:
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countermeasures must be checked. In addition countermeasures often create
new problems. For instance, forbidding the feeding of contaminated whey to
pigs is an efficient way to lower the radiocesium concentration in pork, but this
creates the problem of how to dispose of the whey; prohibiting the spread of
contaminated sewage sludge on fields might prevent additional contamination
of soil, but for the most part no storage facilities exist for this sludge.
It is therefore to be assumed that it would be favorable to establish before
an accident a group comprising governmental authorities responsible for the
health, environment, internal affairs, military, trade, economics, finances, and
agriculture of the country and experts from various sciences like radiation
protection and meteorology. During an emergency this group should meet
regularly to make decisions. Another important step would be to establish a
small group of experts to collect all available data and combine them to form
a situation report. This group should keep in contact with the mass media to
distribute the latest news on the contamination situation. Both groups should
be as flexible as possible because no contamination situation can be predicted,
no generally accepted response to it can be evaluated or learned.
2.4 Communications
In the previous sections many technical aspects of monitoring and assessing
radioactive contamination have been discussed. Also some aspects of organi-
zation have been mentioned. Communication paths may be considered equally
important, as was demonstrated in the case of the Chernobyl accident.
According to my knowledge there was almost no official communication
at the international level - at least not in the first few days. No warnings
or information was given during the first days by the Soviet authorities to
any other country or international organization. (It still is an open question
whether this would have helped much in handling the impact, because exact
prediction of contamination is obviously not possible.) Most information seems
to have been spread by mass media (which were seldom reliable) and especially
by private communications between scientists involved in measurements and
assessment, who passed the information to their authorities.
Communication at the national level seems to have been a problem as well.
The administrative machinery in most countries is based on strict hierarchy
through which it is not possible to transfer information quickly. Too many
authorities were involved with their own hierarchies. In the course of the first
days, channels had to be established to pass information quickly to compe-
tent persons. The human factor was also evident: some scientists seeking
publicity presented only the highest values, which exaggerated the situation;
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scientists even carried results in a briefcase to ensure that they could present
the measurements first to the authorities.
The combination of incomplete information, single measurement results,
and telephones continuously blocked by scared people seeking personal infor-
mation caused in some countries a communication chaos. As a result regular
work and the transfer of information were hindered severely in the first days.
It was very difficult to interpret the flood of single results because they were so
widespread both geographically and with regard to the media. It took at least
a week until slowly, a clear picture of the contamination situation in Europe
developed from different information.
It is concluded that for handling the impact of large accidents better com-
munication pathways must be installed, irrespective of their costs.
2.5 Monitoring Networks and Assessment in
Five European Countries
Almost all European countries have more or less elaborate monitoring net-
works. Long after the Chernobyl accident several countries installed or ex-
tended automatic networks obviously owing to political and public pressures.
It is to be hoped that monitoring on a discontinuous and nuclide-specific basis,
which is necessary for assessing the contamination of the environment, food,
and the public, will not be neglected in favor of costly automatic networks
(which in the case of a severe accident may provide a quick warning, but no
information on isotopic composition, chemical form, and contamination of the
food chain).
The monitoring networks of some European countries as they were in ex-
istence in 1986 are described below, and the results of their assessment of
the Chernobyl accident are also reported. Only qualitative results are given,
because it is the aim of this chapter to give a quick overview. Finland and
Sweden were chosen as examples of how the contamination was first detected
in Scandinavia. Other countries were chosen because they could provide good
documentation of the contamination situation. They reflect different contam-
ination levels as well as different geographic and seasonal situations. Only
official reports are presented in the descriptions. The vast amount of reports
and scientific papers on limited aspects of the contamination path or local
problems could of course not be considered here. All official reports are well
in accordance with the actual contamination situation and therefore reliable.
Data sources are provided for further information.
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2.5.1 Finland
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The description is based on studies done by the Finnish Centre for Radiation
and Nuclear Safety (STUK, 1986a and 1986b).
Monitoring Networks
In Finland a radiation-monitoring network consisting of approximately 270
measurement stations is run by the Ministry of the Interior and the Finnish
Defense Forces. They are equipped with simple Geiger counters and measure
every second day. An aerosol measurement network consisting of 10 stations
is run by the Finnish Meteorological Institute. It is not nuclide specific but
acts as a warning system.
For environmental samples and foodstuff the Finnish Centre for Radia-
tion and Nuclear Safety (STUK) also routinely runs a monitoring program.
Aerosols are collected with high-volume samplers in Konala (Helsinki) and
north of Helsinki as well as in the vicinity of the nuclear power plants of
Loviisa and Olkiluoto. Precipitation is collected with high-surface samplers
normally at four stations in the south and west of the country, but there are
small samplers at an additional 24 stations. Samples from five major rivers
are analyzed four times a year; the tritium content of some lakes is also mea-
sured. From the surrounding sea nine samples are taken usually once a year.
In addition, bottom sediments and fish samples along the coast are collected.
Concerning foodstuff, emphasis is on measuring the radioactivity of milk: milk
and dry milk is controlled from several parts of the country and more inten-
sively near Loviisa and Olkiluoto. Samples of wheat and rye as well as beef
and pork are gathered from the main production areas; vegetables and fruits
are sampled as well.
Whole body counting is performed on control groups from Helsinki, Lovi-
isa, and Olkiluoto yearly. Lapps who are a risk group for radiocesium incor-
poration are monitored in cooperation with the University of Helsinki.
Assessment
During the evening of 27 April 1986 at the measuring station of Kajaani (ap-
proximately in the middle of Finland) dose rates between 70 and 100 JLR/h
were measured after a heavy rain shower. These rates were interpreted as
a "radon peak," which had occurred several times in previous years. (The
aerosol system was not operating owing to a state employees' strike.) On
Monday, 28 April, news came from Sweden that at Forsmark fission prod-
ucts had been detected and that radiation levels were rising. This caused
intensification of measurements. On Tuesday, 29 April, radiation levels rose
considerably, especially in the western part of the country. On 30 April the
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highest level of 400 JLRjh was measured in Uusikaupunki and afterward the
levels decreased.
On the morning of 30 April the state employees concerned with monitoring
and meteorology returned to work. Calculations on the origin of contamination
and extensive monitoring could start. From the dose-rate network and from
air monitoring a rather quick, semi-quantitative overview was established on
the approximate geographic distribution of contamination.
The frequency of sampling air and precipitation was increased, and the
number of samples especially of foodstuff was also increased. A network of
53 local laboratories based at communal food and milk inspection laborato-
ries started measurement of milk, drinking water, and vegetables with simple
equipment, thus freeing the STUK from routine work for more elaborate and
complicated measuring programs.
Since the growing season for grass and most vegetables had not yet started
direct contamination did not occur and the concentration ofI-131 and Cs-137
was very low in milk: typical values in high fallout areas were approximately
30 Bqjl for 1-131, less than 3 Bqjl for Cs-137, and less than 0.05 Bqjl for Sr-90.
(This is in sharp contrast to Central Europe, where direct contamination was
the reason of very high levels in foodstuff.) Since the measured values were well
below the action limits of the Finnish authorities no restrictions were posed
on the sale of foodstuff, but instead general recommendations were issued to
minimize the radiation effects.
Most of the measurement programs resumed their usual activities after
some time. As it could be foreseen from experience with nuclear bomb fallout,
the levels in certain mushrooms, wild berries, and especially in certain fish
(e.g., perch and pike) rose considerably in 1987 and 1988 (Rantavaara, 1987;
Saxen and Rantavaara, 1987), so more intensive monitoring was necessary of
these items. Even in the case of this higher contaminated foodstuffs authorities
regarded recommendations to limit consumption as sufficient countermeasures.
Since northern Finland (Finnish Lapland) received little contamination no
problems arose with contamination of reindeer.
2.5.2 Sweden
The description is based on reports from the Swedish National Institute of Ra-
diation Protection (SSI, 1986a and 1986b) and the Statens Haverikommission
(1986).
Monitoring Networks
Since the end of the 1950s, 25 stations equipped with ionization chambers
2.5 meters above ground have been in operation by the Swedish National
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Institute of Radiation Protection (SSI). They register continuously the gamma
radiation from both ground and cosmic rays. Only three stations transmit data
automatically via telephone to a computer at SSI.
The Swedish National Defense Research Institute (FaA), which from 1978
until 1983 was connected to the SSI, runs a system of high-volume aerosol
samplers that normally detects very small amounts of radionuclides by high-
resolution gamma spectrometry. The FaA also has access to army airplanes
and helicopters to take air samples at different heights, to record measurements
from the air, and to transport equipment and personnel to remote areas quickly
to perform in situ measurements with portable germanium detectors.
At the SSI routine measurements of milk were run before the Chernobyl
accident. Routine programs concerning environmental surveillance of nuclear
power plants currently exist.
Assessment
On 28 April 1986 at the nuclear power plant at Forsmark north of Stockholm
increasing levels of contamination were detected. First it was assumed that
they originated from the power plant. Reports from Studsvik (south of Stock-
holm) about enhanced radiation levels created some doubts. Aerosol analyses
showed artificial radionuclides with ratios typical for a release from a reactor.
Trajectories calculated by the Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Insti-
tute showed that the air masses came from the direction of Latvia, Byelorussia,
and the Ukraine. Sampling of aerosols was performed in short periods, sam-
ples in higher altitude were collected by airplane, and in-cloud measurements
from a helicopter were done with a portable germanium spectrometer.
Very soon the SSI emergency organization was enlarged with experts from
other fields, and external organizations contributed with measurements from
research institutes, the nuclear power stations, universities, and the Swedish
Geological Co. (SGAB).
SGAB started very soon to scan the country from the air, thus providing
maps of geographic distribution of dose rates and deposition of Cs-137. It be-
came evident that there was an extremely nonuniform contamination situation
in the country: the most northern parts were not affected at all and the south
had very little evidence of contamination. Locations in the north of Sundsvall,
a belt toward Norway, and the surroundings of Gavle north of Stockholm were
highly contaminated with local levels up to 200 kBq Cs-137/m2.
A program was set up to monitor milk, and owing to grazing restrictions
the 1-131 concentration in milk was, except in single cases, well below 100
Bq/l. Also the Cs-137 concentration was typically around 50 Bq/l even in
highly contaminated areas. (As in the case of Finland, the growing season
had not yet started in the highly contaminated areas.)
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A limit of 300 Bq Cs-137/kg was applied to all foodstuff. In general there
arose no difficulties from this low value, because with few exceptions all food-
stuff was well below this limit. Nevertheless, some foodstuff was extremely
contaminated: certain freshwater fish in contaminated areas, moose (which is
a major part of the diet for some groups of the population), and especially
reindeer. Only 20% of all reindeer slaughtered in 1986 after Chernobyl had a
Cs-137 concentration below 300 Bq/kg. It can be easily imagined that the ac-
cident made a big impact on the life of the Lapps who live mainly on reindeer
breeding.
2.5.3 Hungary
The description is based on reports from the Hungarian Atomic Energy Com-
mission (1986).
Monitoring Networks
As in many other countries the intensive testing of nuclear bombs in the at-
mosphere during the late 1950s and early 1960s was the reason for installing
environmental monitoring networks. Radioactivity of aerosols is measured by
the National Meteorological Service, surface and drinking water by the Na-
tional Water Authority, and foodstuff and soil by stations of the Ministry of
Agriculture and Food and the Ministry of Domestic Trade. Environmental ra-
diation is also measured by the public health network of the Ministry of Health.
The network was improved with regard to the surveillance of the nuclear power
station at Paks. Also research centers and universities are equipped with the
necessary instruments for environmental surveillance. All monitoring is coor-
dinated by the Hungarian Civil Drfense Organization.
Assessment
First traces of radioactive isotopes were detected in aerosol samples taken in
the morning of 29 April. Ten continuously operating aerosol samplers (based
on gross-beta-measurements) were read once or twice a day. From 30 April
until 2 May northern and western Hungary showed the highest aerosol activi-
ties (from 15 to 84 Bq/m3 ). A second peak was observed from 3 to 4 May in
the western and southern parts (max. 44 Bq/m3 ) and a third one from 7 to 10
May in the east and south (max. 30 Bq/m3 ). After 30 May the concentration
fell below 1 Bq/m3 . Nuclide-specific gamma spectrometric measurements were
reported from Budapest and Paks. There also the ratios of aerosol-bound and
vapor iodine were determined: the ratios varied, but the vapor iodine was in
both cases higher than the aerosol-bound. The highest concentration for both
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was measured in Budapest on 2 May, namely, 14 Bq/m3 • The ground con-
tamination was monitored in a nationwide survey from 1 to 19 May. As in all
other countries it was found that the deposition pattern was nonuniform, but
overall rather low compared with the Scandinavian countries or Austria. The
highest contamination was measured in Budapest and in the western part of
the country. The contamination values at the border to Austria reported by
the Hungarian authorities correspond very well with the Austrian (for Austria
low) contamination measurement. Since about 25% of Hungarian drinking
water is taken from the Danube, this river was monitored also, showing a
gross-beta-activity concentration of approximately 30 Bq/l at the entrance
into Hungary.
Foodstuff was monitored as well. The highest average activity concentra-
tion ofI-131 in milk in the higher contaminated areas was measured on 2 May
with approximately 1.2 kBq/l. To reduce contamination of milk, grazing of
cows was prohibited. People were advised to consume only milk from large
dairies (where surveillance was easy to achieve), and to wash large-leafed veg-
etables carefully before consumption. Surface water was not used as a drinking
water supply for Budapest. These were actually the only countermeasures in-
troduced.
2.5.4 Switzerland
The description is based on material from Bundesamt fiir Gesundheitswesen
(1986) and Bundesamt fiir Energiewirtschaft (1986).
Monitoring Networks
Three warning systems exist. One consists of six early warning stations (FWP)
positioned near the border, which measure continuously the aerosol activity.
If a preset level is exceeded an alarm is automatically sounded locally. Seven
more stations without automatic alarms are distributed over the country. The
second system is NADAM (network for automatic dose alarm and measure-
ment). Twelve NADAM stations were operating at the time of the Chernobyl
accident; the operation of all 55 stations was scheduled for the end of 1986.
Also in this case an automatic alarm is given if a preset dose rate is exceeded.
In the case of high contamination, 111 atomic warning stations (AWP) oper-
ated mainly by the police can be activated, but the dose-rate meters used by
AWP can only measure dose rates higher than 1 mR/h.
Besides these stationary alarms three cars at different organizations con-
tain the necessary measurement equipment. Additional cars can be equipped
to do surveillance. For measurement of foodstuff, drinking water, or fodder
specialized laboratories exist, which also in "normal times" record measure-
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ments and regularly take samples in the region to measure and to communicate
the results to the National Alarm Center (NAZ). The army provides, in the
case of an alarm situation, personnel, an army laboratory, and a surveillance
helicopter.
Assessment
After first reports of contamination in Scandinavia on 28 April, the meteoro-
logical forecasts did not expect contamination of Switzerland for several days.
The early warning stations were alarmed. In spite of the weather forecasts from
the early morning of 30 April onward rising contamination levels were found at
the warning stations. Monitoring networks were organized and after the first
results were intensified to get a quick survey on the geographic distribution,
which was possible though only 12 dose-rate meters were in operation in the
western part of the country by using mobile equipment and helicopter scan-
ning. (An excellent description of the organization is given in Bundesamt fur
Gesundheitswesen, 1986.) Owing to different meteorological conditions, the
distribution was very uneven; those areas where showers had occurred were
more contaminated. Radioactivity of aerosols showed a maximum on 1 May, a
second rise was found between 3 and 7 May. On the whole the aerosol activities
were approximately the same over Switzerland, but deposition was different
depending on precipitation. It ranged from 8 to 85 nCi Cs-137/m2 (296 to
3,145 Bq/m2 ) with a maximum measured in Locarno (Tessin) of 270 nCi/m2
(10,000 Bq/m2 ). The published data on contamination of the surroundings of
Lake Constance correspond very well to the data from the adjacent areas of
southern Germany and Austria.
As in most other European countries emphasis was given to examining
contamination of foodstuff, and soon it was found that internal doses from
incorporation were higher than doses from external radiation. Milk, one of the
most important foodstuffs, was monitored extensively. The region of Tessin
recorded the highest deposition. The highest values in milk were also found
here (up to 50 nCi 1-131/1 and 20 nCi Cs-137/1). Contamination in milk from
dairies was markedly lower due to blending. As experienced in other countries
milk from sheep had extremely high values for 1-131. Also in vegetables the
uneven contamination of the country was reflected.
On the basis of early measurements it could be calculated that the Swiss
limit of 5 mSv (500 mrem), below which no countermeasures are regarded
necessary, would not be reached. The possible dose reductions achievable by
strict countermeasures were regarded as too small to justify their costs. The
only official countermeasures taken were to use milk from southern Tessin for
making cheese, to transport low-contaminated milk from northern Tessin to
the south for consumption, and to ban fishing in Lake Lugano. Otherwise only
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time-limited recommendations were given regarding consumption of higher-
contaminated foodstuff. Children and pregnant women were advised not to
consume fresh milk and fresh vegetables in order to reduce iodine doses.
2.5.5 Austria
The description is based mainly on a study by Schonhofer et at. (1986).
Monitoring Networks
In 1957 the first station for aerosol surveillance was installed. In 1986 eight
stations were operating. At these sites precipitation is collected on a monthly
basis. In 1986 the rivers Danube, Thaya, and March in northern Austria were
monitored mostly on the basis of monthly grab samples. Originally gross-
activity measurements were used in environmental monitoring, but since 1979
high-volume samplers and nuclide-specific high-resolution gamma spectrom-
etry were introduced as the routine method. In 1986 only a small program
on food surveillance was in operation, and it was undergoing reorganization.
Because no nuclear power station is operating in Austria, this surveillance sys-
tem was mainly to monitor the environmental levels of radiation and to detect
discharges from foreign nuclear power stations and from nuclear medicine. As
well it had the task of preparing for nuclear accidents.
In 1975 construction of another system, the Early Warning System, was
started. It consists of 336 stations across Austria, which measure the gamma
dose rates continuously. Its measuring range is from natural background radi-
ation (approximately 10 /-LR/h) to more than 30 R/h and is divided into eight
warning levels. The actual level is reported on-line to centers in the respective
federal state and also to the federal warning center. It is intended to provide
information for immediate action after explosion of nuclear warheads when
external radiation is of much concern. The stations are therefore in populated
areas, and no information is possible on the situation in the mountains. The
system is not coupled to meteorological systems, which is a drawback. Because
no nuclide-specific data can be provided by this system, only the external doses
to the population can be estimated.
Assessment
On the evening of 28 April information about a nuclear accident at Chernobyl
was spread by Austrian radio and TV. Reliable information was obtained in
the morning of 29 April from the radiation protection institutes of Finland
and Sweden. As in the case of Switzerland the meteorological forecasts de-
nied that air masses from Chernobyl would reach Austria in the following
days. However, because information said that the reactor was burning, and
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therefore contamination was expected later, a first alarm was given. In the
early afternoon a small but significant rise of dose rates was noticed in Vi-
enna and northeast Austria, and fresh fission products were detected in high
concentrations in Vienna and in Seibersdorf south of Vienna. As such the
preparations for measurements became the first measurements. Actually all
known models following the spread of the Chernobyl contamination have failed
to give an explanation of why the first radioactive cloud came on 29 April from
Czechoslovakia to Austria and eastern Bavaria (Weiss et al., 1986). (This fact
supports my view that even the best models and calculations cannot replace
measurements.) Increasing air activities and local showers caused heavy con-
tamination in areas in the south and southwest of Austria in the morning of
April 30. A second cloud on the same day added contamination to the north
and northwest of Austria.
The highest air contamination was measured on 30 April in Vienna, namely,
1.5 nCi/m3 for aerosol-bound 1-131 (55 Bq/m3 ) and approximately 250
pCi/m3 (9.3 Bq/m3 ) for Cs-137. The highest deposition occurred on 1 May
during heavy showers in Upper Austria. The map of precipitation shows fairly
good agreement with data from the early warning system.
From data on aerosols it is evident that different parts of the country had
been contaminated by different air masses at various times. Data from the
early warning system showed extreme nonuniform contamination. No data
on the mountains were available; even today the situation there is largely
unknown, but it has been confirmed in several cases that contamination is
increasing with sea level.
Dose rates exceeding natural background radiation varied in Austria from
10 to 260 pR/h on 1 May. The highest depositions measured in Upper Austria
were in the range of more than 100 kBq/m2 • There is little doubt that de-
position was higher in some mountain regions. It is very difficult to compare
the contamination situation for different countries, but it seems that Austria
was perhaps the most affected country in Western Europe. Obviously deposi-
tion was higher in some parts of Sweden, which causes more severe long-term
problems, but the effect of contamination on the population depends on many
parameters, of which initial deposition is only one.
The development of plants plays a very important role. The whole territory
of Austria was more or less contaminated and for a rough comparison it can be
mentioned that the lowest contaminated areas in Austria corresponded to the
highest contaminated ones in the respective neighboring countries. In Austria
the growing season had just started. The main production areas for milk, milk
products, and meat were the ones most contaminated. Direct fallout on leafy
vegetables like lettuce and spinach, on blossoms of many fruit trees, on newly
emerged leaves, and on grass caused severe contamination of all foodstuff on
a short-term scale. Direct fallout on the year's first harvest of hay also caused
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contamination on a long-term scale for milk, milk products, and meat until at
least spring 1987.
Countermeasures by the authorities aimed to reduce the doses received by
the population by first limiting the intake ofI-13l via milk and milk products
as well as by fresh vegetables. After this iodine phase, which lasted about one
month until the 1-131 had decayed, contamination by radiocesium became a
real problem because a part of the food production exceeded the limits set by
the authorities. Extensive monitoring of foodstuff in both the iodine and the
cesium phase was necessary to establish a survey on both type of foodstuff
and regional distribution. An appreciable amount of measuring had to be
done because of public interest. Not all institutions that had the necessary
equipment to perform measurements were able to handle the enormous amount
of samples - not to mention the limited working capacity of personnel. Most
stations had to introduce shift work, but even a 24-hour operation was not
enough to measure all samples.
Samples were collected by local officials and transported mostly by the
army to the laboratories. All governmental laboratories and the research in-
stitute in Seibersdorf were located in the eastern part of the country, and it
took some time to establish a laboratory in Tyrol for local measurements of
the western federal states. By end of 1986 an enormous amount of approx-
imately 80,000 samples had been measured, and it is clear that not all were
measured for radiation protection reasons.
Owing to the use of contaminated hay during the winter of 1986-1987
there was a pronounced rise of the radiocesium concentration in milk, milk
products, and meat, which again made extensive assessment necessary. Since
spring 1987, on the whole, all levels have decreased considerably. Foodstuff
still of concern are mushrooms, which show radiocesium values close to or
above the very strict limit of 3 nCi/kg (111 Bq/kg) with some species like
Xerocomus badius showing extremely high values, and game in certain parts
of the country.
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The discovery of a new type of radiation by W.C. Rontgen in 1895, called
X rays, was very soon followed by the publication of numerous papers de-
scribing the potential and actual applications of the new technique. Almost
simultaneously with these early uses, the first observations on the harmful
effects of radiation in the human body were also made. Alopecia, the loss of
hair following X-ray photography, was reported in 1896, about four months
after Rontgen's discovery. Other skin lesions were eloquently described by sev-
eral authors about the same time. The earliest case of radiation-induced skin
cancer was recorded in 1902 in a radiologist who had made X-ray diagnosis
during the preceding years. As early as 1911, four cases of leukemia among
radiologists were also reported and it was stated that long continued exposure
to X rays might cause this disease. In the meantime, acute effects of radiation
on internal organs including blood-forming tissues and the intestinal tract had
also been observed.
The discovery of radioactivity by H. Becquerel one year later was also
quickly followed by the use of radium in medicine, in research, and subse-
quently in the manufacture of luminous paints. The first casualty from over-
exposure to radium was Becquerel himself. Erythema and ulceration of the
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skin developed in the area under the vest pocket in which he carried a small
radium preparation enclosed in a glass tube.
As a consequence of these observations and the growing clinical and indus-
trial usage of radiation sources, the biological effects of radiation were widely
studied in subsequent years.
3.1 Biological Effects of Radiation
The interaction of ionizing radiation with the human body, arising either from
external sources outside the body or from internal contamination of the body
by radioactive substances, leads to biological effects that may later show up as
clinical symptoms. The nature and severity of these symptoms and the time
at which they appear depend on the amount of radiation energy absorbed in
the body and the rate at which it is received.
The effects of radiation on the human body are the result of damage to the
individual cells. These effects may be conveniently divided into two classes,
namely, somatic and hereditary. The somatic effects arise from damage of
the ordinary cells of the body and affect only the irradiated person. The
hereditary effects are due to damage to the germ cells in the reproductive
organs - the gonads. The important difference is that, in the latter case, the
damage manifests itself in the offspring of the irradiated person: children,
grandchildren, and subsequent generations (Martin and Harbison, 1979).
3.1.1 Somatic effects of radiation
Early effects. Early radiation effects are those which occur in the period from
a few hours up to a few weeks after receiving a large dose over a few hours
or less. The effects are the results of major depletion of cell population in a
number of body organs owing to cell killing and the prevention or delay of cell
division.
The main effects are attributable to bone marrow, gastrointestinal, or neu-
rovascular damage depending on the dose received. Very high doses, of the
order of 100 grays (Gy), damage the central nervous system so badly that
death may occur within hours or days. At doses of 10 to 50 Gy to the whole
body, the victim may escape this fate only to die from gastrointestinal damage
between one and two weeks later. Lower doses may avoid gastrointestinal in-
jury - or permit recovery from it - but still cause death mainly from damage to
the red bone marrow - the tissue that forms blood. The red bone marrow and
the rest of the blood-forming system are among the most sensitive organs and
are affected by as little as 0.5 to 1 Gy. Fortunately, they also have a remark-
able capacity for regeneration and, if the dose is not so great as to overwhelm
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them, can completely recover. If only part of the body is irradiated, enough
bone marrow will normally survive unimpaired to replace what is damaged.
Reproductive organs and eyes are also particularly sensitive.
Absorbed whole body doses above about 1 Gy give rise to acute radia-
tion sickness manifesting itself in nausea and vomiting a few hours after the
exposure. Absorbed doses above 2 Gy can lead to death within one or two
months after exposure. There is no well-defined dose above which death is
certain, but the chances of surviving a dose of about 8 Gy would be very low.
Similarly, there is no well-defined threshold dose below which there is no risk
of death, though below about 1.5 Gy the risk of early death would be very
low. A reasonable estimate of the dose that would be lethal for 50% of the
exposed subjects within 60 days after exposure, called LDso/ 6o, is thought to
be about 3 Gy for a man. Such high doses could only be received in the event
of a major radiation accident (UNEP, 1985).
Late effects. It became apparent in the early part of the twentieth century that
certain individuals, such as radiologists and their patients, who were exposed
to relatively high levels of radiation, showed a higher incidence of certain
types of cancer than those not exposed to ionizing radiation. Later, detailed
studies on populations exposed to radiation from atomic bombs, on patients
subjected to radiation therapy, and on workers exposed to radiation on the
job (particularly uranium miners) have confirmed the ability of radiation to
induce cancer.
The estimation of the increased risk of cancer is complicated by the fact
that radiation-induced cancers are not normally distinguishable from those
which arise spontaneously. In addition, there is a long and variable latent
period, from about 5 to 30 years or more, between exposure to radiation and
the appearance of cancer. However, at the relatively high levels of exposure
approximate estimates can be made by extrapolation from the risk at high dose
levels to much lower levels on the assumption of a linear relationship between
dose and risk. This assumption of a linear relationship forms the basis for the
system of dose limitation recommended by the International Commission on
Radiological Protection (ICRP, 1977; IAEA, 1982).
One implication of the assumption of a linear relationship between dose
equivalent and cancer risk is that the same number of radiation-induced can-
cers would result from the same collective dose spread over a different size of
population. A dose of 1 millisievert (mSv) to 1 million people represents a
collective dose of 1,000 man-Sv. A collective dose of 1,000 man-Sv would also
be expected if a dose of 0.1 mSv is received by each member of a population
of 10 million people. On this convenient basis, it is possible to arrive at rough
estimates of the risks for different types of cancer (Martin and Harbison, 1979).
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Leukemia seems to be the first cancer to emerge in a population after
irradiation. The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation (UNSCEAR) estimates that two people out of every thousand will
die of leukemia for every Gy they receive.
Breast and thyroid cancers seem to be the most common tumors caused by
radiation. About 10 people in every 1,000 will contract thyroid cancer, and 10
women in every 1,000 will contract breast cancer per Gy. But both cancers can
commonly be cured, and radiation-induced thyroid cancers have particularly
low mortality rates. So only about 5 women in every 1,000 are likely to die of
breast cancer per Gy, and only 1 person in every 2,000 thousand is expected
to die of thyroid cancer.
Lung cancer, in contrast, is fatal. It is also a common cancer in irradiated
populations, and 2 persons out of every 1,000 may die from lung cancer for
every Gy in a group of people representing all ages. Other cancers seem to be
less readily induced by radiation.
Children are more vulnerable than adults, and babies in the uterus may
be more vulnerable still (UNEP, 1985).
Prenatal radiation effects. Prenatal mortality as well as malformation (i.e.,
developmental abnormality) and growth disturbances may also result from
exposure to ionizing radiation in the uterus. UNSCEAR (1988) has estimated
that a dose to the conceptus of 0.01 Gy delivered over the whole pregnancy
would add a probability of adverse health effects in the live-born of less than
0.002. The normal risk of a nonirradiated live-born having the same conditions
is about 0.06 (6%).
Mental retardation is the most likely type of developmental abnormality
to appear in the human species. The probability of radiation-related mental
retardation is essentially zero before the eighth week and after the twenty-
fifth week of fetal development; it is maximum between the eighth and fif-
teenth weeks, and decreases between the sixteenth and the twenty-fifth weeks
(UNSCEAR, 1988).
The dosimetric data suggest a linear relationship between risk of severe
mental retardation and dose received between the eighth and the fifteenth
weeks. The risk is 1 in 2,500 for each mGy, and a threshold of 100 to 250
milligray cannot be excluded below which there is no effect. For the time from
the sixteenth to the twenty-fifth week after conception, the risk is about 1 in
10,000 for each mGy, and the dose effect relationship is consistent with the
likelihood of a threshold at about 700 mGy.
Though the individual risks are high, and the effects of the damage are
particularly distressing, the number of women at that particular stage of preg-
nancy at anyone time is only a small proportion of the population. In ad-
dition, the existence of thresholds would effectively ensure that severe mental
Laszlo Sztanyik 47
retardation would not result from environmental exposures to the public ex-
cept for the direct vicinity of a severe radiation accident (Pochin, 1988).
3.1.2 Hereditary effects of radiation
The hereditary effects of radiation result from damage to the reproductive
cells. This damage takes the form of alterations known as genetic mutations
in the hereditary material of the cell. Spontaneous mutation accounts for the
fact that an appreciable fraction, about 10% of the world's population, suffers
from 1 of the 500 or more defects or diseases attributed to hereditary disorders.
Radiation can induce gene mutations in living organisms, which are indis-
tinguishable from naturally occurring mutations. It is generally assumed that
all mutations are harmful, although this is not necessarily true since the hu-
man species has attained its present advanced state via a series of mutations.
Because ionizing radiation can cause an increase in the mutation rate, its use
may increase the number of genetically abnormal people in future generations
(Martin and Harbison, 1979).
There is extremely little information on the genetic effects of radiation on
humans. In the absence of human data, the risks of hereditary defects have
been estimated on the basis of extensive studies on animals. UNSCEAR esti-
mated the risk of serious hereditary ill health within the first two generations
following the irradiation of either parent to be from 0 to 12 per million mSv.
Over all generations, the risk would be about four times this value. Clearly,
only that exposure which occurs up to the time of conception can affect the
genetic characteristics of the offspring; since the mean age of childbearing is
about 30 years, only a small proportion of the dose received by a typical pop-
ulation will be genetically harmful. The total genetic risk in all generations
averaged over both sexes and over all ages is therefore between 0 and 20 serious
effects per million mSv (UNSCEAR, 1988).
3.1.3 Stochastic and nonstochastic effects
Recently, another classification of radiation effects has been introduced by the
International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) to distinguish
between effects which depend on the probability of occurrence and those which
are related to the severity of the dose. The former categories are stochastic
effects, and the latter nonstochastic effects.
Stochastic effects are those for which the probability of an effect occurring,
rather than its severity, is regarded as a function of dose, without threshold.
The term stochastic can best be understood by considering it to refer to effects
that either occur or do not occur. Thus cancer induction is a stochastic effect.
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The probability of a radiation-induced cancer of a particular type depends on
the dose received. Hereditary effects are also regarded as being stochastic.
Nonstochastic effects are those for which the severity of the effect varies
with the dose, and for which a threshold may therefore exist. Examples of
nonstochastic effects are the early effects of radiation - damage to blood ves-
sels, cataracts, and impairment of fertility. The severity of these effects varies
with the amount of the radiation dose received, but it is not detectable at all
unless a threshold dose is exceeded (IAEA, 1982).
3.2 Radiation Protection Principles
3.2.1 Control of exposure under normal conditions
The aim of radiation protection, as stated by ICRP, should be to prevent
detrimental nonstochastic effects and to limit the probability of stochastic
effects to levels deemed to be acceptable. The aim is achieved by the following:
• Setting dose equivalent limits at levels that are sufficiently low to ensure
that no threshold dose is reached over the course of an individual's lifetime
- prevention of nonstochastic effects.
• Keeping all justifiable exposures as low as reasonably achievable, taking
into account economic and social factors, subject always to the boundary
conditions that the appropriate effective dose equivalent limit shall not be
exceeded - limitation of stochastic effects.
To prevent nonstochastic effects in individual members of the public, a
dose equivalent limit of 50 mSv in a year is recommended for all tissues and
organs.
To limit stochastic effects, the annual dose equivalent limit for uniform
irradiation of the whole body is set at 5 mSv. For nonuniform irradiation
of the body, weighting factors have been assigned to the various individual
organs, relative to the whole body as one, reflecting the harm attributable
to irradiation of each organ (Martin and Harbison, 1979). The sum of the
dose equivalents in individual organs, each weighted by the appropriate organ
weighting factor (see Appendix at the back of the book), is the effective dose
equivalent (IAEA, 1982). The effective dose equivalent limit so calculated was
originally recommended by ICRP to be 5 mSv in a year (ICRP, 1977).
At the ICRP 1985 Paris meeting, however, it was stated that 1 mSv in
a year is the principal limit of dose for members of the public (ICRP, 1985).
It is permissible to increase the annual dose limit to 5 mSv for a few years,
provided that the average annual effective dose equivalent over a lifetime does
not exceed the principal limit of 1 mSv per year.
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Table 3.1. Intervention levels for protective measures in the early and inter-
mediate phases of a major nuclear accident.
Dose equivalent (mSv)
Protective measure
Early Phase
Sheltering
Stable iodine prophylaxis
Evacuation
Intermediate Phase
Control of foodstuffs and
drinking water
Relocation
Whole body
5-50
50-500
5-50a
50-500a
Thyroid, lung, or any single
organ preferentially irradiated
50-500
50-500
500-5000
50-500a
Not expected
aDose equivalent committed in the first 'Post-accident year.
3.2.2 Abnormal exposure due to the accident
To limit exposure of the general public following an accidental release of ra-
dioactive substances into the environment, remedial actions or interventions
can only be introduced. It is not possible to recommend general levels of dose
that would be appropriate for application in all accidental circumstances to
undertake interventions. All interventions or countermeasures that can be ap-
plied to reduce the exposure to members of the public following an accidental
release of radioactive materials carry some detriment to the people concerned.
Thus, the decision to introduce countermeasures (Le., make an intervention)
must be based on a balance of the detriment that they carry and the reduction
in the exposure that they are likely to achieve.
However, ICRP judges that it might be possible to set levels below which
intervention would not generally be considered to be justified and similarly
to set dose levels above which intervention is almost obligatory. Intervention
levels should be included in the emergency plan of each facility, and should be
reassessed in the light of the available information at the time of intervention
in the real accident situation (Martin and Harbison, 1979).
For emergency planning three consecutive time phases are usually identi-
fied that are common to all major nuclear accidents: early, intermediate, and
late or recovery phases. Numerical guidance for the introduction of protective
countermeasures in the early and intermediate phases is given by the ICRP
and other competent international organizations, such as the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the World Health Organization (WHO).
The guidance is summarized in Table 3.1, and is expressed in terms of dose
ranges corresponding to each protective measure (ICRP, 1984; IAEA, 1985;
WHO, 1984; WHO, 1987a).
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Table 3.2.
Element
Kr-85
Xe-133
1-131
Te-132
Cs-134
Cs-137
Mo-99
Zr-95
Ru-103
Ru-106
Ba-140
Ce-141
Ce-144
Sr-89
Sr-90
Np-239
Pu-238
Pu-239
Pu-240
Pu-241
Cm-242
Core inventories and total releases.
Half-life Inventorya
(d) (Bq)
3,930 3.3 x 1016
5.27 1.7 X1018
8.05 1.3 x 1018
3.25 3.2 X1017
750 1.9 X1017
1.1x104 2.9x1017
2.8 4.8 x 1018
65.5 4.4 x 1018
39.5 4.1 x 1018
368 2.0 x 1018
12.8 2.9 x 1018
32.5 4.4 x 1018
284 3.2 x 1018
53 2.0 x 1018
1.02 X104 2.0 X1017
2.35 1.4x1017
3.15 x 104 1.0 X1015
8.9 X 106 8.5 X 1014
2.4 X106 1.2 X1015
4,800 1.7 x 1017
164 2.6 xl 016
Chernobyl
Percentage
released
~100
~100
20
15
10
13
2.3
3.2
2.9
2.9
5.6
2.3
2.8
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
aDecay corrected to 6 May 1986 and calculated as prescribed by Soviet experts.
(Source: IAEA, 1986.)
3.3 Impact of the Chernobyl Accident on
Europe's Population
3.3.1 Release and dispersion of radionuclides
The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station was one of the most
serious nuclear accident that has ever occurred. Large amounts of radioactive
materials were released into the environment and vast territories inside and
outside the USSR were contaminated.
The large amounts of radioactive substances released were carried away in
the form of gas and dust particles by air currents. The release did not occur
in a single event. Only about 25% of the material was released during the
first day of the accident; the rest escaped during the next nine days. The core
inventory of radionuclides and its estimated percentage released are shown in
Table 3.2.
The initial explosions and the heat from the fires that followed carried the
radioactive materials to a height of about 1.5 km where they were transported
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by the wind along the western parts of the USSR toward Finland and Scan-
dinavia. First arrival of radioactive materials outside the USSR was detected
in Sweden on 27 April.
A portion of the initial plume at a lower altitude was directed southward
to Poland and the German Democratic Republic. Other Eastern and Central
European countries were affected on 29 and 30 April. Radioactive air masses
entered northern Italy during the night of 29 and 30 April and arrived at the
central and southern parts of the country on the following day. Detectable
activity reached France, Belgium, and the Netherlands on 1 May, the United
Kingdom on 2 May, and Greece on 2 and 3 May. Long-range atmospheric
transport spread the released radioactivity throughout the Northern Hemi-
sphere during the first week of May.
Extensive national monitoring programs were initiated in all countries fol-
lowing the Chernobyl accident to determine the extent and degree of contam-
ination from the radionuclides released and to evaluate the need for imple-
menting various countermeasures. These measurements of the environmental
radiation levels and concentrations of radioactive substances in air, soil, and
diet and in the human body provided the basis for the evaluation of radiation
exposure by national authorities and competent international organizations
such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN Scientific Commit-
tee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, and the World Health Organization
(IAEA, 1986; UNSCEAR, 1988; WHO, 1986 and 1987b; ISH for WHO, 1987).
Radionuclides considered. Radionuclides identified in air by gamma spectrom-
etry indicated a prevalence of volatile radionuclides, such as 1-131,1-132, Te-
132, Cs-134, Cs-136, and Cs-137, as compared with nonvolatile ones, such as
Mo-99, ZrjNb-95, Ru-103, Ru-106, BajLa-140, Ce-141, and Ce-144. Other
radionuclides sporadically detected in air or rainwater by beta or alpha spec-
trometry were Sr-89, Sr-90, H-3, Pu-238, Pu-239, Pu-240, and Cm-242.
The composition of iodine activity in air was shown to be aerosol, elemental
gaseous form and organically bound. The ratio of these fractions changed from
place to place and with time.
Critical exposure pathways. Two major exposure pathways were considered in
the dose assessments after the nuclear accident:
(1) External irradiation from radioactive materials deposited on the ground.
(2) Ingestion of foodstuffs contaminated with radioactive substances.
Two additional minor pathways were also considered:
(3) External gamma irradiation from radioactive materials present in the cloud.
(4) Inhalation of radionuclides during passage of the cloud.
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The pathways of cloud gamma exposure and inhalation of radionuclides
were effective for only the short period before deposition of the airborne ma-
terial. Exposure along the other two pathways continued according to the
half-lives of the radionuclides: several days for 1-131 and several years for
Cs-137.
Deposition of radionuclides. Deposition of radioactive materials was associ-
ated mainly with rainfall. Rainfall occurred very sporadically throughout the
European continent during the contaminated air passage. Therefore, the de-
position pattern was very irregular. Where the plume passed and there was no
rainfall, cesium deposition was significantly less than that of iodine. Where it
rained through the plume, iodine deposition was higher and cesium deposition
was similar to that of iodine. The median value for all countries of the ratio
of 1-131 radionuclide deposition to Cs-137 was about five.
Highest deposition of Cs-137 outside the USSR was recorded in Sweden
north of Stockholm. Average values of deposition density greater than 5
kBq/m2 for the entire country were recorded in Austria, the GDR, Poland,
and Yugoslavia, and less than 5 kBq/m2 were indicated for the other European
countries.
In the first month after initial deposition, a number of short-lived radionu-
clides contributed significantly to the external exposure rate, including Te-132,
1-132,1-131, Ba/La-140, Ru-103, and Ru-106.
Radionuclides of importance to the external gamma irradiation dose from
deposited materials beyond the first month include Cs-134, Cs-137, Ru-103,
and Ru-106. In the long term, external irradiation is due primarily to
Cs-134 and Cs-137. Deposition of 1-131, Cs-134, and Cs-137 is important
in determining doses from the ingestion pathway.
3.3.2 Exposures to European populations
Calculations have been performed and the results published by many Eu-
ropean countries on exposures of their populations to radionuclides released
during the accident (e.g., Sztanyik et al., 1987). In addition, several regional
and international organizations, such as the European Community, the Organ-
isation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Nuclear Energy Agency,
the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation,
and the World Health Organization, have also made such assessments for the
countries for which measurement results have been made available (ISH for
WHO, 1987; WHO, 1987b; Morrey et al., 1987; OECD/NEA, 1987).
First year committed effective dose equivalents. The estimates of the com-
mitted effective dose equivalents to individuals during the first year after the
':Iii
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Table 3.3.
countries.
Average first year effective dose equivalent III the European
Country
Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania
Czechoslovakia, Finland, Italy, Poland,
Switzerland, Yugoslavia
Federal Republic of Germany, German Democratic
Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Norway, Sweden
Belgium, Denmark, France, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK
Overall average
(Source: UNSCEAR, 1988.)
Dose range (JlSv)
500-750
250-500
100-250
<100
200
accident in Europe were the hlghest in Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, and
Romania, followed by other countries in Central and Southeastern Europe.
Countries farther to the west were less affected in accordance with the depo-
sition pattern (Table 3.3).
In each country there were more localized areas where both higher and
lower exposures were received than the calculated average. Regions with first
year committed effective dose equivalents ranging from 1 to 2 mSv were lo-
cated in Romania and Switzerland, and from 0.5 to 1 mSv in Austria, Bulgaria,
the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, and Yugoslavia. These estimates of
the UNSCEAR are in reasonable agreement with those reported separately by
the individual countries. Discrepancies with country results can be attributed
to averaging measurement results over large subregions and to using some-
what different assumptions for occupancy, shielding, urban runoff, and food
consumption.
Thyroid dose equivalents. Thyroid dose equivalents have been evaluated specif-
ically because of the significant amounts of 1-131 in the released materials.
These doses have generally been higher to infants than to adults, owing to
the importance of the main pathway through milk consumption, greater 1-131
uptake, and smaller thyroid mass.
The estimated average infant (one-year-old) and adult thyroid dose equiv-
alents during the first year are primarily due to 1-131. However, contributions
from other radionuclides and all pathways have also been taken into account.
The effects of countermeasures have been considered in the results insofar as
such actions were reflected in integrated concentrations in food.
The country averages of infant thyroid dose equivalents in most European
countries have been in the range of 1 to 20 mSv. Adult thyroid doses are
usually less than infant doses in the same country by a factor of about five in
Central and Western Europe, but the differences are less in Northern Europe
where concentration of radioiodine in milk was relatively low because cows
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Table 3.4. First year thyroid dose equivalent in countries and subregions
(mSv).
Region
Northern Europe (Denmark, Finland,
Norway, Sweden)
Central Europe (Austria, Czechoslovakia,
FRG, GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
Switzerland)
Western Europe (Belgium, France,
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK)
Southern Europe (Bulgaria, Greece,
Italy, Portugal, Spain, Yugoslavia)
(Source: UNSCEAR, 1988.)
Infants
0.15-1.8
1.7-18
0.7-2.7
<0.01-25
Adults
0.06-1.2
0.4-2.8
0.1-0.6
<0.Ql-5.5
were not grazing on pastures and in Southern Europe where contamination of
leafy vegetables increased adult thyroid doses (Table 3.4).
UNSCEAR has not considered the use of thyroid blocking agents, although
these would have afforded some additional protection against inhaled radioio-
dine. Since the contribution of this pathway to the thyroid dose was small,
this neglect is not significant.
3.3.3 Collective effective dose equivalent commitment from
the accident
Estimates of the collective effective dose equivalent commitment can be made
for all countries based on detailed measurement data reported by the coun-
tries, or on the average distance of each country from the release point and
the relationship of Cs-137 deposition density with distance. The total collec-
tive effective dose equivalent commitment for the population of the European
continent from the accident is estimated by UNSCEAR to be about 556,000
man-Sv, of which 226,000 man-Sv (40.6%) is incurred by the population of
the Soviet Union and 330,000 man-Sv (59.4%) by that of the other European
countries.
3.3.4 Risks to health
The possible health consequences of radiation doses delivered after the Cher-
nobyl accident may only be expressed in terms of stochastic effects. These
stochastic health effects are fatal cancers, serious genetically related ill health,
and possible teratogenic effects. They are superimposed on the spontaneous
occurrence of the same diseases in the population. The radiation doses to
individuals for the first year after the Chernobyl accident, as well as the
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committed collective doses projected for 50 years (Le., future exposures), have
been considered to assess the risk of possible health effects.
For fatal cancers induced by radiation, a risk factor of 2 X 1O-2Sv-l is used
(e.g., if 100 individuals received 1 Sv of dose, a lifetime expectation of two
fatal cancers is predicted). For serious genetic health effects, the appropriate
risk factor is 4 X 1O-3Sv-l for the first two generations. Teratogenic effects,
by all probability, may be seen following high radiation doses, and present
knowledge does not exclude the possibility of a threshold, especially for low
doses, in the range of less than 100 mSv. At higher doses the risk of severe
mental retardation (a specific teratogenic effect) is 0.4 Sv-1 for a fetus exposed
in the period from the eighth to the fifteenth week of gestation and 0.1 Sv-1
for a fetus exposed during the period from the sixteenth to the twenty-fifth
week. Although low individual doses are considered here, these factors have
been used in the calculations, which will give a conservative estimate of risk.
Concerning the health effects, the 50-year collective dose is about
0.33 X 106man-Sv. Thus, the upper estimate of associated fatal cancer cases is
about 0.02 xO.33 X 106 = 6,500, which would be added to a normal expectation
of about 96 million fatal cancers (assuming 20% is the fraction of overall spon-
taneous mortality due to cancer that is applied to the cohort of 480 million
Europeans excluding the USSR). This is equivalent to an additional incidence
of up to about 0.007%. Of the 6,500 fatal cancer cases, about 300 cases can be
attributed to thyroid cancer. In addition, about 5,700 nonfatal thyroid cancer
and 18,000 benign nodules can also be expected to be diagnosed.
Assuming 24 X 106 cases as a nominal incidence of serious genetic health
disorders in the first generation, the additional radiation-induced effects are
estimated at up to 650 cases (an extra 0.004%).
The expected number of livebirths in Europe is 12,000 for each million in
a year, or a total of 5.8 million. The average individual dose in the first year is
0.2 mSv, and this is combined with risk factors for severe mental retardation
of 0.4 for eight weeks (8/52 weeks) plus 0.1 for ten weeks (10/52 weeks). Up
to an additional 100 cases might therefore be added to the 50,000 cases which
would be expected spontaneously (an additional 0.2%).
The projected 6,500 anticipated radiation-induced cancer fatalities will not
be evenly distributed throughout Europe (excluding the USSR). The risk of
such fatalities will be higher in areas where deposition was higher or doses were
greater. Because of differences in population density in these areas, radiation-
induced cancer fatalities may be a higher proportion of the normal incidence
than is given for Europe as a whole. Clearly, the reverse is also true.
The estimated range of radiation-induced increments in the possible sto-
chastic effects is very low and possibly could not be detected, even by the most
careful study (WHO, 1987b).
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3.4 Conclusions
• Although the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in 1986 was
a very serious event and the whole population of Europe has since been
exposed to its radioactive emissions, the magnitude of radiation exposure
has not been great.
• According to the best available estimate, the first year effective dose equiv-
alent received by individuals might have been about 0.2 mSv on average,
which is less than 10% of the dose received annually from natural environ-
mental sources.
• The collective effective dose equivalent commitment of the European pop-
ulation (excluding the USSR) resulting from the Chernobyl accident might
lead to additional incidents of fatal cancer, hereditary diseases, and severe
mental retardations. These additional radiation-induced cases, however,
would amount to such a low number that they could not be detected above
the spontaneously occurring cases even by the most sensitive and careful
studies.
• This assessment of radiation exposures from the Chernobyl accident has
only considered the major radionuclides and exposure pathways that have
contributed significantly to the individual and collective doses. Contribu-
tions of less important radionuclides and exposure pathways are also the
subject of studies in various countries, but these studies should not con-
siderably change the general conclusions of the accident's consequences.
• The sensitivity with which radiation and radioactive materials can be de-
tected in the environment has resulted in some countries in overvaluation
of measurement data, exaggeration of potential danger to health, and over-
reaction of national authorities in regard to the introduction of protective
measures in the early post-accident period.
• Preparedness of competent authorities to organize environmental surveil-
lance and monitoring of foodstuffs and people, to make fast and realistic
evaluations of measurement data, and to decide on protective measures,
if needed, as well as to inform the public and media of all aspects of risk
involved in radiation accidents are the most important prerequisites to
avoid anxiety and panic among the population under such circumstances.
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Some preliminary results of the epidemiological studies performed on the health conse-
quences of the Chernobyl accident were published after the completion of this chapter.
These deserve attention and are, therefore, summarized briefly below.
The widespread radioactive contamination of the environment following the Cher-
nobyl accident has generated considerable public concern with regard to possible ad-
verse health effects in the exposed populations. A number of people, among them
even some health professionals, were afraid of increases in spontaneous abortions and
congenital malformations and increases in cancer rates, especially leukemia. Early
dose estimates suggested that - apart from a limited area surrounding the accident
site - such adverse health effects might be at a level too low to be detectable against
variations in their background incidence. Nevertheless, health authorities in several
European countries initiated epidemiological studies to monitor the possible health
implications of the accident.
In January 1987, a cluster of ten cases of trisomy 21 (frequently associated
with Down's syndrome) was reported in births in West Berlin, nine months after
the Chernobyl accident. Therefore, chromosomal anomaly syndromes recorded in 18
EUROCAT registries from January 1986 to March 1987 in livebirths, stillbirths, and
induced abortions were specially reviewed. (EUROCAT, the European Registries of
Congenital Abnormalities and Twins, is a concerted action of the European Commu-
nities for the epidemiological surveillance of congenital anomalies. It comprises 23
centers in 12 countries of Western Europe, and studies more than 0.3 million births
per year.) A comparison of children conceived before 1 May 1986 with those conceived
after the accident did not indicate any significant increase in the frequency rates of
trisomy 21 and other trisomies (EEMS, 1987).
The WHO Regional Office for Europe held a consultation on epidemiology related
to the Chernobyl accident in Copenhagen, 13 and 14 May 1987. At this meeting,
information of the radiological consequences of the accident for the population of the
European part of the USSR was also updated. It was reported that up to the date
of the meeting, 21 children were born to fathers who had been irradiated as a result
of the Chernobyl accident. All children appeared normal. Some women living in the
area around Chernobyl requested abortions following the accident. Their abortuses
were not malformed (WHO, 1987c).
The monthly statistics on pregnancy outcomes, such as induced abortions, fetal
deaths, birth weight under 2,500 g, and various congenital anomalies including Down's
syndrome, were evaluated in Hungary after the Chernobyl accident up to 31 March
1987. Only a somewhat higher rate (10%) of newborns with birth weights under 2,500
g in May and June 1986 was detected. It may, perhaps, be attributed to some cases
of premature childbirth caused by psychosocial anxiety (Czeizel and Billege, 1987).
A preliminary evaluation of the impact on the Chernobyl accident of the frequency
of central nervous system malformations and eye defects in livebirths, stillbirths, and
induced abortions up to June 1987 was published by the EUROCAT Working Group
in 1988. Eighteen registries in nine countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia) were able to supply all
the necessary information. Observed frequencies of the six classes of anomaly in the
exposed cohorts were compared with expected frequencies calculated from baseline
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rates for the period of 1980-1985. Mental retardation could not be considered since
it is not identifiable at birth, except insofar as it is correlated with microcephaly.
The results do not show an increase in the frequency of malformations in the
countries of Western Europe. The only significant increase was in neural tube defects
in Odense, Denmark (four cases were observed in a cohort where 0.9 were expected).
It should be mentioned, however, that Denmark did not belong to the heavily con-
taminated areas of Europe. According to the conclusions of the Working Group, the
evidence presented indicates that in the regions studied termination of pregnancies
or invasive prenatal diagnostic examinations were not justified for women exposed
during pregnancy (EUROCAT Working Group, 1988).
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Chapter 4
Agriculture and Trade
Paul S. Gray
Commission of the European Communities
Brussels, Belgium
This chapter describes the responses of governments to the fallout, particu-
larly with respect to the contamination of food and the effect of governmental
decisions on agriculture and trade. To put the subsequent description of events
in perspective, it is prefaced with a brief explanation of how permitted lev-
els of radiation in food can be derived from radiation dose recommendations.
Although much of this work was done after Chernobyl, it is one of several
possible systematic calculation methods, a knowledge of which allows a better
understanding of the limits adopted under the pressure of events.
4.1 Derived Reference Levels for
Radioactivity in Foods
Before Chernobyl no credence had been given to the possibility that a single
reactor accident could contaminate agricultural crops on a national, let alone a
continental, scale. Plans, developed by countries operating nuclear reactors or
facilities, were based on the assumption that the consequences of an accident
would be localized. The control of the radiation dose to the general public
would therefore be carried out by means of various specific local countermea-
sures that would be taken on the basis of detailed monitoring information from
the area.
Very few countries had established contamination limits for foodstuffs in
trade, the most notable exception being the US Food and Drug Administration
(USFDA, 1982), which had defined protective action guidelines in 1982. These
were set up with domestic nuclear incidents in mind and are basic rules for
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interactive control that give instructions to officials and authorities on how
to deal with contaminated food on the basis of comprehensive monitoring
information.
Using these guidelines as a starting point, the FDA on 15 May 1986 set
"action levels" for imported foods, above which the FDA has discretion to
act. They had been calculated on the assumption that all food being eaten
by the population was contaminated to these levels. They were therefore
intended not as countermeasures to control dose, but as legal levels above
which there was discretion for the FDA to take regulatory action, and below
which traders would have legal certainty that the food would be considered
safe for consumption. In practice, no foods exceeding these discretionary limits
were allowed to enter the USA.
Food law in most countries i~ based on the premise that food must be
safe, and it is illegal to add any nonfood substance to food unless expressly
permitted. It is also illegal to allow it to become contaminated, particularly
where the contaminant is injurious to human health. Unavoidable contami-
nation by such substances as natural toxins (e.g., aflatoxins in groundnuts ) is
usually regulated by setting targets and applying the "as low as reasonably
achievable" (ALARA) approach.
Natural radioactivity occurs in foodstuffs mainly in the form of potassium
40 (K-40) and carbon 14 (C-14), the amounts of these substances present in
food and in the human body being a function of their natural occurrence. For
example, every gram of potassium contains about 30 Bq of K-40. No purpose
would be served by setting limits for these isotopes, since there is no practical
way of affecting their presence in food, nor ultimately in the human body.
(The average K-40 concentration in the human body is about 80 Bq/kg.)
To set limits in a case where food contamination was unavoidable, it was
necessary to develop a new approach that joined the traditional method of de-
termining contamination of foodstuffs with nonradioactive contaminants with
that used in radiological protection. This new approach led to the develop-
ment of the concept of Derived Reference Levels (DRLs), so called because
they are derived from the levels of radiation dose such as the committed ef-
fective dose equivalent to the general population following a nuclear accident
of 5 millisievert (mSv) recommended by the International Commission for
Radiological Protection (ICRP). This will be referred to below as the ICRP
recommendation (ICRP, 1982).
The European Atomic Energy (EURATOM) Treaty provides for the fixing
of radiation protection standards taking into account the advice from a special-
ist committee, the Article 31 Committee. At the request of the Commission
of the European Communities (CEC), the EURATOM Article 31 Committee
began to develop a method of calculation of DRLs soon after Chernobyl.
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The starting point for these calculations was a two-tier system of radiation
dose reference levels, namely:
(1) A lower level below which countermeasures are not warranted on radiolog-
ical protection grounds.
(2) An upper level representing the limit, the transgression of which should be
avoided by the introduction of countermeasures.
Between the two levels there is scope for judgment by control authorities.
The lower level of 5 mSv was used for the effective dose based on the ICRP
recommendation and an upper level of 50 mSv; for singly irradiated organs,
such as the thyroid, the respective values are 10 times higher.
These dose levels were translated into corresponding contamination levels
in foodstuffs (DRLs) expressed in Bqjkg. This required consideration of the
following:
• The radiologically important radionuclides.
• The radiation dose produced by these radionuclides in the human body.
• Their metabolic behavior in the body.
• The pattern of food consumption for all groups of the population (which
foods and how much).
• The diversity of sources of the food supply.
• The levels of the relevant radionuclides in these foods, DRLs.
The following simplifications were made:
• Seventeen radionuclides of potential health significance following an acci-
dental release of radioactivity from a reactor or other nuclear installation
were identified.
• Three representative age ranges were used for the calculation: the 1-year-
old infant, the 10-year-old child, and the adult.
• The diet was broken down into five components: dairy products, meat,
cereals, fruits and vegetables, and drinking water. For each age range, a
typical community diet has been established in terms of these five compo-
nents.
The calculated DRLs do not apply to foodstuff contamination in the area
near the accident, but apply only to widespread contamination. In the latter
case, it will be impossible for an individual to consume food that is contam-
inated at the DRL for a whole year. The diet diversity factor was judged to
be equivalent to the consumption of 10% of each dietary component, contam-
inated to the full value of the DRL for the whole of one year.
Only in the case of the iodine isotopes was the additivity of the doses from
the various dietary components not taken into account. For these short-lived
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isotopes, radiation exposure will last for a very small part of the year giving a
large supplementary safety factor. On this basis, the DRLs corresponding to
the lower dose reference levels were calculated for each radionuclide, each age
range, and each dietary component.
To produce a more manageable system, the radionuclides were grouped
into three categories: iodine and strontium, alpha emitters, and all other
radionuclides with a half-life of more than 10 days. The DRL value selected
in each case was that corresponding to the most restrictive radionuclides for
the food group concerned. As an exception to this rule for the subgroup
all other nuclides in milk products, the cesium value was chosen, since other
more restrictive radionuclides have a very low transfer factor from vegetation
through the animal into milk.
It was concluded that adequate allowance has been made for additivity of
the contribution from different radionuclides both within and between nuclide
groups for the following reasons:
• The DRL for each nuclide group was calculated on the basis that the total
activity of nuclides in the group is compared with the limiting value for
the radionuclide in the group that is the most radiotoxic toward the most
sensitive age range.
• Reference levels for iodine isotopes were based on the dose to the thyroid;
their contribution to the effective dose equivalent is therefore reduced.
• In an accident, it is unlikely that nuclides from all the three groups will be
present in significant amounts in the food chain.
Preliminary DRLs were established in November 1986 and were further
refined; the results are shown in Table 4.1.
The scientists chose assumptions with relatively large built-in safety fac-
tors that are sequential and therefore multiplicative. In addition, authorities
applying the DRLs always use the lower DRL and introduce further safety
factors. Thus, the probability of any individual exceeding the dose on which
even the lower DRL was based is exceedingly small.
The major function of the DRLs when embodied as strict limits in legisla-
tion is to provide unequivocal contamination limits. The adherence to these
limits assures consumers that radiation doses are not excessive and traders
that food conforming to these limits can be sold.
4.2 Reaction of the European Community
The plume of contamination from Chernobyl moved toward Scandinavia within
three days after the accident, Figure 4-1. The countries immediately affected
responded, but it was several days before 1-131 reached its peak in milk. The
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Table 4.1. Derived reference levels (DRLs) as a basis for the control of food
following a nuclear accidents.
Milk Other Drinking
Nuclide products foodstuffs water
Iodine and Strontium
notably 1-131, Sr-90 500 3,000 400
Plutonium and Transplutonium
notably Pu-239, Am-24 20 80 10
All other nuclides with
half-life> 10 days
notably Cs-134, Cs-137 4,000 5,000 800
process of gathering and assessing data takes time, so the full extent of the
fallout could not be recognized immediately.
Under the terms of the EURATOM Treaty, the CEC required environmen-
tal-monitoring data to be communicated to it from the Member States. This
request met with limited success since the system was designed for long time-
scale reporting and not for dealing with nuclear accidents or emergency
situations.
The food division (III-B-2) of the CEC had been operating a rapid alert
system for food contamination for a number of years. This system links nom-
inated officials responsible for food control in each EC Member State with a
nominated official in the CEC. This official acts as an incident coordinator;
data are transmitted to the Commission to be electronically recorded and,
after control, retransmitted to the coordinating officials in the EC Member
States. Where incidents are extensive or pose special problems, meetings of
national coordinators are called in Brussels. On the basis of these consulta-
tions, such actions as the setting up of analytical methods or the setting oflegal
limits for contaminants can be initiated. The system handles several cases of
widespread food contamination every year and was therefore well prepared at
the time of Chernobyl - particularly following such extensive incidents as the
contamination of Austrian wine by diethylene glycol, where more than 10,000
analyses were reported through it.
Following the receipt of information on radioactive fallout in Denmark and
Sweden the CEC coordinator initiated the alert and attempted to call an im-
mediate meeting. May 1, however, and in many countries May 2 were public
holidays immediately preceding a weekend, when the closure of many govern-
ment departments made it impossible to get all the participants to Brussels
before Monday, May 5. Not only national food contamination controllers but
also radiobiological experts and trade experts were invited to ensure that all
aspects of the accident could be examined and the appropriate Community
action initiated.
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Figure 4.1. Average Cs-137 deposition density in countries or large subre-
gions in Europe.
As the contaminated airstream moved westward, national and even local
authorities began to take various countermeasures. These ranged from advice
on prohibiting animals from grazing on pasture and infants from consuming
dairy products to the banning of some foods and even the destruction of crops.
A summary of these measures is set out in Table 4.2.
Trade in foodstuffs was inhibited by new border formalities (e.g., require-
ments for radioactivity certificates by Italy), and all EC countries had bans,
severe restrictions, certification, or special examination requirements on food
coming from the USSR and its neighboring countries. Even by the date of
the meeting, a fully comprehensive picture of fallout and food contamination
was not available. In some parts of Europe, the first fallout had only occurred
on May 3, and in others the peak had not yet been attained. 1-131 was still
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Table 4.2. Countermeasures taken by European countries.
Countermeasure Country
Advice not to drink rainwater
Restriction or ban on game
Ban on sale of fresh vegetables
Limits in radioactivity in food
Limits on imported foods
Ban on grazing cattle outdoors
Advice not to eat
fresh vegetables
Advice to wash fresh vegetables
Evacuation, rehousing USSR
Sheltering Poland, USSR
Distribution of iodine tablets Poland, USSR
Control or restriction of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czeckoslovakia,
dairy products Finland, Greece, Netherlands,
Poland, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland,
USSR, Yugoslavia
Austria, Federal Republic of Germany,
Italy, Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, UK, Yugoslavia
Austria, Bulgaria, France,
Federal Republic of Germany, Greece,
Italy, Netherlands, USSR
Austria, Bulgaria, Italy,
Sweden, Switzerland, Yugoslavia
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Greece,
Hungary, Netherlands, Switzerland, Yugoslavia
Greece, Federal Republic of Germany,
Luxembourg, Sweden, Switzerland, UK
All countries
All countries (EEC)
Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Federal
Republic of Germany, Greece, Netherlands
Based on a report for the CEC by CEPN (Centre detude sur l'evaluation de Ia protection
dans Ie domaine nucleaire) and a study by the US Department of Energy (Lombard, 1987).
building up in the milk, and data being gathered by local authorities had not
yet been centralized and analyzed.
The top priorities for the CEC were the protection of health of its pop-
ulation and the reestablishment of the Common Market in foodstuffs, which
had been interrupted by the various internal frontier measures. If previously
agreed upon DRLs had been available for foods, this problem would have been
easily resolved, even in the absence of mandatory legislation.
The free circulation of goods is one of the principles enshrined in the EC
Treaty. Many restrictions on free circulation of foods arise from differences in
national measures taken to protect health. For nearly two decades, the CEC
has been engaged in the difficult task of removing these restrictions. National
measures that were not fully justified by essential requirements such as health
were attacked using Article 30 of the EC Treaty, as in the case of the German
Beer Law. Article 100 of the EC Treaty was used to harmonize essential
requirements, such as food additive limits, by means of binding EC Council
directives (EC, 1973). Directives taken under Article 100 had to pass through
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the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, frequently
requiring four to five years before being adopted unanimously by the Council
(now by qualified majority under article 100A of the Single European Act).
Even if accelerated procedures had been used, the process could have taken
months, and it was clearly not possible to pursue this route if the problems
created by Chernobyl were to be resolved immediately.
The first problem to be dealt with was that of 1-131. Many Member States
had already fixed limits for the level ofI-131 in foods, and these varied widely.
In view of the national measures already taken, rapid agreement on mandatory
limits for this radionuclide was improbable. Therefore, on May 6, the Commis-
sion issued a recommendation proposing that EC Member States should not
obstruct the free circulation of food meeting the levels of contamination based
on the most restrictive national levels being applied within the EC. These were
500 Bqjl for 1-131 in milk, 500 Bqjkg for dairy products, and 350 Bqjkg for
leafy vegetables. These levels were to be reduced by a factor of two after each
of two successive lO-day intervals. The relation of the cesium radioisotopes
to 1-131 in the fallout was such that the 1-131 limits would effectively control
cesium in the immediate post-accident period.
Essential features of the recommendation were that Member States should
mutually recognize official controls made by other Member States, should not
apply stricter limits to products imported from other Member States than
those they applied to their own produce, and should inform the CEC of action
taken (EC, 1986a).
Since products coming into the Community and entering into free circu-
lation cannot be obstructed at national frontiers inside the Community, the
integrity of the Common Market could only be preserved if there were EC
measures on food contamination for imports from non-EC countries. The to-
tal absence of information on the accident and the scale of the release weighed
heavily in national decisions that had already been taken on imports from
the USSR and Eastern Europe. Immediate notification of the accident by the
USSR, together with estimates of the release and outlines of a possible course
of events, would have greatly facilitated crisis management in Europe.
It appeared that the only measure likely to gain approval would be a tem-
porary total ban on imports of food from the USSR and Eastern Europe, and
a proposal to this effect was made by the CEC to the Council on May 6. The
ban was to last until May 31, by which time common measures on the radioac-
tivity of foodstuffs imported into the EC were to be implemented. Difficulties
were encountered in the Council because some Member States considered that
the 1-131 levels set by the Federal Republic of Germany for leafy vegetables
were too restrictive. They called on the CEC to attempt to agree to higher
levels, although all other Member States could agree it was impossible to ob-
tain unanimity.
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The Council finally adopted the temporary ban on May 12 (EC, 1986c).
Secondary legislation in the veterinary field permitted the CEC to act more
rapidly on meat. After consulting the Standing Veterinary Committee, the
Commission banned the import of bovine animals, swine, and fresh meat from
the same East European countries on May 7 (EC, 1986b).
The continuous flow of information through the rapid alert system, which
permitted an evolving picture of food contamination throughout the Commu-
r.ity to be drawn up, was one of the most important factors that contributed
tn the building of confidence between authorities in EC Member States.
The CEC called a meeting of representatives of the countries of the Eu-
ropean Free Trade Association (EFTA, comprising Austria, Finland, Iceland,
Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland) within the framework of the EC/EFTA
agreements. An informal understanding was arrived at; all parties agreed for
the meantime not to apply stricter rules to imports from each other than they
applied to products from their own territories. There was also a regular flow of
information between the CEC and EFTA countries on levels of contamination.
Consultations were held with Yugoslavia under the EC/Yugoslavia agreement,
and informal talks with other Eastern European countries.
By the second week in May, a clear position on contamination levels of
food was emerging, and it was evident that Cs-134 and Cs-137 would be the
predominant radionuclides determining the radiation dose to the population
through the food supply. After several consultations with EC food and radi-
ation safety experts, the CEC proposed to the Council that the import ban
should be replaced by a system whereby food imports from all non-EC coun-
tries would be subjected to radioactivity limits based on the sum of Cs-134 and
Cs-137 (total cesium). On May 30, the Council adopted Regulation 1707/86,
which set limit values for imported foods as shown in Table 4.3 (EC, 1986d).
These limits are somewhat lower than those recommended to the Commission
on a scientific basis (1,000 Bq/kg) since the Council took into account other
influences such as limits adopted by some of the EC's trading partners. The
scientific limits were based on the International Commission on Radiological
Protection (ICRP) recommendation. This recommendation used a more sim-
plified approach to food intake than was used in the later calculations of DRLs
described at the beginning of this chapter.
It is important to note that although lower levels were chosen for milk and
baby foods, the concentration clause enabled dried products to have radioac-
tivity levels of a factor of 4 to 10 above this limit, depending on the extent
to which they were to be diluted for consumption. The exact concentration
factors and the methods of analysis were left to the discretion of the control
authorities because it was not possible to define a unique dilution coefficient,
but this did not provoke any serious difficulties in control.
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Table 4.3. Permissible levels of radioactivity in foods imported into the EC.
Products Cs-134 and Cs-137 (Bq/kg)
Milk: liquid, dried, concentrated, condensed,
and infant formulas
All other foods
aThe level applicable to concentrated products shall be calculated on the basis of the recon-
stituted product ready for consumption.
Two other points are worth noting. At the moment of adoption of Regula-
tion 1707/86, the Member States declared that they would not apply stricter
limits to trade between Member States than those required for import from
non-EC countries, since it would be illogical to apply stricter limits to EC
goods than to imported goods that were in free circulation. This declaration
established common standards for" intra-EC trade, thus avoiding the lengthy
procedure of a directive referred to earlier. Although Member States were free
to adopt whatever levels they wished for foodstuffs produced and consumed
in their own territories, most adopted limits either identical or equivalent to
those of 1707/86. Regulation 1707/86 was scheduled to expire on 30 Septem-
ber 1986, but was renewed twice: on 30 September 1986 and on 27 February
1987, finally expiring on 31 October 1987 (EC, 1986e and 1987a).
At each renewal there was intense discussion among the EC Member States
on the appropriate limits to be applied. Some Member States wished to have
new limits calculated on the basis of the DRLs that were concurrently being
developed by the EURATOM Article 31 Committee. Tables 4.1 and 4.3 illus-
trate that for total cesium the DRLs were higher than the limits in Regulation
1707/86 by a factor of eight, although the 1-131 in dairy products was the
same as that in the recommendation of May 6.
In making its proposal for a permanent regulation for radioactivity in foods
in the event of a future nuclear accident, on 2 July 1987, the CEC took into
account not only the DRLs proposed by the Article 31 Committee, but also
the degree of public concern, the implications for Community trade, and the
relationship to levels in force elsewhere in the world.
The Council failed to agree on this proposal by the expiry date of Regu-
lation 1707/86 on October 31, but the EC Member States continued to apply
the limits in 1707/86 until the permanent regulation was adopted on 22 De-
cember 1987 (EC, 1987c). This permanent regulation is, however, intended
to apply to future accidents, and the limits of 1707/87 were embodied in a
new regulation to apply to Chernobyl adopted also on 22 December 1987 for
a period of two years (EC, 1987b). Thus the limits decided on 30 May 1986
were to run until 21 December 1989.
In the two years that followed Chernobyl, 119 consignments of food were
refused entry into the EC. Up to the end of 1986, these were mostly live
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animals, the control of which is very difficult, particularly in the case where
most consignments were made up of animals from various locations. At a later
stage, tea, herbs, and hazelnuts predominated. The EC regulation provided
for the possibility to allow exporting countries to designate laboratories to
issue radioactivity certificates to remove the need for systematic control at
the EC frontier, and a number of countries availed themselves of this facility.
4.3 Reactions of Other European Countries
Some of the countermeasures taken by several non-EC countries have been
summarized in Table 4.2. It is not possible in this brief account to give a full
chronology of the development of permitted radioactivity limits in food for
all non-EC European countries. Several countries are therefore dealt with in
summary form, and the events in Austria are described more extensively as a
specific example of measures taken in one nation where many decisions were
made.
In Finland, tolerance levels in foodstuffs were calculated from the ICRP
recommendation, the major foods being defined as milk, beef, pork, and grain.
Action levels were fixed at the following:
• Milk: 1-131,2,000 Bqjkg; Cs-137, 1,000 Bqjkg.
• Beef and Pork: Cs-137, 1,000 Bqjkg.
The Swedish National Food Administration also adopted the ICRP rec-
ommendation. The following guidelines for food contamination were decided
on 16 May 1986 for all foods on sale in Sweden: 1-131, 2,000 Bqjkg; Cs-137,
300 Bqjkgj and Cs-134 and Cs-137, 450-480 Bqjkg.
At the outset, Switzerland did not set tolerance limits for Cs-137, but
the ICRP recommendation was used by the administration as a surveillance
criterion. From November 1987, the EC limits set out in 1707 j86 were applied.
Airborne radioactivity levels in Austria began to rise in the afternoon of
April 29, but significant fallout only occurred on April 30, when it rained. The
Health and Environment Ministry immediately called an expert group together
and issued warnings against the consumption of fresh vegetables, the pasturing
of cattle, contact with soil and vegetation, and the use of children's sandpits;
it also advised frequent hand washing and cleaning of footwear. An extensive
sampling campaign of dairy products at 214 points was carried out. The
radioactivity increased on May 1, and further warnings were issued including
advice to keep children indoors and to avoid contact with pets. Further advice
of this kind was given, and later assurances were given that normal behavior
could be resumed. However, even as late as July 8, the Minister, while assuring
that "there was no danger in going out-of-doors," also said "however, direct
contact with the ground such as sunbathing should be avoided."
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Agricultural measures included:
May 3: A ban on the import of milk products and fresh vegetables from
Eastern Europe, later extended to Albania, Greece, Italy, Turkey,
and Yugoslavia.
May 4: A ban on the sale of fresh field-produced leafy vegetables (lifted on
May 20).
May 7: A ban on the feeding of dairy and later store cattle and poultry with
fresh fodder, pasture, or whey. (This ban was ignored by farmers
owing to the shortage of alternative animal feeds.)
May 16: A delay of the hunting season for game (till June 15) and a ban on
imports of game meats (lifted on June 11).
The actions on radioactivity limits in foods can be best followed when
set out chronologically, Table 4.4. Since limits in Austria were defined in
nanocuries (1 nanocurie = 37 Bq), numbers have been rounded to the nearest
becquerel. In some cases, the limits are given only for Cs-137. To compare
the effect of such a limit with one on Cs-134 and Cs-137, the limit should be
multiplied by 1.6 since Cs-137 was about 60% of total cesium in the fallout.
4.4 Measures Taken by Non-European Countries
Europe is an important exporter of food; EC exports for foods amount to
20.109 ECU (US $23.109 ) or about 20.106 tons. The CEC with the help of the
European Association of Infant Food Manufacturers (IDACE) has compiled a
list of measures applied by 77 non-EC countries; of these countries, 54 require
a radiation certificate for each consignment on export. Countries have many
specified limits, but often these are so complex that it is not possible to set
them out in detail. Table 4.5 shows in simplified form the requirements for two
main groups of foods, dairy products and other foods, for countries where the
limits are known. European countries are included in the table for comparison.
Where a figure was specified for both milk and dairy products (dried milk,
cheese, yogurt, etc.), the figure for these products has been used rather than
that for milk only. Some countries have "concentration clauses" for dried milk
similar to those in force in the EC, some exclude this type of calculation, and
others do not state whether such a clause is operative or not. Some countries
have specified Cs-134 and Cs-137 separately, and in this case the levels have
assumed to be additive for the purposes of deciding into which group they fall.
Group 1: Twenty-five countries with limits equal or close to the EC limits.
Group 2: Eight countries equal or close to US limits.
Group 3: Countries with fixed limits significantly below the USA, but above
100 Bq/kg.
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Table 4.5. Summary of levels set by countries for imported foods.
Dairy products Other foods
Country Cs-134 Cs-137 Total Cs Cs-134 Cs-137 Total Cs
Group 1
Finland 1,000 1,000
EC 12 370 600
Abu Dhabi 370 600
Brazil 370 600
Cyprus 370 600
Egypt 370 600
Hungary 370 600
Israel 370 600
Switzerland 370 600
USSR 370 600
Sweden 300 300-1,500
Belize 370 370 370 370
Algeria 267 302 267 302
Argentina 500
Group 2
USA 370 370
Japan 370 370
Nigeria 370 370
Taiwan 277
Venezuela 250 300
Tunisia 100 500
Canada 100 100 300 300
Jordan 250 150-250
Group 3
Malaysia 120 60 216 108
Indonesia 150 150-300
Syria 150 150
China 148 148
Group -I
Australia 100 100
Morocco 100 100
Bangladesh 95 50
Kuwait 90
Qatar 30 75
Saudi Arabia 30 70
Philippines 22-33 6-28
Thailand 21 7
Iran 10 10
Singapore 0 0
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Group 4: Ten countries with limits at or below 100 Bqjkg; all are Middle
East or Pacific basin countries.
The limits set by the EC on 30 May 1986 for dairy products were clearly
influenced by the existing USFDA levels for cesium which had been decided
on 15 May. The decision taken by the EC can be seen to have had a very
important effect not only on its immediate European neighbors, who were
equally affected by fallout, but also on its non-European trading partners.
Countries in Southeast Asia and Australasia set the lowest limits. In these
regions, the fallout from Chernobyl was negligible, and crop contamination was
scarcely above the pre-Chernobyl background from residual fallout of weapons
testing of the 1960s. Governments had more freedom to set limits, which
in many cases were well below the natural K-40 radioactivity in the foods
concerned, since imports from Europe could easily be replaced by those from
New Zealand and Australia or by processed products from Japan.
It is remarkable that most of the countries in this region acted several
months after Chernobyl, as is shown on Table 4.6. Australia and New Zealand
were the first to act in the region, and there was a domino effect culminating
in the introduction of measures in Thailand in November, following a vigorous
press reaction where one Thai newspaper depicted Europe as a tiger being
milked of radioactive substance by a Thai peasant.
A few countries have been selected for a more detailed description of actions
taken to illustrate the diversity of policies of governments.
On May 12, Canadian customs was instructed to control all shipments of
fresh food produced in Europe and to destroy anything contaminated above
natural levels. On May 15, the Canadian government fixed tolerance levels for
1-131 in milk and produce, and a more comprehensive list of screening levels
was adopted at the end of June:
• Milk: Cs-134, 50 Bqjl; Cs-137, 50 Bqjl; and 1-131, 10 Bqjl.
• Dairy products: Cs-134, 100 Bqjl; Cs-137, 100 Bqjl; and 1-131, 40 Bqjl.
• Other foods: Cs-134, 300 Bqjl; Cs-137, 300 Bqjl; and 1-131, 70 Bqjl.
To December 1986, the Canadian authorities rejected only 12 consignments of
imported European food out of 300 tested.
Japan introduced no specific measures on radioactivity in foods until six
months after Chernobyl, even though the population was advised not to drink
rainwater at the time the diluted cloud from Chernobyl, having traversed the
whole of Asia, passed over Japan. On 31 October 1986, a Japanese expert
committee recommended a limit of 370 Bqjkg on Cs-134 and Cs-137 in food-
stuffs, which was put into force by customs authorities in November 1986. A
sampling regime of 10% of import consignments was imposed. In February
1987, following the discovery of contaminated nuts from Turkey, the degree
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Table 4.6. Dates of adoption of permitted radioactivity levels in foods by
some non-European countries.
Year
1982
1986
1987
Month
May
June
July
August
September
October
November
May
Country
USA
Canada, Saudi Arabia
Israel, Australia, New Zealand
Singapore
Philippines
Malaysia
Japan, Jordan
Thailand
Mexico, Nepal
of inspection was extended to all consignments of nuts from Europe and later
to all consignments of food and liquor from eight European countries, leading
to customs clearance delays. In November 1987, the customs regulation was
extended for another year. The Japanese authorities detained only 25 consign-
ments of food from Europe up to February 1988, of which 10 consignments
were of EC origin (mostly nuts and herbs).
In August 1986, the Philippines stated that, "in the aftermath of the Cher-
nobyl accident, foodstuff imports were to be safe, and free from radioactive
substances" and that "exporters should provide certificates to that effect with
their goods." A week later on August 20, a very low tolerance level of 22
Bq/kg of total cesium was specified for milk. At the end of August and the
beginning of September, a spate of newspaper articles reported the withdrawal
of European foodstuffs from shops, and subsequently the following limits were
set on Cs-134 and Cs-137:
• Liquid milk: 15 Bq/l.
• Milk powder (full cream/nonfat), whey powder, infant food anhydrous
milk fat/butter fat, cream (raw), butter: 22 Bq/kg.
• Cheese: 33 Bq/kg.
• Vegetable products: 22 Bq/kg.
• Fruit products: 8 Bq/kg.
• Meat products: 6 Bq/kg.
• Cereal products: 6 Bq/kg.
• Fish/marine products: 28 Bq/kg.
• Cocoa powder, chocolate drink, candies, tonic drink, coffee: 22 Bq/kg.
• Dextrose, glucose, honey: 2 Bq/kg.
As mentioned above, US guidelines were originally established by the FDA
in 1982, and from these maximum levels of radioactivity the so-called action
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levels for imported foods were calculated and published in the Federal Register
of 25 June 1986 (USFDA, 1986b):
• Infant foods: 1-131,56 Bqjkg; Cs-134 and Cs-137, 370 Bqjkg.
• Other foods: 1-131, 296 Bqjkg; Cs-134 and Cs-137, 370 Bqjkg.
These action levels applied to foods that are regulated by the FDA, but the
US Department of Agriculture (USDA), through other legal instruments, was
applying a limit of 2,800 Bqjkg of total cesium for meat. On 3 November
1986, six months after Chernobyl, the USDA reduced the limit for meat to
370 Bqjkg. The FDA informed the CEC soon after the calculations had
been made on 16 May 1986 (USFDA, 1986a). During the period from the
end of April 1986 to 8 December 1987, the US authorities detained only 15
consignments of food from Europe that exceeded the FDA levels (USFDA,
1987).
Middle East countries pursued an intermediate course. In many cases,
limits were based on the advice of scientists, and the starting point was the 5
mSv ICRP recommendation, although the fixed levels differed markedly from
country to country.
4.5 Effects on Trade and Agriculture
In the days and weeks immediately following Chernobyl, the various govern-
mental warnings and decisions had direct but very localized effects on trade
and agriculture, which it is possible to quantify. Bans on the sale of perishable
goods, such as spinach in the Netherlands and in some German Lander and
green vegetables in Italy, resulted in the loss of some perishable crops, as did
the obstruction of lorries at the borders carrying similar commodities. The
issuing of warnings also deflected public choice away from specific foods, but
it is not possible to quantify the loss of perishable foodstuffs in this period.
Once legal limits had been established in the EC, the majority of foodstuffs
in trade was found to conform. Notable exceptions were game in alpine areas,
sheep in the northern part of the United Kingdom, and herbs, mushrooms,
and durum wheat in Greece.
The cesium contamination of sheep in the UK persisted into 1988, and was
caused by a combination of the high local wet deposition in hilly areas, the
grazing habits of the animals, and the behavior of cesium in the acid soil con-
ditions found in these areas. To deal with this problem, the United Kingdom
introduced a program of control and transhumance. The areas to be con-
trolled were identified by an initial survey, and the sale of sheep for slaughter
from the affected areas was forbidden - control being exercised by marking
the sheep. Marked sheep could be sold for fattening on lowland pastures that
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were not contaminated, and payments were made to farmers to compensate
them for the difference between the price achieved under the scheme and the
market price for slaughter. As cesium levels decreased, the restricted areas
were reduced on the basis of surveys carried out by the authorities. Consider-
able variations were encountered in measurements made on live animals, even
when taken from a relatively small area, and the authorities used a statistical
method of assessment. In the initial stages, reliable measurements could only
be made on slaughtered animals but later a method of screening live animals
was developed.
After the 1986 harvest had been checked, the Greek government reported
that a very large quantity (about 60,000 tons) of durum wheat was above the
600 Bq/kg limit set by the EC for imports and applied by EC countries for
intra-EC trade. Experiments show.ed, however, that the semolina produced by
milling this wheat was well below the 600 Bq/kg level since the contamination
was largely on the outside of the grain, which was removed in milling. Much of
the Greek durum wheat, however, is sold in the unmilled state to Italian firms
for processing into pasta and couscous. Italian law applied the 600 Bq/kg limit
so that the wheat could not be imported in the unmilled state, thus reducing
its value in trade. On two occasions, when the renewal of Regulation 1707/86
was under discussion, the Greek government attempted unsuccessfully to get
a derogation for goods that were not ready for consumption. The problem
was finally solved by making special arrangements for milling the wheat.
In addition to government measures, many companies or traders applied
limits that were stricter than those set by law as deliberate policy, partly to
avoid the negative publicity that could have arisen if brand-named products
had been found to be contaminated above the levels, and partly to cover po-
tential concentration effects in processing. One company that made products
using milk as a raw material set a limit of 100 Bq/kg of cesium on raw milk.
Since the concentration clause in the EC regulation applied only to products to
be re-diluted before use, this was probably a prudent action because powdered
milk, had it been made from 100 Bq/kg liquid, could have had as much as
1,000 Bq/kg. This powder is also used as a solid ingredient in some foodstuffs,
such as chocolate or chocolate drink powders, which did not benefit from the
dilution clause and could have consequently exceeded the 600 Bq/kg limit.
Some breweries set limits for malt of 50 Bq/kg or even as low as 10 Bq/kg.
These were not justifiable on processing grounds since the malt undergoes
considerable dilution in the manufacture of beer, and, although distilling malt
ferments to produce spirits is a concentration process, the cesium remains in
the distillation residues.
On both a national and an international scale, traders used the origin of
foodstuffs in areas known to be less contaminated as a selling point. In one EC
Member State, a large chain of supermarkets, while making no special claims
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for low contamination, labeled all vegetables and fruits with their country of
production where this was known by the public to be only slightly contam-
inated. On the international scale, the low contamination of dairy products
from countries in the Southern Hemisphere was emphasized by traders from
that area.
4.6 Costs of Chernobyl
The value of crops that perished, were destroyed, or were refused in trade
in "non-state-trading countries" after Chernobyl was an extremely small pro-
portion of the total annual value of the food supply. Nevertheless, the con-
centration of the problem in specific areas bore very heavily on the farmers
or traders directly involved in specific crops or transactions. Although pur-
chasing habits of consumers were temporarily perturbed, they soon returned
to normal so that the producers of nonperishable products were temporarily
affected in terms of volume but probably had to lower prices to reintroduce
products. The cost of the compensation scheme for sheep to public funds in
the UK up to the end of 1988 was about US $8.5 million, but the significant
losses for farmers and traders caused by public reaction cannot be quantified.
The Greek durum wheat that exceeded the limits was mixed with about
double the quantity of uncontaminated wheat from subsequent harvests. From
trading sources it is alleged that the price of this blended wheat was about US
$50 for each ton below the normal price, thus the net loss on the sale would
be US $100 million.
The complexity of economic factors touching international trade makes
it impossible to isolate with certainty the consequences of radioactivity from
economic factors. This is demonstrated by the statistics of exports of milk
and concentrated milk from the EC to non-EC countries that are shown in
Table 4.7.
As a whole, exports for 1986 were 13% below the average for the two
preceding years and the following year. An examination of monthly trade
figures, however, shows that in the four months preceding Chernobyl exports
were 22% below normal, 17% below normal in the following four months, and
back to normal in the last four months of 1986. The low annual exports for
1986 were almost wholly caused by pre-Chernobyl economic factors.
The relatively temporary effect of Chernobyl is shown by statistics of ex-
ports to Thailand where severe measures were introduced in November 1981.
A fall in imports to less than 20% of the monthly average in December 1986
was more than recovered within three months.
A number of individual incidents resulted in heavy costs for traders from
European countries. One case that illustrates the difficulties, for both traders
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Table 4.7. Export of milk, cream, and preserved, concentrated, and sugared
milk (in metric tons) from the EC to non-EC countries.
Destination
USA
Canada
Mexico
Brazil
Venezuela
Thailand
Malaysia
Singapore
Philippines
Japan
Nepal
Burma
Kuwait
Saudi Arabia
Israel
Algeria
Ghana
Jordan
All non-EC
1984
1,801
1,525
33,391
3,411
84,596
6,963
11,257
14,432
13,488
11,801
508
6,317
18,592
120,245
2,387
151,519
2,877
11,560
1,383,889
1985
3,885
1,804
36,827
1,234
49,721
6,863
9,771
12,790
16,849
15,054
486
6,937
19,021
94,104
7,368
194,147
2,230
13,409
1,395,957
1986
1,904
1,698
38,806
71,220
14,785
8,974
10,027
7,473
27,345
12,311
437
5,077
20,113
114,118
5,594
131,593
1,906
11,968
1,206,417
1987
2,226
2,828
61,513
1,435
44,804
26,790
12,598
5,931
47,355
29,967
1,002
3,635
21,158
109,815
5,312
156,192
1,495
13,340
1,394,262
and authorities, of dealing with such problems was the export of 6,000 tons
of beef from Ireland and Denmark to Venezuela in May 1987. This consign-
ment was frozen beef produced after Chernobyl. It was checked by reputable
laboratories in Ireland and certified as being below acceptable limits. On ar-
rival in Venezuela, one sample was found to show a relatively high level of
radioactivity, more than 600 Bq/kg of cesium. After one year of negotia-
tion, the whole consignment was replaced, the original meat being reexported.
While the consignment was in transit in a port in the Netherlands, the vet-
erinarian authorities sampled and analyzed more than 600 packs of the meat,
only one of which was found to have a radioactivity level of over 600 Bq/kg.
Half of the packages were found to be at or below the level of detection (40
Bq/kg), despite the fact that sampling was concentrated on packages coming
from the plant that had given the high contamination level. The costs of this
operation for public authorities and for the traders involved must have been
several million dollars.
The costs of analyses for export certificates are relatively high, about US
$100 per sample, and total costs must be of the order of US $4 million per
year for European exports of dairy products alone and possibly US $40-50.106
for all foods. Although all crops in 1988 were below all but the very low-
est limits set by authorities, governments continued unnecessarily to require
1
I
Ii
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certificates of radioactivity on exported products. The cost of discounts, given
to reestablish commercial markets, is unquantifiable. There is some evidence
that they were given since the unit value of exports was lower in 1986. If
they were 5%, then the cost could be of the order of US $1 billion. Added to
these industrial costs are the extensive costs incurred by public authorities to
control and monitor programs that were instituted at the time of Chernobyl,
although in many cases these were reduced to a standby level by the end of
1988. Overall costs to EC authorities and private operators must amount to
several billion dollars.
4.7 Lessons to be Learned
Of necessity this has been a very summary account of action following the
Chernobyl accident, but it highlights the need for a number of actions which
would greatly reduce unnecessary cost and public alarm in any future incident.
Early warning and assessment. The existence of an early warning system
would have enabled control and surveillance systems to have been set in motion
as soon as the accident occurred, giving several days preparation in some cases.
The IAEA convention of 1986 is an important step forward in this respect.
National and international communications. Control and reporting networks
should be set up and should be operational so that an ongoing picture of the
situation is available in any future accident.
Prefixed radioactivity limits for foodstuffs. DRLs must be available at a na-
tional and international level, and ideally both should be identical. The EC
has declared its intention to work toward this end (EC, 1987d), and a proposal
is being prepared by the WHO/FAO Codex Alimentarius (Codex, 1988).
Agreed methods of sampling, statistical analysis, and dispute resolution. Legal
certainty requires fixed limits, but the statistical spread of contamination, as
demonstrated by Chernobyl, requires the development of agreed methods of
sampling and, in particular, statistical analysis of results.
Coordinated recommendations for other countermeasures. Much public alarm
was created by well-meaning but exaggerated advice given by governments,
the media, and experts, both official and self-styled. A code of recommended
countermeasures and advice would help greatly to reduce confusion.
Measures for local application. There is little possibility that DRLs on an inter-
national scale will be agreed upon at much higher levels than those currently
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in discussion in Codex and adopted by the EC for future use (ca. 1,000 Bq/kg
total cesium), although post-Chernobyl experience has shown that dose levels
in an incident would be much lower than 5 mSv even if DRLs were attained.
The application of such restrictive limits in the area immediately around a
reactor site following an accident could cause severe difficulties with food sup-
ply. For these circumstances, a planned system of interactive incident control
in which dose rate is continuously assessed is necessary.
Simple radioactivity limits. Although scientific limits could be fixed sepa-
rately for each radionuclide, there would be no real gain in protection, and the
complexity of differentiated limits in practical control argues strongly for few
simple limits.
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Prospects for a Nuclear
Safety Regime
Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer
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In April 1986, the Chernobyl nuclear reactor breached containment and re-
leased more than 100 million curies of radioactivity into the environment.
The release from this worst case accident, which has been compared to several
dozen Hiroshima bombs (Hohenemser and Renn, 1988), conformed little, if at
all, to accepted nuclear accident scenarios. To everybody's relief, there were
far fewer immediate fatalities in the Ukraine than would have been antici-
pated. Actual deaths, however, instead became anonymous statistical deaths.
The radionuclide contamination reached most of the Northern Hemisphere,
and expected future cancer fatalities may be in the thousands.[l]
This global radionuclide contamination was a surprise to the nuclea.r com-
munity, and triggered a novel international political recognition of a shared,
global responsibility for the safety of nuclear installations. Chernobyl changed
the very definition of nuclear risk. What was seen primarily as a local or na-
tional problem has now become a transboundary problem with regional, and
even global, dimensions. Nuclear risk has thus joined the rapidly expanding
family of global environmental issues, such as ozone depletion, climate warm-
ing, acid rain, and tropical ra.in forest destruction. The abrupt and dramatic
emergence of these transboundary issues is an important element in shaping
institutional responses.
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As a transboundary problem, nuclear risk is unique in two respects. The
Chernobyl release was the first to place the risk of a technological accident on
the international agenda, although the Rhine River disaster following shortly
thereafter tragically repeated the message that technological accidents can
have far-reaching effects (Linnerooth, 1988). Second, and more important,
the nuclear issue is one of the few global problems for which long-standing
international organizations exist with formal responsibilities for its manage-
ment.[2] The most important such institution is the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency (IAEA), which is a functional body concerned with promoting
the peaceful uses of nuclear technologies. Other relevant UN organizations,
although directly concerned to a far lesser extent with nuclear problems, are
the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion (FAO), and the International Labor Organization (ILO). Influential bod-
ies outside the UN include institutions of the European Communities (EC)
and the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD).
In the aftermath of Chernobyl, demands were made for an international
nuclear safety regime that would ensure comparability of standards, effective
transfer of data between national industries and authorities, and genuine im-
provements in safety and emergency response. The IAEA was the only network
already in existence with nuclear expertise, a fund of relevant data, and the
necessary global reach. It was therefore natural to see it as leading attempts at
international safety harmonization put in train by the 1979 Three Mile Island
accident in the USA. However, the stakes had been raised by the Chernobyl
accident, so much so as to pose a new set of aims and challenges, which could
even require intervention in national regulatory processes.
Substantial reorientation is required if the international community is to
play anything more than a clearinghouse role. Therefore, it is relevant to
ask, several years after Chernobyl, what has been achieved by the interna-
tional community and. what are the prospects? Can existing international
organizations effectively contribute to the control of the risks of further global
pollution from more than 400 civilian nuclear power plants in 26 countries and
associated shipments of radionuclides numbering between 18 and 39 million
packages per year? Or will the gap between the apparent achievements of
international environmental diplomacy and the actual environmental results,
as Carroll (1988) warns, also materialize for nuclear power?
This chapter addresses these questions by examining the international or-
ganizations responsible for nuclear safety in Europe. The chapter begins not
with the Chernobyl accident, but with the 1979 Three Mile Island (TMI)
accident in the USA, since the TMI accident (in contrast to the Windscale
accident in the UK) focused international attention on nuclear accident pre-
paredness. Section 5.2 shows how international organizations, already acutely
Ii
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aware of the possibility of a severe nuclear accident, responded to Chernobyl.
Section 5.3 addresses the question whether and, if so, what kind of an effective
international regime for nuclear safety might evolve.
5.1 International Organizations and
Nuclear Safety after TMI
The euphoria over nuclear technology as an energy source in the early 1950s
was followed by intense public debate over its risks. This debate, along with
spiraling capital costs, has seriously damaged earlier faith in the advancement
of nuclear technology.[3] The international response has been varied, but gen-
erally international organizations have only slowly turned their attention to
preventing major nuclear accident~ or reducing their consequences with emer-
gency response measures. Early efforts in the area of nuclear safety focused,
rather, on two other important problems: protecting workers and the public
directly at risk of exposure to ionizing radiation, e.g., medical applications
and occupational safety, and ensuring that nuclear materials from the civilian
uses of nuclear power were not diverted for military purposes. The Interna-
tional Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) was accepted as the
international authority on the former, whereas the IAEA was responsible for
the latter under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
The safety of nuclear power plants, especially those in developing countries,
slowly emerged as an issue on the international agenda. Accident mitigation,
on the other hand, was considered to be the responsibility of national govern-
ments and little serious regulatory attention was given to emergency planning.
In no small measure, this was due to the widespread assumption that a serious
reactor accident simply would not happen.[4]
The TMI accident in 1979 drastically reversed the nuclear community's be-
lief that major accidents were not the central problem of nuclear energy. TMI
was a surprise and a shock to the industry. An accident that developed slowly
and in a confusing manner had not been anticipated by accident management
plans, which were geared only to well-understood accidents (Lathrop, 1981).
While TMI reportedly did not shake industry's faith in the probabilities, it
did change the perception ofthe consequences. Senior industry representatives
admitted that a very serious reactor accident, one that caused many people to
die, would probably shut down the industry (Weinberg, 1985, p. 76). As the
IAEA Director General has often warned, "an accident anywhere may affect
attitudes to nuclear power everywhere" (Blix, 1986).
An important outcome of the TMI accident and the subsequent post-
mortem was a reorientation in the overall risk assessment programs of both
the US government and industry (see Kasperson and Gray, 1981). First, the
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focus in the WASH-1400 report (US NRC, 1975) on catastrophic but very
low-probability events (big pipe breaks and large, rapid transients) was shifted
toward higher-probability/lower-consequence-initiating events. Second, signif-
icantly more attention was given to human error as an ingredient in reactor
accidents. WASH-1400 was inadequate in its attention to this issue, and a
number of analyses, some even before TMI, showed that human failure might
be responsible for a large proportion of all reactor risks [see, e.g., Deutsche
Gesellschaft fur Reaktorsicherheit (German Reactor Study), 1979]. Despite
these revelations, the NRC continued to give insufficient attention to research
on human factors and operator training, and budged very little from its tra-
ditional emphasis on equipment problems (US GAO, 1980).
The third reorientation concerned accident mitigation, especially emer-
gency planning and siting, areas that had been given little priority by industry
and the NRC. The TMI accident clearly demonstrated that none of the re-
sponsible parties was prepared for a major nuclear accident. The Presidential
Inquiry Commission (Kemeny Commission) was blunt in its appraisal:
The response to the emergency was dominated by an atmosphere of almost
total confusion. There was lack of communication at all levels. Many key
recommendations were made by individuals who were not in possession of
accurate information, and those who managed the accident were slow to realize
the significance and implications of the events that had taken place. [US
President's Report, 1979, p. 17]
The confusion in the USA, to which many countries looked as a leader
in nuclear technology, was witnessed on televisions allover the world. The
resulting international concern spurred a reaction from international institu-
tions. The relevant international bodies and their responses to Three Mile
Island, which set the stage for the Chernobyl accident to follow seven years
later, are described below.
5.1.1 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Proposing the ambitious Atoms for Peace Program in 1953, US President
Eisenhower called for the creation ofthe International Atomic Energy Agency.
The IAEA was established in 1957 as an autonomous intergovernmental or-
ganization, although it is administratively a member of the United Nations.
It has 113 Member States. The main objectives of the IAEA are to "seek to
accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and
prosperity throughout the world," and to "ensure, so far as it is able, that
assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control
is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose." The Safeguards
Program under the NPT is the Agency's main functional activity. The IAEA
does not have authority to control the safety of nuclear installations or to
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formulate internationally binding safety standards. Its nuclear safety role is,
thus, principally advisory. Early IAEA efforts in the safety field concentrated
on occupational radiation protection for users of radioisotopes in medicine, in-
dustry, and agriculture.[5] In the Agency's second decade, when nuclear power
became more widespread, the safety of nuclear power became more prominent
on its agenda. In 1977, Rosen from the IAEA warned that developing nations
might be buying and installing nuclear power plants that were less safe than
those operating in supplier nations (see Ferrara, 1978). The Nuclear Safety
Standard (NUSS) Program was started in 1974, and in the course of 11 years
an internationally agreed upon set of codes of practice and safety guides for
nuclear power plants was developed. These guides generally reflect established
safety rules in the nuclear supplier countries.
The TMI accident did not signal a fundamental change in the Agency's po-
sition on nuclear safety, but it did result in a significant expansion of its safety
activities. In 1982, the IAEA set up the Operational Safety Review Team
(OSART) Program under which IAEA and outside experts make three-week
reviews of safety practices at the request of Member Countries. A comple-
mentary activity is the Incident Reporting System (IRS) for which the IAEA
in cooperation with the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD receives and
disseminates information on safety-significant events occurring at nuclear fa-
cilities in participating states.
Even before the TMI accident, the IAEA had turned its attention to ac-
cident response. The accident in the USA, however, expedited these efforts.
Safety Series publications following TMI cover topics on planning for off-site
response to radiation accidents in nuclear facilities (IAEA, 1981), preparedness
of public authorities (IAEA, 1982b), and preparedness of operating organiza-
tions or licensees (IAEA, 1982c). Along with other international bodies, the
IAEA recognized the need to establish guidelines for national authorities to
take action to protect the public from accidental radiation releases. Such
actions are termed "interventions," and, following ICRP recommendations
(ICRP, 1984), the IAEA supplemented its Basic Safety Standards (IAEA,
1982a) to address not only "design-base" releases but also severe nuclear ac-
cidents. In 1985, the Agency published guidelines on the principles for es-
tablishing intervention levels for the protection of the public in the event of
a nuclear accident or radiological emergency (IAEA, 1985a). The relevant
countermeasures included sheltering, evacuation, relocation, control of food-
stuffs and water, and the use of stored animal feed. The Agency also began
work on a supporting document giving more specific guidance on the setting
of "derived" intervention levels (DIL) for foodstuffs and environmental mate-
rials. This document was in preparation at the time of the Chernobyl accident
(IAEA, 1986a).
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These guidelines were based almost entirely on recommendations made
one year earlier by the International Commission on Radiological Protection
(ICRP, 1984), which set out basic principles for planning interventions for se-
rious nonstochastic effects and risks from stochastic effects.[6] The ICRP rec-
ommendations can be interpreted such that high risks to individuals should
be avoided if at all possible (and, implicitly, regardless of expense), but low
risks spread over a population should be avoided only if the costs are jus-
tified by the benefits. For each possible countermeasure, e.g., sheltering or
evacuation, a lower level of dose is reported below which introduction of the
countermeasure is not warranted and an upper level of dose is reported for
which its implementation should be attempted.
To some extent, IAEA's post-TMI publications on emergency response
anticipated a Chernobyl-type accident. While no discussion of the length or
duration of radioactive plumes can be found, the possibility of wide-scale,
transboundary consequences was not ruled out. In addition, the IAEA em-
phasized that the real situation would differ from the "reference accident" and
that meteorological conditions would play an important role (IAEA, 1985a,
p. 7). Severe uncertainties were also correctly foreseen (IAEA, 1985a, p. 12):
"The data obtained from the plant and from the environment during a release
may be incomplete, incorrect or wrongly interpreted."
Issues of information transfer and transboundary radioactive contamina-
tion would only become salient after the Chernobyl accident, yet the problem
was anticipated one year earlier in an information circular describing guide-
lines for reporting and for integrated planning (IAEA, 1985b). The Agency
had hoped to negotiate a convention on the early reporting of nuclear accidents
and much preparatory work was undertaken. This convention, however, would
have to await the Chernobyl accident with its more serious and widespread
consequences.
5.1.2 The World Health Organization (WHO)
The World Health Organization, founded in 1948 as a specialized agency of
the United Nations, has more than 150 Member Countries and aspires to the
goal of "health for all by year 2000." With a budget for nuclear safety only a
small fraction of that of the IAEA, the WHO has concentrated on protecting
workers and the public from radiation. Its early work assisted Member States
in understanding the public health implications from the Widespread use of
radioisotopes (WHO, 1957). As early as 1965, the WHO became concerned
with the possibility of nuclear power accidents and published general guidelines
for emergency health actions (WHO, 1965). Shortly before the TMI accident,
the WHO Regional Office for Europe published a document describing the
health implications of nuclear power production (WHO, 1977).
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The TMI accident prompted the WHO to address specifically accidents at
nuclear power plants. Like the IAEA report, the resulting document (WHO,
1984) adopted the recommendations made by ICRP. Recommendations are
made on emergency plans, setting intervention levels (although the WHO's
recommendations are less quantitative than that of the ICRP and IAEA), early
communication to the public, and dealing with the anxiety and psychological
effects on the population.
5.1.3 The European Communities (EC)
Unlike the UN, which is constitutionally limited to making recommendations
to its Member States, the European Communities (EC) can issue directives
that are binding on the European membership. In the area of nuclear pol-
icy, the EC bases its actions on the 1957 European Atomic Energy Treaty
(EURATOM) with the purpose to "contribute to the raising of the standard
of living in Member States by creating the conditions necessary for the speedy
establishment and growth of nuclear industries" (Article One). Described as
one of the least successful endeavors of the EC (Kohl, 1983; Goldschmidt,
1982),[7] EURATOM nonetheless enabled the EC to respond to the TMI ac-
cident by providing radiological protection criteria for controlling doses to the
public from an accidental radiological release (CEC, 1982). The reference lev-
els provided in this guidance preceded that of the ICRP (1984), the WHO
(1984), and the IAEA (1985a). The guidance is similar, however.
The EC was less successful in contributing more than general guidelines to
require explicit planning for transboundary contamination. In a Commission
resolution submitted to the EC Council of Ministers concerning emergency
planning and contamination of rivers and seas [Document COM (83) 472 fi-
nal, 22 July 1983], the Commission identified the work it would undertake
with respect to transboundary planning in the event of a nuclear accident.
This resolution was not adopted on the grounds that it would be duplicating
work done by the Member States. The Commission criticized this "negative
standpoint" of the Council "which again underlines the independent attitude
taken by Member States" (European Study Service, 1987).
5.1.4 Conclusion
In sum, the TMI accident signaled a rethinking of the risks of nuclear power
on the part of the international community. While TMI had no serious phys-
ical consequences outside the plant, let alone in other countries, it presented
the real possibility that a serious accident could occur despite the reassuring
probabilities. Furthermore, it was recognized that an accident anywhere in
the world could have dire consequences for the whole industry. After TMI,
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the international community therefore acted to improve nuclear power plant
safety and to provide a more consistent approach to emergency response. This
resulted in the international recommendations on criteria for the protection of
the public in the event of a nuclear accident that have been described in this
section. According to a recent NEA report, these recommendations "consti-
tuted a reasonably well developed international basis for emergency response"
(NEA, 1987a, p. 45). With international recommendations in place, on the
face of it a nuclear accident to follow TMI was anticipated. However, general
recommendations were not the same as practical preparedness for a major
accident.
5.2 International Response to the
Chernobyl Accident
What went wrong? Despite elaborate post-TMI recommendations, and with
the relative luxury of time to analyze and make decisions, the European re-
sponse to the Chernobyl accident can only be described as chaotic. As the
radioactive plume spread over most of Europe, the national authorities and
the media were ill-prepared to define the risks and communicate them effec-
tively to the public. Accusations of lack of information, contradictions, and
misinformation were more the rule than the exception during the episode. Im-
mediately after the accident, it became apparent that the formal arrangements
for dealing with transboundary radionuclide pollution were inadequate.
In such emergencies information is invariably inadequate, and Chernobyl
was no exception. Even the existing information about the developing situa-
tion at the reactor was not fully communicated to higher officials in the Soviet
Union. Had there been full information, locally or centrally, no obligations
existed for the countries involved to share this information with neighboring
countries. In addition, the measures taken to protect the public differed widely
among countries affected and even between states within countries. The re-
sponse of the Benelux countries, which because of their proximity to each
other suffered similar consequences, illustrates this. With regard to milk, for
example, the Dutch government set a contamination maximum of 500 Bq/l,
and 175,000 liters were confiscated. The Belgian government said milk was
safe for consumption, but caution should be exercised in giving it to children.
The Luxembourg government claimed milk to be perfectly safe for both adults
and children (BEUC, 1986). In the Federal Republic of Germany, as another
example, the mass of conflicting measures and advice between states and the
federal government led many to near panic.
A poll showed that 50% thought that the government had tried to hide the
consequences to public health. Hotlines were inundated with calls and the
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country's entire stock of iodine tablets was sold out by 30 April.. .. By 6 May,
no more Geiger counters could be bought anywhere in Germany. A few people
left the country, the "Greens" in Munich suggested evacuating small children
to Portugal, and some pregnant women even had abortions for the fear of the
effect on their children. The population took to the streets in vast numbers
to protest against nuclear power. [BEDe, 1986, p. 15]
Some countries, e.g., Finland and the Netherlands, even called for a freeze
on their nuclear power programs.[8] Austria decided definitively against its
moth-balled plant.
How can these disparate national responses be explained in light of the
prodigious post-TMI planning efforts on the part of the international com-
munity? One obvious explanation lies in the inevitable gap between recom-
mendations at an international level and their implementation by national or
even local authorities. To illustrate this "implementation gap" more fully, the
discussion will return again to the post-TMI preparations.
5.2.1 TMI revisited
Emergency planning following TMI did not change appreciably. At a post-
TMI nASA workshop, it was suggested that those presenting their national
emergency plans would have given much the same presentation before the
accident. Harold Collins of the US NRC replied:
[That] is quite right ... because several of us, representing twenty countries,
think that we have identified quite well what ought to go into emergency
plans after more than four years of work on the question. This work was
organized by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Because of the Three
Mile Island accident, people think we should now go back and reinvent the
wheel. [Lathrop, 1981, p. 28]
Given that there is an inevitable surprise element of the next accident,
"reinventing the wheel" is always a problem. Still, it is noteworthy that the
participants at the nASA meeting did not recognize or deal with the possibility
of transboundary contamination.
The nASA participants also would not have anticipated the chaotic re-
sponse to Chernobyl's radionuclide contamination. Uncertainty and confusion
characterized the TMI response, but this kind of confusion was not anticipated
for the later stages of a real release: "On a longer time scale other countermea-
sures may be taken, such as control of possibly contaminated food products,
but these steps typically do not involve decision making under time pressure
and uncertainty" (Lathrop, 1981, p. 6). Chernobyl, of course, proved the
accident managers attending the nASA workshop to be wrong.
In contrast to national emergency planners, international organizations, to
some limited extent, did anticipate an accident with transboundary
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contamination. The concern, however, was only for power plants situated
close to borders, arising from the controversy and anger created in the Federal
Republic of Germany by the French policy of siting pressurized water reactors
(PWRs) at the Rhine frontier. The resulting recommendations (IAEA, 1981;
WHO, 1981) at the time of the Chernobyl accident were thus incomplete and
partly irrelevant. These recommendations suggested that accident response
should proceed in three stages corresponding to the early, intermediate, and
recovery phases of the accident. After Chernobyl, many European countries
found themselves in the "intermediate phase" without having been informed
of the "early phase," and without any anticipation that they could have been
so affected by a distant accident. This intermediate phase would spread over
months, or even years, with the presence of long-lived radiocesium.
More importantly, despite warnings that rare events are by nature unpre-
dictable, international (pre-Chernobyl) recommendations for accidents beyond
the design basis were targeted mainly for accidents with local or regional con-
sequences.[9] Only after Chernobyl did the IAEA (1986a, p. ii), in revising its
planned publication concerning intervention levels, recognize that "the major
part of the collective dose-equivalent commitment resulting from an accident
will, in general, be accumulated at much greater distances." The possibility
of a large collective dose at great distances from an accident was given little
credibility prior to Chernobyl.
It would be a mistake, however, to assign full responsibility for the chaotic
European response to the surprise element of the Chernobyl accident. Had
the accident been of the kind envisaged in emergency planning to date, inter-
national recommendations still may not have assured a smooth and credible
response. A more fundamental problem exists in translating international in-
tentions into national or local reality. After commenting on the extensive work
of national planning authorities coordinated by the IAEA after the TMI acci-
dent, Collins of the US NRC went on to say: "The problem in the US - and I
dare to say in other countries - has been getting people to follow the existing
guidance. They just won't do it" (Collins, 1981, p. 28).
While the fallout from Chernobyl was creating even further public distrust
of nuclear power programs and the institutions that run them, the leaders
of the major nuclear supplier or user countries (Canada, France, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the USA) met at a summit
in Tokyo and resolved that "properly managed" nuclear power would continue
to produce an increasing share of the world's electricity. At about the same
time, President Gorbachev said it was unthinkable to envisage a world economy
without nuclear power. Thus, international organizations were remobilized by
their political leaders to prepare the world for the possibility of future nuclear
accidents. Their response to the Chernobyl accident is described in Sections
5.2.2-5.2.5.
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5.2.2 The IAEA
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The IAEA established itself early on as the international center of activities
concerning the Chernobyl accident. In early May 1986, at the invitation of
the Soviet authorities, the Director General of the IAEA, Dr. Hans Blix,
and two senior colleagues made a much-publicized visit to the Chernobyl site.
This visit was followed in May and June by meetings of the IAEA Board of
Governors to decide on a series of actions to be taken.
The accident at Chernobyl was analyzed at a Post-Accident Review Meet-
ing convened in Vienna from 25-29 August 1986. Participants and media
applauded the candid presentation of facts and background information by
Soviet representatives. A summary report of the accident prepared by the
International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group followed (INSAG, 1986). This
report concluded that: (1) no new physical phenomenon had been identified;
(2) there is a need to develop a "nuclear safety culture" in all operating nu-
clear plants; (3) the defense-in-depth concept must be implemented in reactor
design; and (4) the importance of a satisfactory man-machine interface should
be reemphasized.
The most spectacular diplomatic action following Chernobyl was drafting
and adopting two international conventions in the area of emergency response.
It can be recalled that following TMI, the Agency had unsuccessfully pro-
moted an international agreement on transboundary radionuclide pollution.
The Chernobyl accident provided the necessary shock to turn this draft into
an agreement on the early notification of accidental releases of radioactivity
with potential transboundary consequences. A second convention dealt with
the provision of international emergency assistance in the event of a nuclear
accident.[10]
The IAEA convention on the Early Notification of Nuclear Accidents was
negotiated and signed by 51 states within six months after the Chernobyl
accident. By early 1988, the convention was in operation in 14 states. Its
arrival was generally welcomed by governments as a triumph of international
cooperation, which would greatly improve the communication of nuclear acci-
dents. This convention, according to some observers, however, does not go far
enough in assuring that the public is informed. The convention requires that
state authorities notify those states that are, or may be, physically affected by
any accident involving facilities or activities ... from which a release of ra-
dioactive material occurs or is likely to occur and has resulted or may result
in an international transboundary release that could be of radiological safety
significance for another state.
This wording, as Sands (1988) points out, lets the state in which the ac-
cident occurs decide whether the accident may have transboundary effects or
could be radiologically significant from a safety standpoint. This could be a
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serious loophole. In fact, the convention would not necessarily have required
the USSR and the UK to have provided earlier and more complete information
than they did in 1986 (Chernobyl) or 1957 (Windscale), although the intent of
the convention clearly goes in this direction. In addition, the convention does
not require the state to give information to the public. In the words of Sands,
"The Convention is a missed opportunity to strengthen the tenuous threads
of confidence linking government, people, and press in nuclear matters."
The Agency was concerned not only with improving communications after
a major accident but also with ensuring a more consistent response. The draft
document of guidelines on the setting of derived intervention levels for contam-
ination of foodstuffs and environmental materials was revised and published
shortly after Chernobyl (IAEA, 1986a). The Chernobyl accident also meant a
30% budget increase for the IAEA's nuclear safety activities.[Il]
5.2.3 The WHO
The World Health Organization was one of the first international bodies to
respond to Chernobyl. On May 6, the WHO convened an expert group meeting
at its European regional office in Copenhagen to provide immediate advice to
health authorities. The group focused on those areas that received heavy
rainfall and where it was advised to wash fresh vegetables and to refrain from
using rainwater. It found no reason to restrict travel, bar imports, restrict the
use of drinking water or dairy milk, advise against breast feeding, or encourage
extra hygienic measures (WHO, 1986a).
As a follow-up to this meeting, several documents were prepared which pro-
vided first-hand information on the effects of the Chernobyl accident (WHO,
1986b, 1986c, 1986d). Longer-term activities are planned, together with the
IAEA and the FAO, to provide clearer guidelines for public authorities with
regard to interventions and to follow the epidemiological effects of the accident.
5.2.4 The NEA
The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), an autonomous technical agency of the
OECD, promotes cooperation among 23 participating countries on the produc-
tion and uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.[12] The NEA reported
early on that the Chernobyl accident did not bring to light any new previously
unknown phenomena or safety issues that were not resolved or otherwise cov-
ered by current reactor safety programs in OECD Member Countries (NEA,
1987a). Because of the deficiencies in the RBMK reactor's design and the
difference between the Chernobyl plant and the facilities in OECD countries,
no immediate modifications or regulations were considered necessary. In other
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words, the NEA assured Member Countries that a Chernobyl-type accident
was not likely to happen in the West.[13]
In response to a survey, DECD Member Countries provided data to the
NEA on ground deposition, estimates of individual and collective doses in the
first year, and - perhaps most interesting - information on any countermea-
sures taken to reduce doses. In this survey, Austria, which does not have a
nuclear industry, stands out as both having suffered the largest contamination,
along with the Scandinavian countries, and having taken the most stringent
measures to reduce the effects on the public (Hohenemser, 1988).[14] The NEA
(1987b, p. 52) went on to explain the disparities in response among DECD
countries, which, among other things, were due to the "large emphasis given
to non-radiological, non-objective criteria." [15]
5.2.5 The EC
The EC is legally more empowered than the UN given its binding legislative
authority. This potential power is limited in practice, however, by the political
realities of achieving agreement and cooperation among Member States.
Following the Chernobyl accident, there was a lively debate at a special ses-
sion of the European Parliament. Three main opinions were voiced: improve-
ment of safety measures in the broad sense (center-right groups); a change of
direction on energy policy and gradual reduction of nuclear energy dependency
(socialist and communist groups); and immediate shutdown of all nuclear
power stations and development of alternative sources of energy (Rainbow
group). There was also considerable controversy regarding the unanimously
deplored lack of information from the competent authorities. Two compro-
mise resolutions were passed. The first, inter alia, condemned the way the
information was distributed by the USSR and requested that the Commission
report on the effects of the accident, deplored the absence of binding interna-
tional rules on safety, requested Member States to cooperate with the IAEA
on reporting accidents, and called for common and binding international safety
standards and inspections. The second resolution called for immediate action
on foodstuffs and agricultural products.
Measures taken by the EC regarding foodstuffs are described in detail
in Chapter 4.[16] Derived reference levels (DRLs) were provisionally estab-
lished by the Commission for the import and export of foodstuff to and from
EEC Member Countries. Relatively low values were selected for the control
of radiocesium, namely, 370 Bq/l in milk and 600 Bq/kg in other foodstuff,
which reportedly were not formulated solely on radiological protection grounds
(NEA, 1987b). Some countries chose to set even lower limits for importing
food from Europe.
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A CEC study, which assessed the environmental contamination of the
Chernobyl accident in EC countries, the dose and health effects, and the use-
fulness of countermeasures, concluded (in contrast to the NEA study) that
the countermeasures were only marginally effective.[17] There was concern on
the part of the CEC that some countries had taken measures that were too
restrictive considering the "corresponding to trivial levels of activity." These
measures hurt certain economic-agriculture interests in Member States. In
cooperation with the FAO, the CEC plans to develop reference values of ac-
tivity concentrations in foodstuffs for regulating trade in the event of future
nuclear accident.
5.2.6 Summary remarks
The Chernobyl accident set international organizations into motion, not only
toward preventing a second Chernobyl, which, however, was considered un-
likely in the majority of the world's reactors, but also in preparing national
governments for the highly unlikely event of another reactor accident. This
preparation has had many downstream ramifications: for example, national
alert systems, school education programs, and even (in Austria) requirements
on municipalities and households to finance and build shelters. Reducing acci-
dent consequences by emphasizing accident preparedness has been viewed by
some as the key to public acceptance. Starr, for example, suggests "a mirror
image reversal in the traditional attitudes of the industry." He contends that
public acceptance depends on public perception of credible protection and res-
cue systems for neighbors of a nuclear station. Post-accident planning should,
thus, be a key part of the solution to obtaining public acceptance (Starr, 1987,
p. L111).
Many would undoubtedly argue that protection and rescue systems are not
the key to public acceptance, although they playa role. What is clear is that
after Chernobyl, the response to nuclear accidents was given more attention
by international organizations than, for example, reexamination of the nuclear
option or establishment of rigorous, binding safety rules backed up by an effec-
tive international inspectorate. While the INSAG report clearly emphasized
the importance of preventing nuclear accidents, accident preparedness and
emergency response gained added priority as witnessed by the two major in-
ternational conventions following the Chernobyl accident. Growing emphasis
on energy preparedness is not unique to the nuclear industry, but it is becom-
ing increasingly important in such areas as hazardous materials transportation
and natural catastrophe management. Since the cost of this preparedness gen-
erally, but not always, falls on local and national governments, this trend may
shift part of the risk management burden onto the public. A question which
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naturally arises is to what extent industry should also share in the cost of
emergency preparedness.
International organizations were also concerned with the seeming commu-
nication failures after Chernobyl and especially with the disparate responses
of European countries to the widespread contamination. IAEA's Director
General called the European response an example of poorly harmonized risk
management that could jeopardize public confidence in the authorities (Blix,
1986). The Director General of the NEA expressed concern that Chernobyl
"left the impression that the machinery of international coordination had not
worked very well" (Shapar, 1987).
Harmonization and standardization of emergency response, with all its im-
plications for communication and interventions, thus became one of the chief
post-Chernobyl occupations of int€rnational agencies. Ironically, quite oppo-
site traits of emergency response, namely, flexibility and national (and local)
discretion, were considered desirable in the aftermath of the TMI accident.
An accident planner (Martin, 1981, p. 28) at the post-TMI IIASA meeting
noted that "twenty years of experience in this field have shown me that safety
cannot be assured by administration. There is a limit to how large a role plans
can play." This view was reinforced by Otway:
My experience in planning for this sort of accident is that the more specific
the plan, the more likely it is to be wrong. We seem to be tacitly assuming
that emergency planning is a good thing that one can't get too much of.
... At what point are we involving too much effort, perhaps even distracting
ourselves from the more important issue of preventing accidents? [Lathrop,
1981, p. 29]
This flexibility was reflected in the pre-Chernobyl (post-TMI) ICRP-IAEA-
WHO advice, which recommended that nonstochastic effects be avoided and
that significant stochastic risk to individuals be limited according to cost-
benefit principles. Yet, even this rather general and open advice was not always
followed. The NEA report showed that many countries placed importance on
reducing the collective dose and did not concentrate on critical groups or those
individuals most at risk.[18] In fact, Luxembourg and the Netherlands assumed
that no group of individuals was significantly more at risk than the general
population.
The fact that countries deliberately chose a policy counter to international
recommendations in place at the time of Chernobyl suggests that even flexible
recommendations cannot always be sensitive to the realities and necessities
of political decision making. The ICRP-IAEA-WHO advice to place high
priority on reducing the highest risks appears natural and "objective" if the
goal is solely to "reduce risks." Like other areas of policy response, in reacting
to nuclear emergencies, public authorities are sensitive to a host of social and
psychological factors. Surprises, uncertainties in data, differences in political
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styles, institutional diversity, and public demands will naturally and inevitably
influence response (Wynne, 1983).
While harmonization efforts in the form of improved communications,
warning systems, and internationally accepted DILs are clearly desirable, they
may not lead to a fully harmonized response in the event of another nuclear
accident. Nor, perhaps, should they. An adequate response to the next nu-
clear surprise may depend on national and local flexibility. What appears as
a chaotic international response may, thus, have hidden merits when viewed
in the perspective of the diverse political cultures and needs of the respond-
ing countries. The challenge is to balance local flexibility and international
consistency.
Complete reliance on international guidelines and rules is impracticable
at the national level. There is also a danger of overdependence on and over-
confidence in these international rules. The process of developing emergency
response guides and plans has the added effect of creating knowledgeable and
responsible persons and institutions within the national setting. Knowledge-
able persons may be more important than international documents in the
aftermath of an accident, although clearly the former can appeal to the lat-
ter. In addition, these persons and institutions are accountable for the success
or failure of their policies. Although international institutions are assuming
greater responsibility for safety and response measures, they are not fully ac-
countable for the outcome of these policies - which are usually adopted and
implemented at a more local level. Again, the challenge is to balance interna-
tional and national responsibility and accountability.
5.3 An International Nuclear Safety Regime
The important question is, Can international organizations, especially the
IAEA, meet their increasing nuclear-control responsibility by genuinely con-
tributing to international nuclear safety? This question is posed at a time of
fresh optimism with regard to the credibility of the United Nations as a cen-
tralized forum for world environmental policy following widely acknowledged
agreements on transboundary pollutants coordinated by UNEP. As Carroll
(1988) points out, however, the real test of these negotiated agreements will
be in their implementation. The UN cannot enforce compliance, and skepti-
cism about the rationality of a centralized "global decision maker" still exists.
In addition to general doubts about the effectiveness of the UN, the IAEA's
safety role will hinge critically on three factors: the political will on the part
of Member States to allow increasing international intervention for nuclear
safety; the inherent capacity of the IAEA to control or even oversee global
nuclear operations; and the ability of the Agency, in light of its established
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role in promoting nuclear power, to generate public credibility as a safety
watchdog.
5.3.1 Political will
Chernobyl is viewed by some as the necessary stimulus for a new international
safety regime based on common interest and an authoritative global institu-
tion. In the words of Ramberg (1987, p. 325), "There will always be risks, but
the risks can be minimized by authoritative institutions ready, willing and able
to apply preventive medicine." Others argue that the IAEA cannot effectively
defend international nuclear safety so long as its nuclear safety standards re-
main mere recommendations. Many hope for more political commitment or
political will from Member States to agree to binding safety standards and
inspections. Since the political will was demonstrated in the case of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), this experience is examined below.
The willingness of nations to allow extra-national entities to scrutinize a
most sensitive industry has been viewed as remarkable.[19] It is the first time
in history that sovereign states have allowed an international organization to
perform inspections on important installations within their territories. This
political will has been motivated by two factors: the desire on the part of
"weapon" countries to limit proliferation and the desire on the part of "non-
weapon" countries to develop their civilian nuclear programs. The idea is to
spread the benefits of nuclear power worldwide as a bonus to countries that
voluntarily decide to renounce nuclear weapons. The promotional or technical
assistance activities of the Agency are therefore critical for keeping the safe-
guard system intact. [20] It has been argued that the IAEA has done a good job
in stopping proliferation, given the circumstances, but that the circumstances
themselves may make it impossible to maintain an impervious institutional
barrier (Wynne, 1988). At any rate, the Agency's power to bargain compli-
ance with NPT in exchange for technical assistance is wavering, as developing
states acquire their own technical know-how.[21]
The politically imposed limits on IAEA's powers to control proliferation
are often ignored or misunderstood. The IAEA can only verify information
submitted to it on national nuclear programs. It cannot demand access of
information, and thus does not have anything like the powers of an "inter-
national policeman." If the IAEA is failing with respect to this exaggerated
model, it is more a reflection of missing political will among Member States
than it is of the IAEA per se. It is the Member States and non-signatories of
the NPT who have invested the agency with what are actually quite limited
powers. As the NPT bargain shows strains, it is even less likely that sovereign
states will agree to nonpartisan inspections of nuclear power plant safety or
to binding international safety regulations. These would have to be far more
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extensive than they are for materials diversion. In fact, the record of requests
for IAEA inspection teams has not been impressive. From 1983 to 1987, some
23 OSART missions were carried out. Inspections increased after Chernobyl
(5 in 1987 and 12 to 15 in 1988) and included, for the first time, requests
from East European countries. Although OSART findings are summarized to
be used by other plants, the actual missions do not constitute a significant
proportion of the 380 or so operating nuclear power plants in the world.
National governments are also reluctant to grant an international body the
power to impose binding nuclear standards. This power would restrict their
operating flexibility and could have undesired consequences on the commer-
cial viability of national nuclear industries. The nuclear industry, which is
concentrated in only a few supplier countries and is characterized by very few
competing technological designs, is especially sensitive to international safety
standards. A recent discussion to limit the whole body radiation exposure, in
the case of a severe nuclear accident, to persons at the site boundary illustrates
this sensitivity. While light-water reactors could meet the requirement of 25
rems recently recommended by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI,
1990), they would have trouble meeting lower limits that could, however, be
met by gas-cooled reactors (Gas-Cooled Reactor Association, 1989). An in-
ternational standard below 25 rems could seriously jeopardize the future of
light-water reactors.
5.3.2 Resources
Constitutionally, the UN has no enforcement power and has to operate by
moral persuasion more than legal sanction. Yet some argue (e.g., Pitt, 1986)
that these existing channels of influence have been limited by political forces
and bureaucratic ineptitude. Even the more independent UN agencies such
as the IAEA have not escaped these difficulties. Suggestions for increasing
the IAEA's safety role, e.g., an Agency emergency response capability, an
international nuclear safety inspectorate, or increased resources devoted to
OSART missions, would require massive increases in the Agency's resources.
The IAEA's budget for safeguards and nuclear safety programs rose from
$10.2 million to $42.7 million during the 10-year period from 1977-1987; the
$11 million budget for safety programs increased approximately 30% (to $14
million) after Chernobyl. Still, these funds are minuscule compared with the
multibillion dollar international nuclear industry.[22] Several countries (includ-
ing the USSR, the USA, and the Federal Republic of Germany) have requested
OSART missions following Chernobyl; however, IAEA's limited resources per-
mit only cursory inspections. For lack of funds, even the Director General of
the IAEA is pessimistic about the Agency's role in an international nuclear
safety regime:
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Although the JAEA has and will retain a central role in international co-
operation, it has no mandate and cannot become an international supervisory
organ to assure nuclear safety. Governments will retain their present respon-
sibility and competence.
It is arguable that co-operation between all who are concerned with nuclear
safety is already better than it is in other industries. But more needs to be
done before we can claim that there is such a thing as "an international nuclear
safety regime." [JAEA, 1987]
If the IAEA were given the ingredients of a political mandate, legal pow-
ers, and vastly increased resources, still a cursory look at nuclear safety as a
technical problem indicates serious practical limitations for an international
safety regime. Nuclear safety is a problem requiring almost full-time inter-
action between industry and regulators, from the earliest design phases right
through to eventual plant decommissioning. Each national system's technical
commitments to reactor types, fuel-cycles, data on operational experience, de-
tailed regulatory mechanisms, etc., are closely linked to a national network of
established institutional practices and decision-making relationships. Even if
an international body had unlimited powers of access and manpower, it would
be difficult for it to become meaningfully involved at a technical level in the
national safety regulation systems of the 26 countries currently with nuclear
programs.
This problem, combined with the questions of authentic political will,
leaves the possibility that the diffuse but real public pressure to improve global
nuclear safety could generate initiatives that are more symbolic than practi-
cal. This leads naturally to the question of credibility, which has emerged as a
recognized issue only recently, alongside the realization that without "public
confidence" the industry is crippled.
5.3.3 Credibility
Disregarding resource problems and other barriers to implementation, some
suggest that the IAEA might overcome political resistance to an expanded
watchdog role by appealing to the benefits of added credibility that an au-
thoritative international institution would give national nuclear programs. In
the words of Fischer (1986, p. 48), "Governments might help to reestablish
public confidence in nuclear power if the standards they applied had interna-
tional authority and if they were to strengthen the IAEA's capacity to provide
authoritative advice about the safety of their operations."
Appealing to the IAEA as a means of increasing public confidence in the
safety of nuclear power begs questions about its existing public image. There
are some potential problems here. While the Agency has shifted emphasis
away from promotion toward safeguards and nuclear safety, the public and
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critics of nuclear power may not place confidence in an international body
with the mandated purpose of promoting the nuclear industry. The more
the IAEA asserts political and intellectual independence in search of public
credibility, the less credible it may become with its members, thus threatening
the fragile negotiating influence that it has. A similar dilemma confronts
national regulatory bodies, but at least they deal in a single culture. They
can and do carefully play on public concerns to encourage better standards.
This is far more difficult for an international body with many such clients and
more diffuse and distant publics.
The already fragile credibility of nuclear regulatory bodies, as well as the
IAEA, was put to a further test at the time of the Chernobyl accident. The
heretofore messages to the public that the chances of a major nuclear accident
were minuscule had to be explained in light of two serious accidents in the
span of only one decade. As discussed at length in Chapters 6 and 7, there
are many ways of communicating risk information to the public. Chernobyl il-
lustrated the double meanings and seemingly conflicting perspectives that can
be given to small probability risks spread over a large population. For those
consequences outside of the Ukraine and Byelorussia, the small individual risk
(the seemingly insignificant increase in cancer mortality) throughout Europe
could be emphasized or, alternatively, the large population at risk could be
emphasized with the significant number of expected future fatalities. For each
individual, these risks are small; however, for a large population, the conse-
quences are large. A balanced communication would emphasize both. This
balance was apparent in the rather careful explanations of the Chernobyl con-
sequences in the USSR offered by the IAEA's Director General following the
accident:
It has now been authoritatively estimated that the collective dose could give
a maximum of 5,000 to 20,000 additional cancers in the Western part of the
Soviet Union over the next 70 years. Using the same method it is estimated
that there will be some 100,000 cancers from the normal background radia-
tion. To give a perspective - we can forecast with some certainty that there
will be some 10 to 15 million cancer deaths in the same population over the
period. We can thus conclude that the medical consequences of the accident
were severe, even though they did not reach the level of the chemical industry
accident in Bhopal in India. [Blix, 1986, p. 9]
This quote illustrates two perspectives on population risk data: (1) con-
trasting the probabilities with other common risks or background risk and (2)
comparing the expected consequences to those of other accidents. While both
perspectives are valid and, in this case, reassuring, there is still a danger that
they may be interpreted as trivializing the accident. In fact, such perspectives
are not generally given for accidents that result in immediate fatalities. Soci-
ety's callousness to future "statistical" deaths led the US NRC (1987, p. 4) in
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its evaluation of Chernobyl to remark, "Extra cancers calculated from radia-
tion exposure are real, not imaginary or merely theoretical." The theoretical
nature of the Chernobyl consequences have changed rather dramatically only
four years after the accident. Rising cancer rates in parts of the Ukraine and
Byelorussia have prompted officials to evacuate many areas. The public is
naturally asking why these risks were not foreseen earlier.
In contrast to the balanced perspectives given to the Chernobyl conse-
quences immediately after the accident (although one can question the sensi-
tivity of the perspectives chosen), a later publication by the IAEA to mark
the second anniversary of Chernobyl was far less balanced:
Despite some public perceptions about an impending global-scale catastrophe,
the Chernobyl accident resulted in no human fatalities outside the plant area;
the 31 deaths and nearly 300 injuries involved plant workers and fire fighters
at the accident scene. [IAEA, 1988, p. 1]
No mention was made of the statistically expected fatalities throughout
Europe.
This selective approach on the part of the IAEA is not surprising given its
historical mission of promoting the development of nuclear power. However,
it will hardly help the Agency to become accepted as a credible watchdog for
nuclear safety by many national politicians, activist groups, and a skeptical
public. Even worse if, as argued by Wynne (1988), perceptions of risk are
grounded in the credibility of the institutions that are supposed to control the
risks, then more intervention by the IAEA might even increase the apparent
gap between expert and public perceptions, unless a critical review of these
underlying problems is undertaken.
The post-TMI Kemeny Commission identified deep-seated organizational
mind-sets as undermining the full and critical regulatory independence needed
to ensure safety and public confidence. In national settings, where this struc-
tural or intellectual "capture" problem has existed, relations between regu-
latory bodies and industry have been altered to create more direct oversight
by political representative bodies. In the USA, for example, President Carter
established a Congressional Nuclear Oversight Committee. While such ar-
rangements have their limitations, mutual accountabilities of regulator to in-
dustry, and vice versa, have been somewhat changed. In the IAEA's case, a
key structural problem is that the national reference groups to whom it re-
lates, and with whom it establishes credibility, are not political representative
institutions (such as special parliamentary committees on energy) but national
administrative bodies. For the IAEA to shift away from the structural conflict
of interests in regulation would require accountability to national public opin-
ion reflected in politicallY representative institutions, which would render its
relations with national nuclear industries more complicated and difficult. This
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is arguably a necessary (though not sufficient) condition of its wider public
credibility, and only exposes the depth of the obstacles confronting an effective
and credible international safety regime.
5.3.4 Developing an international safety regime
Solutions to many risk problems need international coordination and action;
yet most transnational institutions lack the authority and power to implement
their requirements directly. Especially institutions with many members try-
ing to tackle global problems have proved to be weak in reaching effective
agreements.
Perhaps more progress in coping with transboundary risks has been made
through bilateral and multilateral agreements. Majone (1985) argues that the
more promising form of international regulatory institutions will be based on
functional regionalism, where the scope and authority of international bodies
are limited to specific issues in some geographically and functionally demar-
cated area. A leader-country approach is advocated, in which a few key coun-
tries with relatively homogeneous interests take regulatory actions that "pull"
or "push" other countries to follow.
The NEA of the OECD might be such a regional, functional institution,
although it has, as yet, no real regulatory powers. The EURATOM frame-
work within the EC might be thought to have many points in its favor. It
exists within a genuine international framework in which the sovereignty of
Member States yields to a regional power with authentic legal sanction in
many environmental areas. However, EURATOM has been one of Europe's
least successful regulatory institutions, ironically in a sector with most public
demand for regulation. Short of such an international institution, several bi-
lateral agreements are being negotiated as countries become aware of nuclear
risks across their borders. This type of cooperation includes consultative agree-
ments with regard to nuclear safety, radiological protection, physical security,
and environmental acceptability of proposed or existing plants. Examples of
such bilateral and regional agreements include the arrangement among Nordic
countries and the agreements between Austria and Czechoslovakia, Argentina
and Brazil, and Finland and the USSR.
These agreements can best be reached when countries share common in-
terests and risks, that is, between countries with similar nuclear ambitions
and nuclear technology. Where this is not the case (for example, witness Aus-
tria's conflict with the Federal Republic of Germany over its ambitious breeder
program), confrontation is more likely than negotiation.
This developing patchwork of bilateral agreements - or incremental, re-
gional policymaking - can have significance beyond the formal words and
obligations. As Gerlach and Rayner (1988) have proposed with respect to the
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climate-change issue, effective management decisions need not be made only
through formal treaties between nations, although such agreements may have
significant symbolic value. Decisions can also be taken by a process of formal
and informal interactions between very different people and organizations. In-
formal networks can be developed that lead to government or institutional
actions that are harmonious but not part of any international agreement. In
short, a "regime" is built. Gerlach and Rayner define a regime as a social net-
work coordinated by shared designs for action and interaction, and by shared
interpretations of the problem to be solved. Participants interact in loose
flexible networks rather than tight hierarchies, and the shared principles and
procedures often are informal, implicit, and more flexible to variable conditions
and criteria for effectiveness.
With regard to nuclear safety, ~uch a networking process is well imaginable,
even underway and coordinated to some extent by the IAEA. Webs of scien-
tists, industry specialists, concerned citizens, and regulators are being spun
across borders, and these webs are the beginning of an international safety
regime, less formal but potentially more effective than the conventional con-
cept.[23] Those examining the lessons from both the TMI and Chernobyl acci-
dents have articulated the importance of developing a nuclear safety culture,
or shared perceptions of the importance of safety measures during day-to-day
operations. The point of such a concept is that it could be more widely based
than centralized, with formally standardized (though in practice, unevenly
implemented) frameworks and obligations. Such an approach may allow for
more public and work force identification and access. However, whether it is
ultimately compatible with nuclear technology remains an open question.
A word of caution should be voiced. One important element of a regime is
that the principles, norms, and rules, whether explicit or implicit, are shared
and understood by the participants about what is legitimate, appropriate, or
moral (Gerlach and Rayner, 1988, p. 52). The nuclear power issue is character-
ized by opposing views of the problem and legitimate solutions. A developing
international safety regime, composed of different national organizations, sits
with a growing sense of confrontation and insecurity alongside a second (in-
creasingly organized and powerful) antinuclear regime, which does not believe
that nuclear power can ever be acceptably safe, on both environmental and
weapons proliferation grounds. Hitherto, it has been the political articula-
tions and criticisms from the latter regime, largely at national levels, that
have forced more critical attention to safety from the more formal pronuclear
safety regime.
At an international level, the evolution of perhaps overlapping bilateral and
regional agreements among different organizations circumvents more inflexible
models of control. With regard to the nuclear safety regime, the bilateral
treaties are important symbols of this network. The IAEA can and does play
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a central role as a forum for this nuclear safety network. As Gerlach and
Rayner (1988, p. 74) observe, "Most who are directly connected with [the
UN] agree that its real value is not in the formal debates conducted in the
General Assembly or Security Council Chambers, but its role as a vital node
for international networking."
This informal, networking model leads to a number of issues with regard
to the safety of nuclear energy on a global scale. For instance:
• Will the emergence of a more flexible international safety regime make it
more or less difficult to sustain public pressure for the practical improve-
ment of standards and safety? Or will the properties that create extra
flexibility also make the overall system less transparent and accessible?
• The nuclear industry is a global business with patterns of ownership, com-
mercial interest, power, commitment, and loyalty reaching across national
boundaries. If regulatory regimes are to reflect the structure of the tech-
nology, equivalent patterns of transnational command and authority are
implied. Can these be achieved via a network of ad hoc regional agreements
and commitments? The alternative is a more formal global regulatory in-
stitution, unfortunately with little relationship to a genuine constituency
of public opinion.
5.4 Summary
• From an international perspective, the accident at Chernobyl was antici-
pated and prepared for, at least in the sense that international guidelines
and recommendations for dealing with a major nuclear accident had been
put into place after TMI.
• The TMI accident had changed industry's view that an accident was not
the central problem of nuclear energy. Since more could be done to improve
the largely ignored area of emergency response, then more should be done
- even though the probability of a major nuclear accident continued to be
considered minute.
• At the time of Chernobyl, emergency response was securely in the hands of
national authorities. The international community had prepared guidelines
on planning and interventions, as well as some nonbinding recommenda-
tions on safety (targeted mainly to developing countries). In addition,
international authorities had anticipated transboundary effects but, for
lack of political momentum, made no preparations for such emergencies.
• The Chernobyl accident changed this, and the international response was in
some ways dramatic. The EC banned the import of certain contaminated
foodstuffs, and important international agreements were concluded by the
IAEA in areas of emergency communication and assistance. The clear
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emphasis was on establishing the conditions for more harmonized political
actions.
• Because of complex institutional and political considerations, some coun-
tries deliberately chose to ignore even the flexible international guidelines
on interventions in place at the time of Chernobyl. This complexity is
a natural part of political decision making, perhaps the more so after a
national emergency, and will inevitably limit attempts at harmonization.
A seemingly chaotic response to a wide-scale nuclear accident may mask
the underlying value of national discretion in meeting the diverse needs of
different political cultures.
• With regard to preventing future nuclear accidents, as opposed to respond-
ing to them, Chernobyl had little effect on the role of the IAEA which was
already committed to prevention. However, the IAEA still has no bind-
ing regulatory and inspection powers, and a limited budget for nuclear
safety. Nuclear accident preparedness, as well as preparedness for other
low-probability accidents, raises the issue of industry's obligation to con-
tribute to the expense involved.
• The unique feature of the nuclear transboundary issue is the existence of
a functional, international body - the IAEA - that is concerned with the
civilian uses of nuclear technologies. The IAEA's contribution to global
nuclear safety is constrained, however, by the lack of political will on the
part of Member States to allow more meaningful and binding international
interventions for nuclear safety, the IAEA's limited staff and budget to
control global nuclear installations, and the restricted ability of the Agency
to establish its credibility as an authoritative control body in light of its
mandate to promote nuclear power. The EC has considerably more binding
powers to regulate the nuclear industry in Europe, but its EURATOM
initiatives, to date, have been disappointing.
• In the absence of an authoritative global or regional institution with bind-
ing and effective regulatory powers, less visible "regimes" made up of
networks of scientists, industry representatives, regulators, and perhaps
citizens are developing to further nuclear safety and, in part, are being co-
ordinated by the IAEA. Bilateral agreements between countries can have
significant symbolic value, and international agencies can contribute a use-
ful networking service. Crucial aspects of such regimes, however, are shared
principles, norms, and rules on the part of the participants, which make it
unlikely that they can accommodate persons and groups with fundamen-
tally opposing views on the future of nuclear power.
• The real lesson of the Chernobyl accident may lie in triggering interna-
tional political recognition of a shared global responsibility for the safety
of nuclear technologies. The question of whether this recognition leads
to an international nuclear safety regime that genuinely contributes to
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worldwide nuclear safety remains unanswered, although it is not likely that
such a regime, if it develops, will be led by an authoritative, international
institution. Our international institutions and treaties, alone, cannot, as
Carroll suggested, close the gap between the direction of our diplomatic
efforts and the direction of the environment. This holds equally true for
global nuclear safety.
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Notes
[1] Scientists express an extraordinary range of calculations about the long-term
effects of Chernobyl: the low being 210 deaths (Wilson, 1986) and the high, 1
million deaths (Sternglass, 1986). A US government study projects 14,000 cancer
deaths (US NRC, 1987).
[2] Recently, UN agencies have taken responsibility for administering international
treaties for the control of ozone and climate-threatening gases.
[3] In 1974, the IAEA projected that 4.45 million megawatts of nuclear power would
be in place in the world by the year 2000. In 1987, its predictions were 505,000
megawatts. In the USA, where costs of nuclear power have in many instances
become noncompetitive, a new plant has not been ordered since 1974. In France,
which gets two-thirds of its electricity from nuclear power, Electricite de France
has a debt of $32 billion, exceeding that of most developing countries (Flavin,
1987).
[4] Government-sponsored assessments in the USA and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many showed that core-damaging accidents could be expected to occur about
once in every 10,000 years of reactor operation. The WASH-1400 report esti-
mated that for the 200 nuclear power plants operating in the USA, the proba-
bility of an accident resulting in 10 or more fatalities to be about 1 in 3 million,
and for 100 or more fatalities to be about 1 in 10 million. From a cost-benefit
perspective, assigning a benefit of $1 million to saving a life (not uncommon for
cost-benefit purposes in the USA), preventing deaths from an accident otherwise
resulting in 100 or more fatalities would be worth an expenditure per plant of
about 5¢.
[5] In 1958, a manual on the safe handling of these substances was completed, fol-
lowed by other Safety Series publications such as Regulations for the Safe Trans-
port of Radioactive Materials (1960) and Basic Safety Standards for Radiation
Protection (1963). In 1963, the Agency organized a symposium on the siting of
nuclear power plants, one of the first major activities concerning reactor safety.
[6] The ICRP is an independent scientific body based originally on the International
Congress of Radiologists, from whom it drew its members. After World War II,
it was reconstituted as a self-appointed body of scientists from fields connected
with radiology. The ICRP has always set recommended protection standards,
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involving social judgments of acceptable risk, as well as making scientific esti-
mates of the risks. It has been criticized for being accountable only to itself,
as well as being informally too close to the nuclear industry and radiology. Re-
cently, after charges of being slow to recognize new scientific evidence on the
health effects of radiation, some national authorities have broken rank and made
recommendations that are stricter than ICRP recommendations.
[7] EURATOM has suffered from problems of national sovereignty and a shifting
energy context. Its main functions include a safeguards program (which has been
made partly redundant by the IAEA's program), the coordination of research and
development, and a program concerned with assuring equal access to nuclear
supplies. Its lack of teeth has been exposed by a recent controversy about its
inspectors' inability to access the Sellafield reprocessing plant in the UK, the
largest producer of sensitive nuclear materials in Europe.
[8] In Finland, the application on a.fifth nuclear power station was shelved, and the
newly elected government pledged not to expand the nuclear program.
[9] According to IAEA safety philosophy, technical provisions are made at the de-
sign stage for the control of accidents within that design basis. Only for acci-
dents beyond the design basis are off-site measures necessary to limit the damage
(INSAG-3, 1986).
[10] Following consideration by the IAEA Board of Governors, these two conventions
were adopted by unanimous resolution at a special session of the IAEA General
Conference in September 1986. Both are now in force. A computerized Emer-
gency Response Unit has been set up, which will be notified when an accident
occurs. Use will be made of the World Meteorological Organization's Global
Telecommunication System for rapid notification and exchange of information in
a radiological manner.
[11] This has to be allocated to operator training programs; expansion of the Agency's
OSART Program; the management of severe accidents and emergency response;
the man-machine interface; probabilistic safety assessment; and advanced safety
technology.
[12] Formed in 1958, the NEA helped to stimulate the European nuclear industry and
to lay the groundwork for EURATOM. The budget of the NEA is approximately
$10 million. Concerned with safety and regulatory issues as well as with the
scientific and economic aspects of nuclear energy, the NEA is, at present, the
only forum where Western developed countries can discuss technical problems
and exchange information with each other.
[13] The report concluded that the design of the RBMK reactor is deficient, although
the design was well understood and was considered capable of providing protec-
tion against events that had been considered on the design basis. The report
also pointed to the Soviet problems of implementing safety measures.
[14] The average individual effective dose equivalents range from a few microsieverts
or less for Spain, Portugal, and most of the countries outside of Europe to about
0.7 millisieverts for Austria (although the doses in many cases were far greater).
Austria reportedly reduced the average individual dose received by as much as
50%, whereas, e.g., Norway reported 33%, Sweden 17%, Turkey 11%, and the
UK 1%.
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[15] The report also cites the large uncertainties in impacts, the use of differing as-
sessment methodologies, and different assumptions on population characteristics
as contributing to the varied responses.
[16] As described in Chapter 4, the Commission acted on 7 May under its own
decision-making process by temporarily suspending the importation of certain
meats from seven countries with territory within a radius of 1,000 km from the
site of the accident. The importation of other foods was later restricted.
[17] In a few countries, the restriction on food consumption was effective in reducing
doses to the most exposed individuals up to about a factor of two. Throughout
the EC, however, countermeasures were estimated to have reduced the collective
effective dose by only about 5% (Morrey et al., 19S7).
[IS] Countries such as Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Scandinavian
countries; the UK, however, concentrated on high-risk groups.
[19] The safeguard system itself has been subject to controversy and to increasing
stress, yet there is little question that the safeguard system has established the
Agency's credibility and assured its survival.
[20] The IAEA has dispensed nearly $150 million worth of equipment to advance
the introduction of nuclear applications and to facilitate hands-on experience
in training and an additional $25 million in the form of research contracts
(Scheinman, 19S5).
[21] Funding for promotional activities at the IAEA has been modest and has re-
mained fairly static, rising from $2.9 million in 1977 to $4.2 million in 19S7.
[22] Critics of the IAEA claim that industrialized nations have little interest in con-
tributing large resources to the IAEA for activities outside of the safeguards
program and that the few million dollars spent on nuclear safety only give an
illusion of a meaningful activity (International Nuclear Safety Advisory, Interna-
tional Nuclear Reactor Study, 19S6).
[23] For example, the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) was founded
in 19S9 with the purpose of enhancing the safety of nuclear power stations. It
has four regional centers in Atlanta, Paris, Moscow, and Tokyo.
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Chapter 6
Perception of a
Secondhand Reality
Bruna De Marchi and Nicoletta Tessarin
Institute of International Sociology (ISIG)
Gorizia, Italy
This chapter begins by defining perception in relation to its social deter-
minants, including the beliefs that filter experience and give meaning to it.
The Chernobyl event is then described as a "secondhand reality," shaped and
framed by the mass media. Methodological problems are then discussed. Fi-
nally, the main issues of public concern that came to the fore in connection
with the Chernobyl accident are identified and discussed. These include the
decision-making procedures, competence and reliability of decision makers,
and ultimately the credibility of democratic institutions.
6.1 Defining Perception
6.1.1 The filter of beliefs
We perceive through our senses, but what we perceive (and how we perceive
it) is selected through a series of both personal and social filters, having to
do with our criteria, values, beliefs, personal inclinations, social milieus, etc.
Beliefs originate in experience. Experience is considered here in a very broad
sense; literally anything that people may encounter, both objectively and sub-
jectively.
Experience is information individuals get - episodes they go through or
events they observe. It is also thoughts they have, intellectual connections
they make. Thus, beliefs may be also inferential: not grounded in objective
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experience, but rather derived from experiences that have little or nothing
to do with the object of the belief. For example, phobias (fears of certain
objects or actions) may originate in experiences that do not directly concern
such objects or actions. In a similar way, beliefs about technologies may hold
even in people that have no direct contact with them.
Gregory, a student of the physiology of perception, has suggested an anal-
ogy between perceptions and scientific hypotheses. He assumes that percep-
tions have no direct relation with the world and are often incongruent with one
another and with what is conceptually accepted as true. Moreover, percep-
tion proceeds from unconscious inference processes, not always controlled by
the mind. From these and other assumptions, it follows that data cannot be
equated to what physically exists. Rather, data represent variables or events
according to a code (Gregory, 1984, pp. 132 and 134).
Even if the overlapping of perception with belief is not totally appropriate,
for the purpose of this chapter we will treat the perception of the Chernobyl
event as a set of beliefs originating in or reinforced (in different social groups)
by the experience of that event, and reaching far beyond it. This seems at the
moment the best, or at least the most effective, way to define perception of
the Chernobyl event for the purpose of this inquiry. If no definite answers can
yet be provided, we believe that at least the right questions can and should
be asked.
As Otway (1988, p. 407) has appropriately pointed out, people do not
perceive abstractions such as risk; rather they perceive specific phenomena
and events. Indeed, most recent research trends in risk analysis tend to accept
that an individual's perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes with regard to modern
technologies are made of several factors of which the so-called objective risk
is just one. Therefore, questions such as How do people define risk? How do
they feel about it? What amount of risk is acceptable? are gradually replaced
by questions such as What is involved in people's perception of a technology?
Why and how do they judge it acceptable?
6.1.2 The social determinants of perception
The social dimensions of risk perception have recently attracted the interest
of anthropologists and sociologists (see Nelkin, 1985; Douglas, 1986 and 1987;
Drabek, 1986; Rayner and Cantor, 1987; Wynne, 1987). These scholars have
argued that the perception of risk may depend less on the nature of the danger
than on the political, cultural, and social values of the subject.
According to Douglas (1987) - the foremost proponent of this approach
- it is the social system, the ideological premises of a group or of a society,
that shapes perceptions of risk. Risk perception can also reflect institutional
arrangements, social situations, and political relationships (Nelkin, 1985).
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In short, the sociological and anthropological approaches assume that "in-
terests and biases of different groups and the social situations in which they are
involved influence their perceptions of risk and their strategies of management
and control" (Nelkin, 1985, p. 17).
Sociological studies concerned with the perception and the management of
industrial risk have shown that the definition of risk is a conflictual process in-
side society, which involves a large variety of groups: scientists, policymakers,
regulators, company doctors, lawyers, journalists, manufacturers, administra-
tors, and so on (Hilgartner, 1985). The perceptions and beliefs of such groups
reflect different values, economic stakes, professional ideologies, political pref-
erences, etc.
Thus, it clearly appears that risk is not only a technological matter, but
also a social and political one. Risk is a social product resulting from scientific
and technological issues inside society and from social, political, and cultural
values. Such values shape the perception of different groups and also influence
decisions about different forms of risk regulation and management.
6.1.3 Objective versus perceived risk
If the approach sketched above becomes widely accepted, the long-standing
controversy between objective and perceived risks is to be totally dismissed.
Indeed the discussion can no longer be restricted by the fact that technologists
know real risk and lay people rely on subjective impressions. Both technolo-
gists and the public have perceptions, beliefs, and consequent attitudes with
regard to modern technologies.
The difference consists in the fact that the former's beliefs tend to be
shaped primarily on the basis of scientific and technical data, probability of
risk, technical measures of safety, etc., the latter's on the basis of different
criteria, although not as easy to express in quantitative terms or to investigate.
This difference reflects diversities in education, group culture, reference groups,
social networks; that is, it reflects social diversities.
It is not, therefore, that technologists' views are wrong, nor are the public's;
they are only framed differently. The theory of relativity applies to the social
as well as to the physical world. To progress to a higher level of understanding,
one has to be able to take different points of view and to consider them not
as antagonistic, but as possibly understandable in a wider frame of reference.
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6.2 Perception of Chernobyl
6.2.1 Chernobyl as a technological mass emergency
We define Chernobyl as a mass emergency in that many people were involved
in a potentially dangerous situation of environmental stress that could debouch
into a disaster.
Scholars in the field labeled "sociology of disasters" tend to agree that
social factors, besides physical ones, must be part of the definition of disasters
and mass emergencies. A widely accepted definition of disasters is that they
are social events, observable in space and in time, in which humans and social
systems have to face the upset of everyday activities resulting from the impact
of an agent or from the perception of a threat that cannot be controlled directly
and completely by existing social knowledge (see Kreps, 1984). It is generally
recognized that the same physical agent may turn into a disaster in one society
but not in another (for an excursus of literature see Drabek, 1986).
Despite the widely held belief that a disaster triggers a big change in
the society, many researches have shown that social, political, and economic
dynamics, both in the immediate post-impact and in the long term, develop
according to the "principle of continuity" (Quarantelli, 1978).
Neither disasters nor mass emergencies occur in a social vacuum, rather
they assume their peculiar features depending upon the characteristics of the
preexisting social organization. Many researches have shown that the preexist-
ing economical, social, cultural, and political characteristics of the community
greatly determine both the individual and the societal behavior during the
phases of response and recovery, i.e., the way crises are managed.
In short, when a hypothetical hazard becomes a mass emergency, a real
present danger, we can observe the way in which different societies, com-
munities, organizations, groups, and social and individual actors define and
perceive the situation that they must face: the different levels of involvement
and responsibility and the different tasks and roles. At the same time, we can
recognize the latent dynamics that in the pre-disaster situation were implicit.
In analyzing the behavior of different actors in relation to Chernobyl, we
will try to describe how decision makers, scientists, economic and social actors,
and the public perceived the event; how they defined and responded to the
situation of a nuclear emergency. We are confident that such an analysis will
contribute to understanding the way risk perception shapes up within society,
and we hope that, in the long run, risk perception will be more seriously taken
into account by policymakers involved in risk management.
The first step in our analysis is to outline the rather peculiar nature of the
Chernobyl emergency. Issues to address pertain to the kind of facts, experi-
ences, and stimuli upon which people based their perceptions of the Chernobyl
I
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accident. On what data did people rely for defining the event and for devel-
oping their beliefs about it?
Chernobyl, as with most technological emergencies, displayed different fea-
tures from natural ones (Quarantelli, 1981; Cuthberston and Nigg, 1987). In
fact, technological disasters are often characterized by the absence of a clearly
definable and perceptive impact phase; by an unpredictable evolution, length,
and seriousness of danger; lastly, as in the case of a nuclear emergency, by the
lack of an immediate and visible physical damage. Therefore, a technological
emergency is often characterized by a high level of uncertainty that influences
both technological and social emergency management (see Quarantelli, 1981;
Lathrop, 1981).
When effects are not immediately visible, tangible, or ascertainable within
a limited period of time and a circumscribed space, social response in terms of
decisions and communications takes on a central role in shaping the event. The
decisions that implicitly define the situation and entail the ways of coping with
it and the actions carried out by different social and political actors become
the complex scenario in which social perception takes shape.
6.2.2 Chernobyl as an "information catastrophe"
For the Chernobyl accident, the definition of "information catastrophe" has
been suggested, since its "only and real image was the one broadcasted by the
media" (Lombardi, 1988). Indeed, all over Europe - except the immediate
area - the perceptions of the public, and likely of most technologists, social
scientists, and decision makers, at the time of the event were shaped mainly
by the information provided by the mass media, with its peculiar content and
structure.
By no means does this mean that it was false, bad, or inaccurate informa-
tion. That is not the issue here, and moreover those who analyzed the print
media in relation to the Chernobyl accident concluded that they did "a fairly
good job" (see Otway, Chapter 7).
At issue is simply the fact - neither good nor bad, just a fact - that people's
perceptions were shaped mainly by media information. Physical data and any
other kind of information had all the same level of reality, a symbolic level
constructed upon communication processes widely dominated by the media.
The public had no way of accessing information except via the messages and
images conveyed by the mass media.
The media became the field of social relations, the ground where different
actors voiced their opinions, beliefs, requests, etc.; where conflicts emerged;
where negotiations were conducted. In synthesis, the media brought to the
fore not only the results of the decision process (directives, approved measures,
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etc.), but the decision process itself, with its multiplicity of actors, uncertain-
ties, compromises, and so forth.
To some extent, this is true for any kind of emergency, e.g., one created
by a natural disaster, by a political crisis, by an epidemic. "Public behavior
develops . . . within this well-defined communication field where events are
dealt with at an exclusively symbolic level, beyond the physical impact of the
disaster" (De Marchi and Ungaro, 1987, p. 130). What is peculiar to the
Chernobyl case, however, is the overwhelming role held by the mass media in
defining the communication field within which boundaries of the event became
symbolically relevant.
6.2.3 Media's secondhand reality
In the early 1960s communication research started to claim that our reality
is a kind of "secondhand reality" (Lang and Lang, 1962), insisting on the
importance of the media in shaping and framing it.
Since the time of the so-called "hypodermic needle theory" (or "bullet
theory") - which saw the receiver of media messages as an isolated, atomized,
almost nonsocial, naive "victim" - much more sophisticated theories have
developed. In early empirical research, the importance of personal influence
and relational networks was recognized.
The model derived from Shannon and Weaver's mathematical theory of
communication (1949) - at first widely adopted and prized - proved too el-
ementary and was gradually substituted for more complex ones, taking into
account the active role ofthe participants in communication processes, both in
giving the message its "real" meaning and in shaping the relationship between
communicators.
Research trends and focuses are also related to the developments in media
technologies, characterized by rapid and outstanding changes that are reflected
also upon audience's consistency, composition, and type of exposure.
The power of the mass media remains a relevant issue throughout the
tradition of communication research. However, most recent theoretical and
empirical studies no longer deal with short-term persuasion effects and no
longer consider individuals as isolated members of a mass society. They rather
concentrate on long-term effects and on ways in which the media succeed in
constructing the image of social reality (Wolf, 1985, p. 137).
They also pay attention to differences among the media and are aware of
the relevance of interpersonal networks in "filtering" media messages. The
central issue does not pertain to persuasion, but rather to agenda setting. In
other words, the media define the topics and the issues about which people
will think and will develop opinions, attitudes, and beliefs, providing not just
news and information, but also interpretive frames (Noelle-Neumann, 1973).
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Of course people did have the possibility of either accepting or rejecting
the information provided to them regarding the Chernobyl accident. However,
every single piece of it was acknowledged as "truth" within the symbolic reality
defined by media communication, with little or no possibility of access to other
levels of reality which, so to say, did not exist.
The status of every piece of information - objective data versus proba-
bility estimates, hypotheses versus value judgments, etc. - was attributed to
all, and each one was placed within the same reference frame. Interpersonal
communication networks were triggered by and fed with messages issued by
the media. Rumors could only develop starting from such messages.
Our point is that a message actually issued mayor may not be received,
mayor may not be believed, accepted, trusted, etc. To the opposite, a piece of
information that is not communica.ted (because it is not available at the time,
because it is only derived from sources not within the reach of the public, or
for whatever other reasons) simply does not exist; it is not information, no
matter how "real" its content may be. Information is not an abstract entity;
it becomes real, it takes shape, when it enters a communication system.
6.3 Investigating Perception
6.3.1 Data and sources
From what kind of sources can we obtain information about the perception
of the Chernobyl event? Which data are relevant and which are available?
What is the empirical basis we rely upon to draw our picture and to attempt
an interpretation? How do we test or "measure" perception? What particular
aspects of perception are of interest to us?
Answering the last question first, it is not our aim (as should be clear from
our premises), nor would it be attainable on a large-scale basis, to deal with
perception in terms of an individual's internal representations, Le., in terms
of the ways one pictured the Chernobyl event to oneself, the things one said
to oneself, the feelings one experienced.
From such internal experiences, however, elaborated on the basis of per-
sonal and social codes and maps, spring the perceptions that are the focus of
our interest, and that we treat largely as a set of beliefs on quite a number
of issues - in their turn giving rise to attitudes, behaviors, and actions. Our
interest is directed to social, rather than individual, phenomena; our frame of
reference is of a socio-psychological type.
Even if dealt with in social terms, however, perception - as any other
activity of the human mind, as any kind of value, attitude, belief, etc. - is
something we can only infer from behavior. We cannot get inside an individ-
ual's heads and watch what happens, how thoughts are shaped.
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We can observe external behavior and from it infer one's internal mental
status; we can also question people about their internal status, about their
thoughts, opinions, feelings, perceptions, etc. Even in this case, however, the
response we get is a kind of behavior - a behavior of a verbal (and possibly
even of an analogical) type - elicited by a verbal stimulus.
We believe that social scientists could greatly improve their understanding
of an individual's internal experiences and external behavior, and of group
dynamics as well, by developing the ability to detect both linguistic and ana-
logical cues from which to infer and predict structures and patterns. Such
talents, however, entail the direct observation of individual and group behav-
ior and, therefore, are of no interest here. Indeed, in our analysis of the social
perception of the Chernobyl event, we are trapped in a kind of "mediological
cage."
6.3.2 Media accounts as objects of social inquiry
To reconstruct, after several years, the social perceptions related to the Cher-
nobyl accident, social scientists are also paradoxically forced to rely mainly
upon media accounts. The reasons for this are not only of a technical and
economic kind, i.e., they are not only related to the necessity of collecting
data about an extensive geographic area, many people, and a great variety of
social groups. The use of media sources is a compulsory choice also for reasons
of content. Since we are investigating perception, we have to rely upon the
sources that mainly contributed to both shaping perception and accounting
for it, i.e., the mass media.
Whether the communications that constituted the basis for perception had
a "real" content or not - tested upon criteria other than the one of being expe-
rienced through communication - is simply irrelevant here. This means that
it is irrelevant relative to the issue of perception formation, not irrelevant in
an absolute way. For example, the media reported a sudden increase in the
number of abortions sought in Austria and Italy (Otway, Chapter 7). We are
able to say now that statistics do not support such a fact in either country. In
particular, with regard to Italy, data on abortion rates were not available to
anyone, not even to health authorities, at the time of the Chernobyl accident.
They were collected much later and made public only in September 1987 (Sen-
ato della Repubblica, 1987). Data for 1986 show a decrease in abortions (at
least those carried out within the state health system) compared with 1985
data - both in absolute rates and in rates calculated with respect to livebirths
and to numbers of women in a fertile age span - thus confirming a trend
ini tiated in 1983.
What is relevant to our argument, however, is not the discrepancy be-
tween information derived from media and statistical sources, it is rather their
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incomparability. The media did not report false news. They actually reported
information provided by one or several reliable sources. The fact is that pre-
cise, objective data were not available at the time of the event, not even to
reliable sources.
Without questioning the good faith of the media, we are simply stating
that, when issued, the information about increased abortion rates was based
upon impressionistic evaluations or very limited samples or both - not rep-
resentative, and likely not even casual. We are facile prophets if we predict
that the statement "the media reported increase in abortion rates" (correctly
identified as such by Otway in Chapter 7) is, or will become, for most people
including many scholars and scientists "increase in abortion rates" tout court.
6.3.3 An example
This is true for many other "facts" and behaviors that were reported by the
media. A recent study based upon statistical sources was conducted in Friuli-
Venezia Giulia (a region in northeastern Italy) within a project devoted to
suggesting measures for implementing a regional policy of civil protection
(Pelanda, 1988). The study had to contend with serious and sometimes un-
solvable methodological and technical problems in designing reliable indicators
of significant behavioral changes within the resident population in connection
with the Chernobyl accident and, once designed, in fulfilling the steps required
by their operational definition.
For instance, the media and even a well-known Italian research institute
(Censis, 1986) claimed that during the period of fallout deposition people
stayed home (without, however, providing any empirical evidence to support
that claim). An attempt was made to verify whether such phenomenon had
actually occurred in the region under study. Having accomplished a first selec-
tion of indicators that, in theory, seemed appropriate and measurable - such
as absences from school and work, decreased sale of public transport tickets,
and increased private consumption of water and electric energy - outstanding
difficulties arose when an attempt was made to collect the actual information.
Data were often unavailable owing to a variety of reasons: the lack of col-
laboration on the part of some competent sources, aggregation different from
that of the researchers (e.g., different geographic and temporal units), delays
in elaborating and issuing data, etc. (Ferrauto, 1988).
As a consequence, the hypothesis of self-confinement could be neither
proved nor disproved by "objective" data. It may, of course, be maintained
with the status of a hypothesis, or it may also be acknowledged with the sta-
tus of "truth" at a communication level. At such a level, truth refers not to
content, but to existence; Le., the content of the information was not nec-
essarily true, but - for the very fact of being communicated - information
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about self-confinement became a "true" experience and entered the processes
of perception formation for large masses of people.
However, this communication level must not be confused with the one of
actual behavior. We simply cannot say - on the basis of the information
available to us - whether self-confinement was or was not a behavior enacted
by large masses of people in Friuli-Venezia Giulia or in Italy or in the rest of
Europe.
Diverse data about the Chernobyl accident are, at present, available and
can be derived from sources other than the mass media. Nowadays, more easily
than at the time of the event, we can rely on "objective" data, for instance, on
contamination of crops (see Gray, Chapter 4), on health effects (see Sztanyik,
Chapter 3), etc.; we can also rely upon data from opinion surveys and upon
data and information derived from researches or experiences or both in some
restricted areas, etc. However, such data pertain to levels of reality different
from the one addressed here, largely dominated by the media: levels which
at the time of the accident were, and partially still are, only accessible to
restricted groups.
6.4 The Perception of Chernobyl as a
"Social Accident"
6.4.1 Issues to the fore
In our opinion, the Chernobyl emergency - as it was reported to the public
by the media - has focused the attention of the public on three main issues
related to nuclear energy and, more generally, to modern technologies: (1)
who decides; (2) what are the criteria for the decisions; and (3) how reliable
are decision makers.
After Chernobyl, Europe was divided into two main sectors, separated by
East-West political border. When Swedish technicians monitored the increase
in radioactivity in their country, they warned all European governments who
immediately tried to get information from the USSR.
Each government, however, had to face a complex set of problems: Was
the public to be warned? Were preventive measures to be taken to reduce
risk of radiation exposure? What social consequences would be entailed in
the warning? Would people panic? How would ecological movements, Green
parties, and other political forces react to the nuclear accident? And more
important, what levels of radioactivity should to be considered dangerous and
in relation to which aspects of individual and social life? What measures had
to be recommended to or imposed upon people? How much social consensus
would the adopted measures encounter?
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It seems to us that three main phases can be singled out by the reaction to
the Chernobyl emergency, characterized by different definitions of the situation
and by different actors involved in decision-making processes. The three phases
can be identified, we believe, in all European countries, although with some
inconsistencies and lags in relation to chronological time.
6.4.2 Decision makers' perception of the social threat
In the first phase, all national governments in Europe managed the problem by
minimizing the significance of the amount of radiation in Europe, though the
situation was unclear and was rapidly developing. Official statements reported
in the international press paid great attention to the accident in the USSR,
reassuring people that there was no risk to human health in Western Europe.
So authorities turned the interests and the attention of the public toward the
Ukrainian population. At the same time, to reassure people, a "technical
thesis" was developed about the difference between "here" (Western Europe)
and "there" (USSR): that a similar accident is impossible "here" because of
much safer and more modern nuclear technology (Cappelli, 1987; Flavin, 1987;
Guizzardi, 1987).
This tactical decision was supported by the fact that during the sociopo-
litical conflicts of the crisis management, the governments felt threatened not
only by possible contamination, but by social and political opposition to na-
tional nuclear energy plans. In short, they feared that the nightmare of a
nuclear accident may become reality and might lead people to perceive nu-
clear energy as unacceptable, thus triggering a strong reaction from Green
movements and other political forces.
Therefore, the problem of making decisions on well-grounded scientific cri-
teria was only one component of the decision-making process. Moreover, the
different evaluations and the uncertainties shown within the scientific commu-
nity did not give the decisional subjects great support for a "correct" decision.
But this was not the main problem in the first phase, since the decision-making
process was rather attentive to the urgency of political, economic, and social
necessities.
This situation broke down when, borne by the winds, the radioactive pol-
lution began to affect Western Europe. What appeared from media reports
was that, rather than coordinating and deciding preventive measures to pro-
tect populations from risk pollution, national governments were more keen on
criticizing Soviet management of the crisis.
Besides the "technical thesis," the statements of different governments
reported in the international press implied that the accident had happened
because in the USSR there is no free and democratic debate about technology,
economy, and the environment. The problem was therefore stated in terms
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of the "right" model of society, i.e., of those inner societal conditions which
make accurate technical planning possible.
6.4.3 Emergent actors in the decision process
The second phase is characterized by the attempt to redefine the situation to
face the problems of radioactive pollution in Europe and to take adequate pre-
ventive measures. Two main factors characterized the international, national,
and local decision-making processes: (1) the absence of a common definition
of risk and (2) the emergence of conflicting actors.
The first factor relates to the disagreement among scientists, whose quar-
rels about what and how much was dangerous - diffused by the mass media
- contributed to the ambiguity and uncertainty in the public. Occasionally,
data about radiation exposure displayed by different scientists were inconsis-
tent. More often, data were the same, but diverging evaluations of the effects
on the public were made by scientists.
At both the international and the national levels, the organizations in-
volved demonstrated that they were not prepared to monitor nuclear contam-
ination or to manage the emergency. For instance, the World Health Orga-
nization was totally absent during the fallout period, and unable to define a
common set of preventive measures and recommendations (cf. Linnerooth-
Bayer, Chapter 5).
Some political authorities tried to minimize the pollution problems; some
did not communicate the data referring to radioactivity or released only partial
information. The French decision to maintain silence about the danger of
radiation for about two weeks is an extreme case. However, governments in
other countries displayed radiation data in a way that seemed to be aimed
at minimizing the problem. For instance, early in the emergency, the Italian
national organization of civil protection claimed that the levels of radioactivity
were not dangerous. Later, when political and social forces started asking for
specific data, the Ministry of Civil Protection declared that data about many
areas, especially the ones most exposed to pollution, were not and had never
been available (Chernobyl Cronologia, 1987).
The second factor that characterized the crisis management was the emer-
gence in the decision field of different actors (social, economic, and political)
who tried to defend their interests and influence the decisions of crisis man-
agement. By now, it is widely recognized by sociopolitical scientist that the
direct and indirect participation of different actors in the decision field is nor-
mal in political decision making. However, the way this process works in mass
emergencies and in cases of uncertainty and urgency is not yet well understood.
What is clear from the Chernobyl emergency is that institutional author-
ities, though with slight differences in each country, made their decisions
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without taking into account the needs of various actors potentially present
in the decisional field, and underestimating the problem of social and political
"active consensus."
The development of the decision-making process during the Chernobyl
emergency in Friuli-Venezia Giulia (Italy) has been the focus of recent research.
Two main issues emerged: (1) the uncertainty under which decision making
took place relates not only to scientific and technical issues, but also and even
more to sociopolitical ones, and (2) despite the urgency the decision makers
could not neglect the problem of social consensus or the presence of different
actors (social, political, and economic) who, in a democratic society, intervene
and participate in the decision field (for a closer analysis, see Tessarin, 1988;
Lizzi, 1988).
Decision making is a process that defines and organizes reality. Mostly
during emergencies it is aimed at resolving the uncertainty and ordering cri-
teria for the actions of many different actors in the social field. But, to fulfill
such a task, the decision must be widely accepted and actively supported by
the actors.
Since the authorities, in the second phase of the emergency, did not elicit
political and social consensus, a conflict broke out in the third phase. In short,
after the institutional authorities' attempt at minimizing the "risk," the dif-
ferent perceptions and evaluations of other social actors were evident through
direct and indirect participation in the social organization of the emergency.
6.4.4 The conflict and the "credibility of institutions"
The third phase is characterized by a high level of conflict, where the credibil-
ity of the institution is questioned (cf. Poumadere, Chapter 8), and a strong
request emerges, not only for a more democratic management of emergencies,
but also for enhancing sociopolitical debate before decisions on energy sources
are taken. The contrasting interpretations of the situation - displayed by dif-
ferent actors and reflected by the mass media -led to remarkable consequences
in both crisis management and public opinions.
Faced with such complex circumstances, not only decision makers showed
great difficulty in evaluating and perceiving all the implications of their own
decisions, but also lay people became bewildered by the confusion. They could
not see radioactivity, but they saw the impact ofthis threat on society: author-
ities, politicians, businessmen, experts, scientists, professionals, institutions,
all distrusting and opposing each other. In particular, border communities
saw the frontiers become quite concrete by virtue of different warnings and
different emergency plans carried out even though the physical event was the
same. No common criterion was given to people for evaluating the situation
and taking preventive measures; thus, the uncertainty was amplified.
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Though authorities were afraid of mass panic and justified their decisions as
also intending to avoid it, short-term responses to the emergency did not show
extensive "pathologies" in the collective behavior. Occasional manifestations
of stress and anxiety are likely to have occurred, and some were reported by
the media - for example, in Greece (see Otway, Chapter 7) - but mass panic
was not the response, nor were extended forms of antisocial behavior.
According to most of the sociological literature - which, however, is based
mainly upon studies of natural disasters - individuals tend to react and re-
spond to threats in a rather "rational" (or at least "meaningful") way. They
explore and use all possible resources and strategies for escape, and seldom
panic (for an excursus of human behavior in disasters see Drabek, 1986).
Usually, in the beginning, people faced with a hazard or an emergency tend
to minimize the threat; at the same time, however, they tend to act in a "ra-
tional" way, starting to collect additional information to define the situation.
During the Chernobyl emergency, people were faced with several sources of
information, conflicting messages, different attitudes of sociopoli tical groups,
institutional authorities, experts, technicians, etc. Thus, it was extremely dif-
ficult to obtain a "warning confirmation" and to select an appropriate pattern
of behavior to minimize danger.
Social perception of nuclear risk after Chernobyl has rebounded on social
institutions, decreasing their credibility. As indicated by a survey on the
attitudes of local planners about nuclear power carried out in Italy one year
after Chernobyl (Strassoldo and del Zotto, 1988), the common concern is that
"nuclear energy itself may be acceptable; what is unacceptable, at the present,
is its management in this country."
So the thesis that in the USSR the accident was possible because of the
"wrong" model of society where no democratic and free debate could develop
around technology, environment, etc., backfired on authorities in Western Eu-
rope, directing the public's attention to the ways in which these societies
manage goods and values such as human health, environment, and, ultimately,
democracy.
6.5 Conclusion
The Chernobyl accident was extensively covered by the media all over Europe
and became an everyday experience - although a secondhand experience - for
many people. Thus, they were forced to reflect upon the issue of nuclear risk
that, very likely, had been alien to many of them up to that time. We are
convinced that the topic of nuclear risk appeared to the public as multifaceted.
The experience of Chernobyl was, thus, one of many experiences that con-
tributed to shaping individual and social beliefs, opinions, and attitudes about
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many issues. We maintain that such issues pertain to technology management,
policymaking, and the overall functioning of Western democracies. In sum-
mary, our thesis is that the features of the Chernobyl emergency that mainly
attracted social perception were not of a technical, but rather of a sociopo-
litical nature. It appears - on the basis of public demonstrations all over
Europe following Chernobyl - that the public was concerned not so much
with the problem of radioactivity itself, but rather with the sociopolitical de-
cisions concerning modern technologies, crisis management, energy choices:
issues concerning the reliability of institutions and faith in democracy.
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Chapter 7
The Media and Crisis
Management
Harry Otway*
Commission of the European Communities
Joint Research Centre
Ispra, Italy
Modern governments can effectively communicate with citizens only through
the mass media, especially in emergencies when people must be informed im-
mediately of developments and advised on what to do. According to an opinion
poll reported by Schneider (1986), 80% of respondents got their information
about health countermeasures after Chernobyl from the media, while only 3%
contacted public health authorities directly.
We investigated how the media in seven European countries communicated
information that was technical (dealing with nuclear technology), sensitive (re-
garding the effects of radiation on public health), and complicated (involving
a strong East-West political dimension). Our intent was to identify common
problems and to suggest ways in which communications and crisis manage-
ment might be improved. We have carefully avoided second-guessing specific
decisions for two reasons: first, even under similar circumstances quite differ-
ent policy choices can be equally reasonable and, second, it is impossible to
judge decisions fairly without intimate knowledge of the political context and
constraints surrounding them.
The countries studied (Austria, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom) are heterogeneous in indus-
trial development and in the status of their domestic nuclear energy programs.
Our main sources were the more "authoritative" national newspapers. These
were supplemented by weekly and monthly magazines, television broadcasts,
*Current address: Health, Safety, and Environment Division Office, Los Alamos National
Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM, USA.
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official statements, and interviews with journalists and public officials. A daily
press summary was made of each country with emphasis on the timing and
basis of countermeasures, how they were announced, and the general public's
response. The summaries (Otway et al., 1986) are too long to be included here,
but a list of print sources used is included in the Appendix to this chapter (see
also Borelli et al., 1987; Chausse, 1987; Peters et al., 1987).
The print media may not be the most important source of information, but
they are more specific and detailed than other media and are readily available
for analysis. Checks between television and print media showed that coverage
was similar, as were the communications problems. National media styles
vary, and reporting of public responses does itself influence public behavior;
however, it seems unlikely that these would have an appreciable effect on the
conclusions.
7.1 Communication Needs and
Government Responses
Upon becoming aware that an accident had occurred, governments were con-
fronted with the necessity of managing an emergency whose dimensions were
yet unknown, and of meeting public demands for information about it. In gen-
eral, governments were not well prepared to do this for several reasons: they
did not immediately know the nature of the accident, so they did not know
what consequences to expect or when to expect them; their monitoring sys-
tems were not suited to widespread and nonuniform radioactivity originating
outside the country; and they did not always have pre-established intervention
levels or countermeasures.
7.1.1 Early information about the accident
The first indication of the accident in Western Europe was the detection of
airborne radioactivity in Sweden two days after its start. Meteorologists fore-
casted that the radioactive cloud would stay in Northern Europe for some time
and might even be harmless when it reached Central and Southern Europe.
Little information was available about the accident or the extent of the re-
lease. However, the release of radioactivity continued and weather conditions
changed, bringing the cloud south. Many governments were not prepared for
the speed with which the cloud arrived or the high levels of contamination it
caused.
Authorities responsible for the management of radiation emergencies had
generally not anticipated that a reactor accident could result in such high lev-
els of contamination so far from the plant. A reactor accident is commonly
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conceived as causing a sector of contamination downwind from the site, de-
creasing in intensity with distance, with significant downwind contamination
limited to some tens of kilometers. But the Chernobyl release went much
higher than usually assumed in accident calculations; the cloud encountered
different wind conditions as it rose, and fallout patterns were affected by local
rains. Consequently, contamination levels bore no simple relationship to dis-
tance from the reactor. For this reason, early calculations made in the West
overestimated the size of the release and the number of casualties close to the
plant.
7.1.2 The source term controversy
Contamination of an entire country, caused by an accident so far away, had not
been expected, so monitoring systems tended to be focused on nearby nuclear
facilities and were ill-suited to monitor widespread and uneven contamination.
Early reports by Western officials criticized the Soviet Union for not providing
more information on the accident's sequence of events, the extent of damage,
and the amount and type of radioactivity released. It was widely claimed that
the lack of information was hindering crisis management.
The Soviet government did not admit that an accident had happened for
about 64 hours. Although this was a problem for Denmark, Finland, Poland,
and Sweden - countries that learned about the accident through their own
routine atmospheric monitoring programs - many early problems encountered
by crisis managers were not really due to uncertainty about the source term
but, rather, due to the insufficient amount ofgood information about what was
happening in their own countries, i.e., the cloud trajectory and local radiation
measurements.
Local information could hardly have been provided by the Soviet Union,
and, in view of their organizational problems and the technical uncertainties,
it seems doubtful that Soviet authorities in Moscow even had reliable detailed
information (Gubarev and Odinets, 1988). It might also be recalled that
similar organizational problems were seen after the Three Mile Island (TMI)
accident in the USA when it was only some days after the accident that reliable
technical information was available. At TMI, the optimistic mind-set of the
private utility operator and a general desire to protect the nuclear industry
seriously damaged the credibility of early information released. The first press
releases were unjustifiably soothing, not to mention deceptive (Rubin, 1987).
There was some sensationalist reporting in the West of early events in the
Soviet Union, but some of this was a faithful repetition of information from
apparently credible sources. For example, in the first days after the accident
the media widely reported thousands of deaths in the vicinity of the reactor
(15,000 bodies buried in a mass grave), riots in Kiev, and an out-of-control
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fire in a second unit. Most of these stories originated in the US media and
were attributed to US "intelligence" sources in the European media, leading
Secretary Gorbachev to refer to "malicious mountains of lies." As it turned
out, official Soviet information later proved correct (see Walker, 1986, for a
journalist's account of reporting the emergency from Moscow and the origins
of some of the more bizarre news stories).
7.1.3 Actions required of government
Many governments had to formulate strategies to respond to the crisis as it
was developing, e.g., monitoring radioactivity, setting tolerance levels, and
recommending ways to reduce exposure. Atmospheric radioactivity as well
as surface concentrations and levels in both imported and locally produced
foodstuffs had to be monitored.
Tolerance levels were sometimes available for other contingencies, but ad
hoc arrangements had to be made to locate and deploy the necessary equip-
ment and manpower for this particular application. In other cases, where tol-
erance levels had not already been decided upon, they had to be determined
rapidly, often without time to consider the many theoretical and practical ques-
tions involved. Ways devised to limit radiation exposures included banning
certain foodstuffs from the market, setting consumption limits on others, and
recommending personal behaviors that would minimize individual exposures,
e.g., by not drinking rainwater and by not letting children play outdoors.
There were immediate demands for information on environmental radioac-
tivity, its level in various foodstuffs, the corresponding health implications,
expected future developments, and ways that individuals could limit their ex-
posures.
7.2 Common Communications Problems
Several problems related to communications were encountered, in varying de-
grees, in many of the countries studied. Those discussed below were the most
common.
7.2.1 Organizational confusion
Government responses required action by several departments and ministries.
Because the goals and responsibilities of each organization are different, the re-
sult was often friction and confusion. In particular, there seemed to be conflicts
between economic interests and public safety in decisions to ban agricultural
produce. Agriculture ministries, or local authorities in rural areas, tended to
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support higher intervention levels than those recommended by public health
officials.
There were also conflicts between members of government and senior civil
servants. Webster (1986) reports that a senior spokesman of a health agency
tried to give reassurance by saying that "a few tens of people" would die
because of the late effects of Chernobyl, but the responsible minister, either
thinking only of immediate health effects or ignorant of long-term effects,
announced that there were no health risks.
7.2.2 Anticipating the need for countermeasures
Besides inadequacies in local monitoring, there was little attempt to use what-
ever local information was available in conjunction with models of atmospheric
transport and radioactivity deposition and uptake by humans and animals to
foresee crisis management needs. For example, the first countermeasures fo-
cused on the threat posed by 1-131, which was initially the greatest contributor
to radiation exposures. In several countries, shortly after restrictions on iodine
contamination were lifted, it was necessary to re-implement them because of
cesium contamination. This created confusion about which countermeasures
were actually in force and hurt public confidence in the management of the
crisis.
In the case of the sheep farmers studied by Wynne et al. (1988), the fail-
ure to anticipate foreseeable events caused serious financial losses. Farmers
were told that contamination would last only a few weeks and that restric-
tions would be lifted before their lambs went to market. However, the crisis
lasted much longer, and compensation claims were often rejected because of
incomplete documentation - documentation that the farmers had not collected
because earlier the same ministry had assured them that they need not worry
because there would be no significant losses.
7.2.3 Explaining countermeasures
Many different intervention levels exist for particular foodstuffs, used by differ-
ent countries and international organizations, and it was often unclear which
levels were actually being used. Furthermore, well-intentioned people some-
times behaved inappropriately when following government advice without un-
derstanding the reasons for it, e.g., by consuming long-life milk packaged after
it had already been contaminated or by bringing a contaminated sandbox into
the house after instructions had been given not to let children play outdoors.
There was confusion about the extent to which the implementation of
countermeasures was the responsibility of the government or of the individ-
ual, informed by government advice. For example, sometimes people were
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advised not to consume more than a certain amount of some foods while other
foods were withdrawn from the market. Thus, consumers were unsure if foods
available in shops were free of radioactivity or not.
Sometimes countermeasures failed to distinguish between produce grown in
the open and similar, but uncontaminated, produce grown in greenhouses (e.g.,
lettuce and strawberries). The consumers' inability to check personally for
radioactivity, coupled with suspicions of the shopkeepers' knowledge of where
products originated, and an awareness of conflicting government objectives
caused apprehension to buy any fresh produce at all. Another complication
was that it was relatively easy to tell when countermeasures were instituted,
but difficult to know when they were removed, perhaps because the imposition
of countermeasures is more newsworthy (see Peltu, 1985, for a discussion of
how the media determine what is "news").
Perhaps even more serious was the fact that countermeasures sometimes
failed to appreciate the realities of the lives of the individuals who were ex-
pected to act on them. Taking again Wynne's (1988) example of sheep farm-
ers, advice to hold the new lamb crop on the farms until radioactivity decayed
simply neglected the realities of balancing the availability of grass, the condi-
tion of the sheep, parasite buildup, market prices, the availability of help, and
the need for capital. Worse, advice was given to feed straw to sheep, leading
one farmer to say: "I've never heard of a sheep that would look at straw as
fodder."
In summary, official advice was sometimes unrealistic and, in the deed,
impossible to implement. However well meaning advice may be, the loss of
credibility caused by inadequate or confusing recommendations spills over into
other issues, is likely to erode the credibility of other authorities, and is ex-
tremely difficult to repair.
7.2.4 Radiation units
In all countries there was a serious problem of reporting quantitative infor-
mation, especially with regard to radiation measurement units. Contamina-
tion levels were reported in rontgen, curies, or becquerel per kilogram, liter,
square meter, etc. Radiation exposures or doses were given in rads per unit
time or in grays, while dose equivalents were given in rads or sieverts. Milli-,
micro-, pico-, and nano-units of the above were also used, sometimes as if the
basic units with different prefixes were completely unrelated. The time rates
used also varied widely, e.g., per second, per hour, per day, or even over a
lifetime.
Confusion was caused first by different units being used, sometimes in the
same report, without providing information on how to convert them and sec-
ond because units were used incorrectly, making the information
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meaningless even to specialists (e.g., by not indicating the time unit of a rate
measurement). This was not only a media problem; often ministries within
a country used different units, and the press simply reported the information
given to them. In some cases, the media were careless because they did not
understand the importance of prefixes or the time dimension.
7.2.5 Relating exposures to health effects
Raw numbers on radiation exposures mean little to nonspecialists because
these measures are difficult to relate to health effects. Attempts were made to
put these numbers into context by expressing them as fractions of allowable
limits, but the limits were rarely explained, Le., to what situations they apply
or how they relate to health effect's. Also, various limit values were used, often
inappropriately or without proper identification, e.g., the ICRP recommended
yearly occupational whole body dose equivalent, the public dose limit, the
dose required for the onset of acute effects, or the dose at which half of those
exposed would die of acute radiation sickness (the LD-50).
Exposures to Chernobyl radiation were also compared to familiar activities
that involve exposure to natural radiation: e.g., vacationing in the mountains,
traveling by air, or moving to a part of the country with higher background
radiation. These comparisons were generally regarded suspiciously by the
press. One reason may be that comparisons of industrial accident risks to
leisure time activities seem obviously inappropriate; another explanation is
that they have so frequently been used by nuclear experts to put prospective
accident risks "in perspective" that they are now simply discounted as being
part of self-serving promotional campaigns.
Alternatively, the cancer deaths expected from Chernobyl were compared
to the large number of "natural" cancer deaths. The intent was to demonstrate
the relative insignificance of radiation hazards, but its success as a communica-
tions strategy requires that the public accept this as a legitimate comparison.
This seemed not to be the case, partly because up to 10,000 additional cancer
deaths were predicted for Europe.
7.2.6 Differences across national borders
Several different intervention levels were used by the countries studied for
the same foodstuffs; in the Federal Republic of Germany, there were also dif-
ferences among the state (Lander) governments. Countermeasures based on
political judgment were also not consistent - especially noticeable in the of-
ficial responses to similar levels of contamination across political boundaries.
For example, in the West German city of Wiesbaden the mayor closed pub-
lic parks and swimming pools, while in Mainz - just over the Rhine - they
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remained open. Similarly, the Federal Republic of Germany placed restrictions
on vegetables and milk, while across the Rhine, in France, there were none.
In Austria, parents were advised to keep children indoors, while in Italy they
were not.
On the Swiss-Italian border, differences in the averaging and aggregation
of data caused apparent inconsistencies in the reporting of radioactivity levels.
Italy, a peninsula with north-south cultural differences, reported aggregated
levels for northern, central, and southern regions. However, the Swiss, with
cultural differences across language groups, aggregated in terms of linguistic
region. Thus, in the Italian-speaking Ticino region of Switzerland, which ex-
perienced heavy rains, radiation levels were reported that were about 10 times
higher than those given in the Italian media for northern Italy. The part of
Italy bordering on Ticino, which experienced roughly the same contamination
levels, was averaged with drier parts of the north. Both sets of data were
correct within their own terms of reference, but the apparent differences were
confusing to those who followed the media of both countries.
7.2.7 Unusual public reactions
The entire range of public responses cannot be documented from media reports
because unexceptional behavior is not newsworthy; Schneider (1986) estimated
that 60% of the public complied with government recommendations, making
radical changes in their life-styles to minimize risk.
Nevertheless, some extreme responses were reported: a sudden increase
in the number of abortions sought (in Austria and Italy); panic buying of
long-life foods in most countries, but reaching near-riot proportions in Greece;
buying radiation-measuring equipment for personal use (United Kingdom and
the Federal Republic of Germany); an increase in antinuclear demonstrations,
including demonstrations at nuclear sites in bordering countries (e.g., groups
demonstrated in Bavaria and in Prague and Budapest, where individuals were
arrested); deaths and hospitalizations due to self-administered overdoses of
potassium iodide in the Federal Republic of Germany (this stable iodine com-
pound blocks the thyroid gland so it cannot take up radioactive iodine - phar-
macies in Denmark reportedly sold out of it shortly after the accident); suicides
attributed to anxiety or economic losses caused by Chernobyl.
7.2.8 Changes in public opinion about nuclear energy
Post-Chernobyl public opinion polls posed questions for governments com-
mitted to nuclear energy. Each poll was phrased differently, but opposition
to nuclear power was invariably seen to have increased. In 1982, 52% of
West German respondents supported nuclear energy, with 46% opposed; after
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Chernobyl the figures were 29% and 69%, respectively. A UK Gallup Poll in
March 1986 showed 34% supported increasing nuclear power generation and
53% against; results in May were 18% and 75%, respectively.
Polls also suggested dissatisfaction with government information. In a 1986
Harris Poll, in France, 13% agreed that "they are telling the truth about Cher-
nobyl" while 74% believed that "they are not telling everything." Hohenemser
and Renn (1988) have summarized pre- and post-Chernobyl changes in public
opinions about nuclear energy in 11 European countries.
7.2.9 Special information telephones
Many countries set up special telephone numbers where people could get ad-
ditional information or check rumors. Often demands for information were
so heavy that the lines were overloaded and callers could not get through.
(In one country, incorrect numbers were mistakenly published.) Even worse,
when they did reach someone, callers found that those who answered were
overworked and abrupt or able only to give general reassurance and repeat
information already available in the media.
People with very specific and (to them) important questions, such as farm-
ers who needed to know if grass could be fed to livestock, were unable to get
detailed information. Overloaded special telephone lines sometimes caused
people to call authorities at their normal telephone numbers, jamming switch-
boards and making crisis management even more difficult.
7.3 Discussion and Conclusions
7.3.1 Organizational aspects
The widespread impression was that governments were not well prepared for
the crisis management problems presented by Chernobyl, partly because of its
international dimension - a fairly recent phenomenon in industrial accidents.
It was often apparent that strategies were being improvised, evidenced by fre-
quent reversals of decisions and by the different policies chosen by different
countries to solve the same problems. This was complicated by conflicting
information provided by different government departments or even by various
hierarchical levels within the same department. Also, the desire for informa-
tion responsive to the needs of specific groups was underestimated, causing
delay in the provision of information, inadequate information, and a conse-
quent loss of credibility in crisis management.
Paradoxically, even if crisis management organizations and procedures are
set up in advance, there are inherent problems of maintaining readiness. Ev-
ery crisis is different; plans made in advance will still need to be improvised
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as the nature of the particular crisis becomes apparent. In addition, plans
existing on paper need frequent updating and must also be rehearsed often.
Experience has shown that the problems of updating information and main-
taining proficiency are serious ones; day-to-day responsibilities inevitably take
precedence over special assignments to emergency teams. It is also expensive
to assign people only to emergency tasks, and boredom caused by long periods
of inactivity also causes problems in maintaining proficiency.
Personal goals may conflict with intentions to limit official sources of in-
formation. Elected politicians may still want to be seen by the media and
the public to be actively involved in crisis management. Government changes
occur more frequently than major crises, thus politicians may not have first-
hand experience of previous crises, increasing the possibility of repeating past
mistakes.
7.3.2 Risk communication: Macro-risk versus micro-risk
Public confidence was not helped by overly technocratic efforts to put Cher-
nobyl risks "in perspective" by comparisons with natural death rates or the
risks of dissimilar activities. This was viewed as an attempt to minimize or to
cover up the accident's consequences. The regulatory role deals with "macro-
risks," the threat to the health of society. The individual, however, asks the
"micro-risk" question: "What does this risk mean to me and my family?"
Successful communications require those in authority to be sensitive to this
distinction and to address both issues (Sharlin, 1986).
In the case of Chernobyl, attempts to provide reassurance using compar-
isons that blurred the macro-micro risk dichotomy often backfired; 50 addi-
tional cancer deaths may not seem like much to public health experts who
frequently think in terms of hundreds of thousands of "natural" cancer deaths
each year, but an increase of 50 deaths, visualized by lay people as bodies to
be put in coffins and buried, is a considerable amount - especially when caused
by a reactor no one had ever heard of, in a distant and unfamiliar land.
People were concerned to hear their own public health authorities essen-
tially say that it did not matter because so many people die of cancer anyway.
Carrying this logic to the extreme implies that an equal number of deaths
could be caused by every industrial facility in the world and still not matter
- a position that most people would intuitively reject.
Often the spokesperson who said that the additional cancer deaths were
insignificant also said that technologists could learn nothing from the Cher-
nobyl accident because Western technology is so much more advanced. This
made the nuclear experts seem arrogant and damaged the credibility of public
health information because it was suspected of being influenced by a desire to
Harry Otway 143
protect the domestic nuclear industry, especially where governments officially
support nuclear energy.
The majority of the public in most countries regarded government infor-
mation provisions as inadequate; people seemed to feel that the public health
threat was worse than government sources said. But public authorities faced
a most sensitive communications problem, the inherently difficult one of cred-
ibly transmitting a double message - asking people to change their daily lives
to minimize risk while, at the same time, urging them not to become unduly
anxious or to overreact in ways that might be equally dangerous.
7.3.3 Media accuracy
We found, in agreement with a study of the UK media (Herbert, 1987), that
the more "responsible" print media did a fairly good job of covering the acci-
dent, especially in conveying information provided by authorities. The media
did have problems with highly technical topics, especially with units of radi-
ation, contamination, and exposure; however, many scientists not working in
the area of radiation protection on a daily basis were unaware of the "new"
International System of Units (81) and were forced to consult references (see
Appendix to this volume).
The scientific-technical community tends to judge media accuracy by sci-
entific standards. The typical scientific paper takes months to draft and may
not appear in print for a year or two. Journalists, in contrast, often have dead-
lines measured in hours, perhaps even minutes, and the material may appear
the next day; thus, some inaccuracy in technical matters is inevitable, and
should not come as a surprise. This will always be a problem in the coverage
of emergencies; it is unrealistic to expect journalists to be informed of the
technical details of all varieties of hazardous facility.
The media will always check government information with unofficial sources
such as university laboratories and "independent" scientists, and whatever sci-
entific disagreements exist will be mirrored in this supplementary information.
Where consequences are uncertain, and thus open to genuine differences of
opinion, these divergent viewpoints will be reported - with implications for
the credibility of official information, especially if government credibility is
already in question.
The only way that authorities can be perceived as being credible in emer-
gencies is if they have already earned credibility in their daily dealings with
the public. The cosmetics of packaging and presenting information cannot
cause a previously untrustworthy source suddenly to be perceived as credible.
144 Chernobyl
7.4 Recommendations
This analysis suggests several recommendations to improve emergency man-
agement and communications, the first two of which are specific to nuclear
accidents.
Standardization of radiation units. The effects of radiation have been more ex-
tensively studied than those of any other toxic agent, and there is substantial
agreement (at least in official circles) on dose-response relationships, thus it
is ironic that so much confusion was caused by misunderstanding of the basic
units. This could be improved by ensuring consistency in official circles and by
using only SI units. Nongovernmental laboratories should also be encouraged
to use standard units since it does not affect their independence. Some confu-
sion is inevitable since measurements made under different conditions cannot
readily be compared, e.g., per kilogram of wet and dry grass.
Aggregation rules. Aggregation of contamination data is necessary and is likely
to cause disagreements even in the best of circumstances. Aggregating data
from areas that have experienced quite different weather conditions, and thus
have widely different levels of contamination, must be avoided. Aggregation
decisions should also consider factors such as population density and land use,
recognizing that individuals are sensitive to maxima as well as average values.
Communications credibility. Communication with the public is central to ef-
fective crisis management. Governments have a responsibility to intervene in
the marketing offoodstuffs and to provide services required to reduce risks, but
the effectiveness of countermeasures in practice depends upon individual deci-
sions. Sensible public behavior can result only from adequate, understandable,
and credible information. This has obvious implications for a government's
day-to-day dealings with the public.
Organizational aspects. Crisis management procedures were generally
perceived by the public as inadequate and confused. This was typified by
disagreements, for instance, between ministries. The need for centralized in-
formation dissemination became apparent as the accident progressed when
journalists had trouble identifying official sources, the public was not sure
where to turn for information, there was uncertainty about the impartiality of
the information that was available, and there were discrepancies among vari-
ous official sources. It is important to have, and to present to the public and
press, pre-established methods for dealing with crises of this sort. Obviously,
every crisis is different, but organizational relationships should be defined in
advance to avoid overlapping responsibilities and conflicts of interest in the
heat of a developing crisis.
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Transboundary harmonization. The harmonization of intervention levels has
a strong political dimension because different policies can result from equally
reasonable trade-offs among political, economic, and safety considerations.
However, the fact that intervention levels vary across national or state borders
undermines the credibility of government choices, because the public expects
health and safety issues to be the primary consideration.
Information hot lines. Special telephone operators who can give quick and
authoritative answers to particular questions can help to show that those re-
sponsible are "on top" of the situation and to reduce the spread of rumors.
The telephone lines must function properly, not be overloaded, and be staffed
by well-informed individuals who are skilled in dealing with lay people who
may be somewhat over-anxious. In addition, the numbers should be published
accurately. Arrangements for an adequate supply of telephone lines and spe-
cial training for enough people to staff them should be made in advance so
that the emergency information system can be rapidly activated when needed.
"Education" and communication. In view of the wide variety of conceivable
emergencies, suggestions that journalists be "educated" in the scientific and
technical details of hazardous technologies are unrealistic. They should, how-
ever, be helped to understand crisis management procedures as background for
dealing with particular emergencies. Governments should prepare information
in advance for specific cases, e.g., on radiation units and their meaning. Sci-
entists and public officials who have responsibilities for communicating about
risks should learn more about how the media work and what their constraints
are. Scientific standards of accuracy should not be expected of journalists,
who must work under severe deadline pressures amid confusion that is not of
their making.
Scientists and public officials are generally not good at clearly communi-
cating complex information, itself clouded by uncertainty, to journalists and
the public. This requires improved communication skills, an understanding of
how risks are perceived, and knowledge of how to express technical information
so that it is meaningful to nonspecialists.
Some very good guides to successful communications that reflect these
principles are starting to appear (e.g., Hance et al., 1988), but we must be
sensitive to the fact that this research has an inherent political dimension
and a potential for manipulation that may depend less on the content of the
research than on the intent with which it is ultimately applied (Otway, 1987).
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Appendix: Print Media Sources
Austria: Neue Kronen Zeitung, Kurier, Die Presse, Profil, Wochenpresse, Wiener,
Wiener Zeitung.
Denmark: Information, Weekendavisen, press releases and summary reports from
Miljoestryelsen.
Federal Republic of Germany: Siiddeutsche Zeitung, Die Zeit, Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, Der Spiegel.
France: Le Figaro, Le Monde.
Greece: K athimerini, Makedonia.
Italy: II Corriere della Sera, II Giornale, La Repubblica.
United Kingdom: Times, Financial Times, Guardian, several weeklies.
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Chapter 8
The Credibility Crisis
Marc Poumadere
Institut SYMLOG
Cachan, France
8.1 Introduction: Something Worse than the
Bad News
Those who said that the twentieth century is the century of the atom didn't
know how right they were. Certainly, the scientific discovery of a particularly
powerful new energy source had produced hopes and applications in both
the civil and military sectors. In the final equation, though, it is the major
accident at Chernobyl that dramatically and suddenly brought the reality of
the atom's presence home to many persons and groups around the world.
Some see in this accident future perspectives darkening those sketched by
the accident at Three Mile Island. Chernobyl is held up to be the confirmation
of nuclear power as an unacceptably dangerous technological choice. Others
appear to feel that this accident represents one of a long and unending series of
human-made disasters that beat the rhythm of our existence: Amoco-Cadiz,
Bhopal, Sandoz, collisions of trains, boats, and airplanes, etc. Still others,
perhaps the most numerous, seem to awaken out of a routine existence in
which they were as if held at a distance, protected from the possibility of a large
nuclear accident. The presence of nuclear industry in industrialized countries,
the repeated guarantees of high levels of safety offered by governments and
experts, the profound wish we all harbor that all goes well in our world had
eased our peaceful retreat into slumber and caressing dreams of totally safe
nuclear energy.
150 Chernobyl
In Europe, especially, where the high concentration of nuclear power in-
stallations is matched by the proximity of national borders, this sudden awak-
ening forced by outside events has produced an overall credibility crisis: the
Chernobyl accident is bad news, but the worst is perhaps yet to come.
The special nature of this crisis and its profound workings may be more
easily understood with this fictional telephone conversation:
"Hello, my friend, I have the results of your analyses from the health
center."
"Thank you for calling. We both know my situation is critical, and I asked
you as a friend and medical expert to reveal the truth to me. So go ahead,
what do you have to tell me?"
"Well, I'm afraid I have bad news and even worse news. Which do you
want first?"
"Tell me the bad news."
"I am so sorry, the results say you have only two days left to live."
"I was afraid of that. But you said you had worse news. What could
possibly be worse than that?"
"I tried to call you yesterday."
This somber story illustrates to an extreme degree that there can be some-
thing worse than the bad news: some tragic events require us to put things
into a fundamentally different perspective. Life will never again be just as it
was before.
The bad news of the Chernobyl accident became worse news in different
ways for different people, as a function of many variables. One such variable
is proximity to the site: the radically revised conditions experienced by those
closest to the accident are death for some, high exposure to radiation for others,
and the displacement of large populations. Many other persons and groups,
as well as the global environment, have been exposed in varying degrees to
radiation. It appears that in Europe the effects are, and will remain for some
time, difficult to evaluate with precision. Still, it is possible to say that the
vast majority of the European population has been exposed to the bad news
of the accident, and with it the obligation of coping with the new perspectives
imposed by it.
It has already been established how previous human-made disasters, espe-
cially those associated with the release of toxic matter, have pathogenic effects,
regardless of whether or not the actual physical exposure can be proved to be
dangerous to the organism. In the domain of large accidents, research is lack-
ing on the factors and mechanisms which mediate the social and psychological
impact these accidents have upon individuals and populations.
This chapter explores those perspectives at several levels. Nuclear acci-
dents resemble in many ways other human-made disasters rooted in technol-
ogy. At the same time, though, nuclear accidents have specific characteristics
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that make them a critical social and human experience. Understanding these
two levels of dynamics can lead to a better appraisal of the crisis experienced
and its possible evolution. Based on this knowledge, better ways of helping
victimized populations could be designed.
8.2 The Chernobyl Accident as a
Human-made Disaster
Catastrophes have always been part of human existence, at least in the sense
that a persons' relationship with the natural environment proves sometimes to
be negative. Technology might represent some of the attempts made by man
to reduce negative experiences coming from nature and to increase satisfaction
by controlling the environment. Unfortunately, natural disasters are far from
being under control. Nevertheless, another category of disaster, associated
with the development of technology, has appeared: human-made disasters.
Comparisons and contrasts with natural disasters and human-made disas-
ters have been frequently established. In a review of the matter, Baum (1987)
has put together a summary table (see Table 8.1). The sources for this table
include published descriptions and impact evaluations of several human-made
disasters, including: the fire at Cocoanut Grove, a Boston nightclub; a collision
between two ships; the Buffalo Creek flood in West Virginia; the Three Mile
Island accident; and various leaks of toxic chemicals. The Chernobyl accident
can be screened through the characteristics identified in this table. Based
on available data, it can then be ascertained to what extent the Chernobyl
accident is typical of human-made disasters.
Suddenness. Seen from the outside of the nuclear power plant, the Chernobyl
accident of 26 April 1986 occurred very suddenly, with no warning signs. From
this standpoint, it resembles other human-made disasters such as the collapse
of a dam or a bridge. Little precise information is available on the announce-
ment of the Chernobyl accident to the immediate rural communities in the
first few hours following radiation release. They had little intimation of the
problem and little preparation for the later wholesale evacuation of the popu-
lation. This suddenness is amplified in that radiation is invisible, immediately
permeating, and not entirely comprehended by the general public.
In the international community, knowledge of the accident was all the more
sudden in that it came indirectly, through the interpretation of extremely
puzzling circumstances. Swedish workers arriving at their nuclear plant trig-
gered radiation monitors, confronting decision makers with unexplained data
requiring rapid review of a wide range of unanticipated hypotheses. It was
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Table 8.1. Characteristics of natural and human-made disasters.
Disasters
Chernobyl
Characteristics
Suddenness
Impact
Visible damage
Predictability
Low point
Perception of control
Extent of effects
Persistence of effects
(Source: Baum, 1987.)
Natural
Often sudden, some warning
Usually powerful
Usually causes damage, loss
Some predictability
Clear low point
Uncontrollable, lack of
control
Usually limited to victims
Up to a year,. mostly acute
Human-made
May be sudden or drawn out
Usually powerful
May not cause damage, loss
Low predictability
Unclear low point
Uncontrollable but potential-
ly controllable; result of loss
of control
Victim's and public's loss of
confidence and credibility in
perceived human agents
May be chronic,
long-term uncertainty
the Swedish authorities who announced to the world that weather patterns
indicated radiation was emanating from a site in the USSR.
Suddenness is not only a technical parameter, but very much a question of
perception: Are people prepared to learn that their environment is profoundly
and invisibly altered? In all parts of the world, people were astonished by this
sudden shift in reality, appearing as a news flash in the media or relayed by
word of mouth. As we shall see, it was not only the physical environment that
underwent radical change in the minds of the people.
Impact. The health impact of the accident was powerful. The meltdown and
burnthrough of the reactor core and violent release of radioactivity killed 31
persons (operators and fire fighters). Although difficult to assess, and thus
controversial, it appears that about 300 persons were exposed to extremely
severe levels of radiation. Wide-range and long-term health impacts are even
harder to quantify. Thyroid tumors from radioactive iodine intake through
milk consumption could range from 12,000 to 200,000 cases; thrQugh inhala-
tion, between 2,500 and 30,000 cases. Other cancer pathologies, stemming
from whole body exposure or from intake of radioactive cesium, could amount
to from 4,000 to 60,000 cases. Overall, up to 100,000 persons are thought to
have been exposed to levels that will require medical follow-ups for negative
health effects.
Another level of impact was that upon public attitudes toward nuclear en-
ergy. The belief that a major accident in a nuclear power plant is an insignifi-
cantly remote possibility was severely shaken. Public anxiety about radiation
I
I
Ii
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has been potentialized. Although difficult to assess, it is likely that pathologies
associated with both acute and chronic states of anxiety have arisen.[l]
Visible damage. The Chernobyl accident caused a wide range of physical
damage. Several hundred square miles of land surrounding the plant were
either barred from all use or necessitated radiation cleanup. In the immediate
area, the Soviet authorities had to evacuate and resettle more than 100,000
persons, half of whom were able to return to their homes after one year. The
town of Chernobyl has been razed.
In Sweden some 100,000 reindeer were destroyed. Several other European
countries were obliged as well to destroy crops and foodstuffs that were irra-
diated beyond the levels that were considered safe for consumption.
The economic cost is extremely high. Although the cost of a reactor ac-
cident is difficult to assess completely, that it is high is evidenced by the fact
that experts have agreed that only governments, and not private concerns,
could possibly dispose of resources sufficient to reply.
Predictability. This is a particularly controversial issue. Opponents of nuclear
energy have regularly sought to keep the possibility of such a disaster in view.
The Chernobyl accident is close to being the "worst possible case" projected by
some experts. From another perspective, Perrow (1984) concludes that such
accidents are "normal," inasmuch as they are produced by the unmanageable
complex interaction of technological and human factors in operating systems.
Simon (1983) draws our attention to the human will to be rational, and
equally to the difficulties confronted on that path. These stem from such
sources as one's reduced short-term memory capacity which puts a ceiling on
one's information treatment abilities. These limits induce typical individual
behaviors that are far from optimum. Similar typical behaviors appear at the
organizational level as organizations are composed of individuals with bounded
rationality.
Crozier (1963) has also documented the detrimental impacts on overall
organizational effectiveness of intergroup power conflicts and information con-
trol. Poumadere and Mays (1988) report on how individual and organizational
values can vary throughout the work structure of a nuclear power plant and
how these variations can have an impact on overall safety effectiveness.
Unless these issues of complex systems, bounded rationality, and inter-
group relations can be effectively addressed, one can argue that human-made
disasters in large engineered systems are in some way predictable.
In the precise case of Chernobyl, however, and from the strict point of
view of operators, it can be argued that predictability in that context was
quite low. This simply because, if any real awareness had existed of the risk
present, corrective steps would have been taken much earlier in the sequence
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of events. Of course, the issue of why such awareness did not exist is probably
a result of some extremely complex interaction of the factors mentioned above.
Low point. Certain technological accidents can indeed have a low point, that
is, a clearly identifiable moment at which the damaging action ceases and from
which time recovery can begin. The low point in the case of Chernobyl, though,
is difficult to determine. For instance, those persons who have reason to think
they were exposed, directly or indirectly, can still fear long-term effects upon
their health that may not be evident until many years have passed. The extent
of damage across time then remains uncertain. Numerous events may appear
from one moment to another that make up part of that category of things
included in "worse than the bad news" of the accident itself.
Perception of control. Natural disasters are often perceived as being outside
human control. The assumption, though, that technology as a human pro-
duction should remain within our mastery leads inquiry to focus upon the
very loss of control from which the disaster resulted. Studies of attribution of
responsibility draw upon that tendency. Drabek and Quarantelli (1969), for
instance, show how decision makers could be held responsible for not having
prevented the explosion of a gas tank in fairgrounds.
Top managers at the Chernobyl plant have been severely criticized and
blamed for the accident by Soviet state officials. Such scapegoating processes,
which amount to blaming the victims, were expressed in other countries by
criticizing deficient Soviet nuclear technology. One effect of such scapegoating
is that it can lead those who differentiate themselves by this means to believe
or make believe that they are not concerned with the occurrence of such an
accident at home. "It can't happen here" was often stated shortly after the
accident. Since the time of that immediate attempt to push away the unde-
sirable reality of the accident, lucid reflection has led most experts to admit
that they cannot be so categorical about the probabilities of reexperiencing a
large accident of this sort.
Extent of effects. One effect of a human-made disaster is loss of confidence and
credibility in those perceived to be the human agents involved in the accident.
This attitude change is not limited to immediate victims, but affects in deep
ways the general public as well. In the case of the Chernobyl accident, we can
see how this is particularly true. Beyond the fact that many persons probably
consider themselves to be victims of direct or indirect radiation exposure, more
"victims" might exist among those suffering from the effects of the ruptures
suddenly caused by the Chernobyl accident. Otway (1987) warned that the
effects of Chernobyl should not be underestimated in the sense that they might
change forever the relationship between lay people and experts.
Marc Poumadere 155
Loss of both confidence and attribution of credibility is apt to be a non-
linear process and, thus, difficult to assess. Several polls have attempted to
measure changes in European attitudes toward nuclear energy by comparing
opinions before and after the Chernobyl accident. According to Roser (1987),
General Secretary of the German Nuclear Forum, differences do exist from one
European country to another in terms of the public's expression of hostility
toward nuclear energy. He concludes in part by stating that "public opinion
on nuclear energy in Europe is slowly regaining its pre-Chernobyl position"
after measured worsening.
But measurement and comprehensive evaluation of data at that level of
public opinion are difficult to perform. There is no ongoing systematic mon-
itoring of public opinion in Europe. Furthermore, such a major event as
Chernobyl has a cognitive and affective influence on the perception evaluation
of other topics. Thus, the structural dimensions themselves of the referen-
tial systems used to represent opinion data become modified (see Ansel et at.,
1987).
Persistence of effects. Considering the uncertainty regarding a clearly marked
low point in the case of Chernobyl, combined with shaken public confidence in
nuclear energy, long-term effects at many levels are likely to maintain them-
selves. In no part of the world since Chernobyl can nuclear energy be generated
just as before. Despite the purported improvement of its image in European
polls, nuclear power - as a perfectly safe technology - can no longer be de-
fended rationally. A doubt exists; ultimately credibility of the power source,
and those who defend it, has taken a blow.
Though this doubt is now part of every person's reality, the existence of
nuclear power plants in high concentration in Europe is equally an undeni-
able part of reality. One policy response has been to plan phaseouts, but
the continuing proximity of functioning plants in geographically close sites is
nonetheless inevitable. Nuclear power in Europe cannot be replaced overnight
by other sources. The conflict between lowered credibility (composed of ratio-
nal doubt amplified by irrational response) and the incontrovertible presence
of installations is apt to be a chronic stressor to large populations in Europe.
The Chernobyl accident fits the descriptive pattern that has been estab-
lished through the study of other human-made disasters. It is apparent,
though, that some of the major characteristics of the accident are specific to
its nuclear context. In the next section, I will attempt to analyze the unique
deeper impact of the nuclear accident.
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8.3 The Uniqueness of Nuclear Disasters
Section 8.2 shows how the Chernobyl accident can be identified as a human-
made disaster. Nuclear technology, however, belongs to a category unto itself
in that public anxiety over nuclear accidents and radiation hazards appears
to be of a fundamentally different nature from anxiety associated with other
technological accidents and hazards. Physiological aspects of severe exposure
to radiation are well documented. The psychological impact, through stress
agents linked to the threat (real or imaginary) and which can lead eventually
to specific pathologies, is beginning to be studied. This section treats the
uniqueness of nuclear accidents in terms of their being a critical life event,
triggering specific social and psychological reactions and ways of coping. Spe-
cial attention is given to basic factors structuring deep responses that build
into a credibility crisis.
8.3.1 The rupture of a de facto contract:
Nuclear accidents are not supposed to happen
As I have commented earlier, by definition no accident is ever supposed to
happen. If individuals are aware of the rising possibility of an accident, then
they take steps (whether efficient or inefficient) to stop the process. However,
while the idea of accidents in most areas of technology can be more or less
easily entertained, the social acceptance of the eventuality of nuclear accidents
is very low - much lower than for any other possible type of accident.
This fact is perhaps what prompts nuclear technocrats and politicians to
provide themselves and others with a reassurance that nuclear accidents are
not supposed to happen. More precisely, there are strong pressures from all
sides to produce probabilistic risk evaluations that fit the level of social accep-
tance of nuclear accidents. It is common to analyze the relationship between
the public, on the one hand, and nuclear technocrats and government, on the
other, in terms of opposing interests. At some level, however, the relation-
ship is de facto of a collusive nature: low social acceptance produces low risk
probabilities.
This deep-level relationship is cast in terms of a tacit contract, and the
contracting parties are unaware of its nature. Nuclear energy proponents and
the public, with its attitudes ranging from support of to opposition to nuclear
energy, are bound by one absolute threshold agreed to by all parties: core
radioactive material is to be confined, without the possibility of escape, no
matter what type of system function or dysfunction may be experienced. This
clause ofthe tacit contract was enacted in the 1970s, at which time appropriate
containment equipment was installed in many plants.
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However, the unforeseeable combinations of technical characteristics and
human factors can defy, in certain cases, any large engineered system. The
collective, wishfully low estimate of nuclear risk unfortunately is not a self-
fulfilling prophecy. A silent agreement, which can function as symbolic pro-
tection, is powerless to act as a real protection in the area of technology and
its failures.
Thus, the accident at TMI struck a first blow to this social contract. It
has become apparent that a loss of control occurred during the operation of
the plant, causing a partial meltdown. Safety backup systems did, however,
function, and only a minuscule amount of radioactive material was released
into the environment.
In the case of Chernobyl, a chain of human errors resulted in not only a loss
of control within the plant, but also a release of great quantities of radioactivity
to the outside. This struck an even more severe blow to the social contract, in
that it gave reality to the "worst case" of a reactor meltdown and burnthrough
with large-scale open-air release of radiation. Thus far this had been a uniquely
theoretical event, pushed by probabilistic calculations to a distance of one
billion reactor years, though seen as much more looming by opponents of
nuclear energy. The apparent will to see probabilistic projections coincide
with social acceptance is present in the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
(NRC) pronouncement in 1985: A TMI-type accident might occur once in
3,300 reactor years; a "worst case" accident in one billion reactor years. In
fact, the TMI accident occurred rather early in the series for most people
to accept, at about 400 reactor years in the USA. The USSR had some 450
reactor years in operation when the one-in-a-billion accident occurred.
This points to the fact that the Chernobyl accident not only is difficult
to cope with, as with any other human-made disaster, but also represents
the rupture of a very special social contract that carried the strength of the
converging needs and wishes of all parties.
When this rupture occurred, the reactions of anger, outrage, and fear ap-
peared to be in inverse proportion to the social acceptability quotient. Having
a flat tire on one's car, short of a blowout at high speed, is quite high on the
social acceptability scale, though it signifies a rupture of the contract engaged
when a person acquires a car believing it is apt to present few operational
problems. When the tire is found to be flat, most people can accept the fact
with only annoyance (high social acceptability-low affective impact). The so-
cial acceptability of a nuclear accident, in contrast, is so very low that reactions
to such an accident are that much more laden with distress.
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8.3.2 The loss of a socially valued object
Often, when analyzing the impact of disaster, reference is made to loss: loss
of control, loss of confidence, loss of credibility, etc. We will look at a level of
loss that supersedes these others: the loss of nuclear technology as a valued
object.
According to Ellul (1987), who has traced since 1954 the social mutations
caused by technology, our societies have been subject to the charm of technol-
ogy to the point of no longer knowing how to make use of good sense. Nuclear
energy, along with space exploration, is a hallmark of the twentieth century.
It has taken over, receiving collective projections of being an all-powerful ideal
object, constructed by belief systems impermeable to facts, and consolidated
by the silent agreement described above. Nuclear power can be an object
of national pride, the symbol of high-tech achievement and one's control of
forces stronger than oneself. (In France, for instance, some 250,000 to 300,000
persons visit and tour nuclear plants each year.) In the practical sphere, it
has undeniable benefits for societies demanding reliable, cheap, and abundant
energy.
In this light it is easy to conceive that the loss of this collectively idealized
technology through the Chernobyl accident triggers deep responses that cannot
be approached by direct inquiry or overt surveys. We must, thus, search
elsewhere for information on the process of loss. Research has been conducted
on human and social experience in facing the loss of a valued object: one's
own life, a close relative or friend, or a limb or one of the senses. Our working
hypothesis is that findings in this field can probably help us understand the
human and social experience of loss of confidence and credibility in nuclear
power, and the mechanisms involved.
A major finding is that there are several interrelated steps in facing the
loss of a valued object. Sometimes the process appears to be cyclical, in that it
involves shifting back and forth between different states of mind and emotions.
Table 8.2 provides a summary of the four major models in the literature of
loss. It must be stated that not everyone goes through each stage in a personal
experience ofloss. Furthermore, undoubtedly other variables occur during the
social reactions to a large accident like Chernobyl, notably those linked to
interpersonal interactions, large group dynamics, information processing, and
so forth. Nonetheless, it seems useful to look at these stages; deeper responses
are too often simply termed as being "irrational." Emotional responses to
nuclear energy are often cited, but seldom analyzed.
According to the models of Table 8.2, the first individual reaction following
the loss of a valued object varies: numbness, denial, shock, feeling of detach-
ment. This corresponds to what has sometimes been reported following the
Chernobyl accident and can explain, at least in part, various observations.
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Table 8.2.
Shontz
1965, 1975
Stage models showing responses to the loss of a valued object.
Kiibler-Ross Bowlby Horowitz
1969 1980 1976, 1985
Denial Numbness, feeling (Feeling of being
of being stunned stunned; denial
Anger Yearning, searching, Intrusion of the
urge to recover the reality of the loss
lost object; anger
1 Shock; feeling
of detachment
2 Encounter; experience
of helplessness, )
disorganization,
panic, reality seems
overw helming
3 Retreat; avoidance
4 Adaptation
5
Bargaining
Depression
Acceptance
Giving up attempts
to recover lost object;
disinclination to look
to the future
Breaking down attach-
ment to lost object;
establishment
of new ties to others
Coping
These include a certain slowness of officials to act, absence of apparent reac-
tion among some parts of the population, and denial of the accident and its
effects: "such an accident is not possible ... cannot happen here ... the cloud
of radioactivity will not reach our borders."
The next step seems marked with reactions that demonstrate coming to
grips with the reality of the loss. This can be expressed by anger, panic, or
attempts to recover the lost object. Horowitz (1976, 1985) points to a back
and forth movement between this stage and the previous one. This indicates
that affect and cognition are linked in a rapid feedback loop, with one term
prevailing at any time over the other. It indicates also that reactions are not
a linear process.
Eventually these stages give way to adaptation, coping, acceptance, and
establishment of new ties with other objects. In concrete terms, what does
this point to in the case of nuclear accident? Two distinct alternatives fit the
adaptation profile. One is that social acceptance of a possible nuclear accident
- at present, extremely low - can gradually rise, showing a better tolerance
for risk after passing through the test of reality. Alternatively, nuclear energy
can gradually be given up and other options explored.
Not all individuals go through all the stages, nor at the same speed. Some
stages may be skipped; others may never be resolved. The stages-of-loss per-
spective on the Chernobyl accident can have important implications for risk
communication and crisis management. Denial and anger may seem to domi-
nate in reactions at one time, but are apt to evolve into different ways of coping
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with reality. Knowing of typical and temporary stages can help in adjusting
the type of communication best adapted to an evanescent situation.
A large nuclear accident like Chernobyl might be more of a trauma than
individual and groups experiencing it may be aware. In this case, we can
expect to find clinically observed patterns of reaction: that is, people are
unaware of going through a mourning process and may act out behaviors that
seem to them to be perfectly rational and normal. They do not recognize that
these reactions may be overdetermined by affect rather than cognition. An
outsider, unless highly trusted, is thus not likely to achieve a helpful effect in
making direct reference to the irrational nature of the reactions observed.
An evaluation of the stage of loss currently experienced by a victimized
population can indicate appropriate content or theme. This raises the point
that governments and nuclear energy authorities may not be equipped to ad-
dress the demand for risk communication. They may lack a certain frame-
work for understanding victims' needs, above and beyond the fact that they
are likely to give first priority to other tasks (e.g., reevaluating the future of
nuclear energy).
In effect, these communicators need to understand that the loss caused
by Chernobyl is double. Populations are not only blaming those who were
supposed to be in control of nuclear power and who might be overestimating
its safety status. They have also lost nuclear power as a socially valued object-
one that had been invested with beliefs of being safe, useful, positive, glorious,
and infallible. The current credibility crisis not only is directed toward the
individuals and groups controlling nuclear energy, but, much more deeply,
addresses the collective image of nuclear energy itself whenever and however
it is presented.
8.3.3 The removal of distances
Another specific characteristic of nuclear accidents is the dynamics they en-
tertain with distances. Chernobyl is especially striking in that it has had
the effect of radically removing a variety of distances. Be they geographic or
national, corporeal or fantastical, economic or social, many slowly built and
firmly installed distances have suddenly collapsed.
Geographic and national distances. The toxic release at Chernobyl has been
widely commented on for its "transnational" character. For many days, ra-
dioactive clouds covered wide areas, crossing and recrossing numerous borders
and frontiers, regardless of national and political characteristics. The differ-
ences in official attitudes toward nuclear energy in Europe became apparent in
the measures set up in each country: radiation levels varied drastically from
one national border to another.
Marc Poumadere 161
Even in 1986 the European Community (EC) was preparing to abolish
economic borders and open a vast common market. Nevertheless, the sudden
levy caused by the Chernobyl accident, producing universal equality under a
radioactive cloud, came as a shock. The protective role of frontiers - those
official and legal limits, markers of where proximity becomes invasion, his-
torically established through countless wars and treaties - suddenly ceased.
Abrupt closeness was created with a common and pervasive invader. Europe
was not ready to cope with the unanticipated demands of transnational solidar-
ity. Will Chernobyl ultimately have a positive outcome of making Europeans
realize how close together they actually are?
Political distances. The Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
Hans Blix, said in November 1986, "Chernobyl showed that a serious acci-
dent anywhere has consequences for nuclear power everywhere." Until that
time, each country developing this energy source enjoyed a large measure of
sovereignty in the design and order of the nuclear program. The technology
was managed in accordance with the political, economic, and social principles
and projects of each nation. This sovereignty was challenged by Chernobyl,
leaving countries to deal with the aftermath as if the accident had happened
within their dominion, rather than solely in the USSR. Most governments were
thrown into a situation requiring not only public health measures but a reeval-
uation of nuclear power's cost and energy alternatives. The autonomy of each
nation to make decisions regarding nuclear energy was called into question,
effectively destroying the social and political balance typical to each country.
This removal of difference is a blow to national identity.
Social distances. Other well-established distances that were removed were
those linked to the division of labor throughout the social structure. Since the
beginning of time, and especially since the industrial revolution, energy pro-
duction has had human and social costs. For instance, coal mining's painful
history of casualties is not over; family groups and communities have seen
their history made by the economic pull of the mines and the deaths and
disabilities that often result. Outside groups, though, were not directly con-
cerned. Nuclear operators and related professionals, like other industrial work-
ers, encounter some context-dependent risks on-site. Indeed, the immediate
casualties at Chernobyl were among fire fighters and operators.
The threat exists, though, that all social groups, at all levels, can be af-
fected by a nuclear accident. No longer do the groups charged with energy
production bear all the burden of its cost. Those groups whose high living
standards were assured by cheap and plentiful energy suddenly find themselves
unwillingly sharing the risk involved in producing it. Such radical removal of
social distances cannot come about without being aware of the division of
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labor and the inequalities inherent in the system. This is a trauma in just
that measure to which individuals as members of their society expend a sort
of energy in keeping these inequalites out of view.
Stigmatization distances. Social psychological research on stigma (Goffman,
1963) describes the social dynamics and relationships in which a particular
mark is defined as shameful or discrediting. Social groups distance themselves
from other groups identified as being afRicted in some way. The basic moti-
vation to such phenomena is to maintain distance with some life- or identity-
threatening characteristic. This often is observed in health-related risks, where
the notion of "risk group" appears. The illness can be thought of as being the
shameful dues of membership in the risk group; in this way, nonmembers can
feel safe from the illness.
The Chernobyl accident can be seen as a stigma, concentrating on images
of danger and death. It happened to occur in a setting already stigmatized
in a certain way: Western countries tend to reject the USSR as having an
unacceptable political and social system. Thus, it is easy at first to attribute
the accident to the characteristics of the out-group: "Chernobyl happened
because the Soviets are backward in technology." In such a perspective, the
events of Chernobyl confirm everything that has been rejected in the Soviet
system.
Such victim blaming, though, in the case of Chernobyl, could not be main-
tained. The impact of the accident far overflowed the borders of the stigma-
tized group. Other groups could not avoid the perception of sharing charac-
teristics with the afRicted setting: nuclear technology is too close to home, the
magnitude of its risk too great to be contained by one rejected out-group.
Thus, the trauma suffered could not be sent away as the discrediting af-
fliction of others. Individuals and groups are deprived in this situation of
this important protective mechanism. The effects on the individual afRicted
with an illness he had convinced himself was impossible to acquire are known:
they are shattering. The effects upon society of the collapse of stigmatization
distances must now be observed.
Personal distances. The confrontation with a situation in which toxic ra-
diation has been released puts people in the presence of an invisible threat
that cannot be felt or stopped. In addition to national boundaries and so-
cial distances being trespassed, an ultimate limit is swept aside: that of the
private distance between inside and outside. Some observations have been
made of how individuals manage their psychological privacy, as if distanc-
ing access to the inner self with successive rings. Subtle social and personal
customs regulate communications across these nested rings; the person can
slow or even stop the circulation of information from the deep self toward the
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outside or from the outside toward the self. The violent news of an accident like
Chernobyl can make these inner limits fall abruptly. Bad news flows inward;
anxiety flows outward. The feeling of loss of control, of the environment, and
of communications with it is a documented trauma. In this way the disaster
is like rape or torture.
Research on "cognitive maps" has shown the way in which people represent
the layout of their world to themselves. The image of a nuclear plant in an
emergency is a feature that had been absent or very far away in most people's
cognitive maps. The Chernobyl accident suddenly brought a faltering Soviet
plant extremely close to home, as if it had sprung up in one's garden.
The existing state of social attitudes and mental frameworks regarding nu-
clear technology is of great importance in shaping deep reactions to a major
nuclear accident. Tacit social agreement, attachment to an idealized object,
established and structured distances are all global social facts existing before
the nuclear accident itself. The accident actually has the effect of revealing to
numerous members of society how magical and inoperative the tacit contract
is, how frail the idealized object is despite its power, how artificial many social
distances are. We can suppose that these constructions served to protect us
from the intrusion into everyday life of the "fundamental anxiety" (Schutz,
1962) linked to the reality of death and our mortality. A nuclear disaster con-
fronts the issues of death and illness, already faced by individuals and groups
involved with nuclear power. Such open confrontation with this inescapable
anxiety is part of the dynamics triggering a generalized credibility crisis.
8.4 The Future of a Credibility Crisis
In Section 8.3, I investigated the major elements that form the basis of the
long-term reactions to the Chernobyl accident. Among those reactions is the
loss of credibility.
A credibility crisis - articulated upon the rupture of a tacit contr...ct, the
loss of a valued object, and the removal of distances - is a slow, unfolding
process. A way to portray it is first to describe a state of generalized conflicting
cognition. From that confusion can emerge a capacity to look in a more lucid
manner at the cost of nuclear energy. Other positive consequences of the
credibility crisis following the Chernobyl accident are the identification ofthose
social conditions best able to address the very specific demands nuclear energy
puts upon individuals and groups. Finally, the fact that we know better now
what a nuclear disaster looks like can enable us to organize more appropriate
primary prevention programs in the case of another disaster.
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8.4.1 A generalized state of conflicting cognition
Before the Chernobyl accident, the global social situation could be briefly char-
acterized as simultaneous high-level anxiety about atomic radiation and high
expectations for the safety of nuclear installations. The way in which these
simultaneous attitudes gave forth a very special silent agreement between the
public and nuclear officials, wherein risk probabilities were apt to be adjusted
to the social acceptance level for nuclear accidents, was explored earlier.
This underestimation of accident potential was not, however, a voluntary
attempt by nuclear power authorities to manipulate the public. Rather, it
seems to rest upon an avoidance of conflict at a deeper level. The deeper
characteristics of the preexisting social situation are apt to be just as important
as the characteristics of the accident itself, when looking at what follows. Some
of the mechanisms at work to prodllce a silent agreement can be traced in terms
of typical defensive reactions.
Studies have shown that the high level of anxiety among the public can be
related to the following:
• The physical properties of nuclear energy, mostly as an invisible threat.
• Previous use of atomic energy in wartime to aggress and destroy popula-
tions.
• Continuous presence of a nuclear strike force as a dissuasive weapon [see,
for instance, Simon's (1984) apocalyptic scenario of the "nuclear winter"
that follows a massive nuclear strike].
Some researchers (Fornari, 1969; Guedeney and Mendel, 1973) have tried
to link the fear of the atom to myths: the myth of the Apocalypse, correspond-
ing to a final destruction of the world; the myth of Prometheus, punished for
having stolen the fire of the gods; the myth of the almighty power of what is
infinitely small like the atom and uncontrollable in its action toward man.
These elements have led to a splitting of nuclear images in the public's
attention. Two relatively independent conceptual images exist: positive (nu-
clear energy production) and negative (destruction by nuclear energy). These
two valences of nuclear energy cannot be psychologically merged to one social
image. Individual and social defenses are set up against such a holistic image,
to protect not only from the notion of the destructive power of this technol-
ogy, but from the destructive power of the fears that are inspired by that
notion. The destructive potential of "positive" nuclear energy production is,
thus, often deeply buried, so as never to have to be entertained by the mind.
Obviously, certain persons are directly confronted with the immediate re-
ality of nuclear power and its risks: persons living close to power plants, for
example. The paradoxical results of some surveys demonstrate the type of de-
fensive reaction described above: the closer a person's home is to a plant, the
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more that person minimizes nuclear risk (in contrast to persons living farther
away who are more open to recognizing the risky character ofthe technology).
Those persons living close by have, in fact, resolved the tension resulting from
the cognitive conflict created by living in the proximity of risk. The perceived
importance of one term of conflict is simply reduced. This type of conflict
resolution is typical in cases of "cognitive dissonance" (Festinger, 1957).
The reaction of these individuals can also be seen in terms of human han-
dling of complexity. Studies indicate that people can avoid facing contradic-
tory data. Kahneman and Tversky (1984) have shown how people, when asked
to evaluate risk, provide different preferences according to the way in which
the situation is "framed." This tendency is reflected in "self-framing" whereby
the individual perceives situations in such a way that the "best" choice to be
made will, in fact, automatically be consistent with prior sets of beliefs.
It can be said that all social systems gain in strength through facing and
coping with a crisis. The Chinese ideogram for crisis reads "opportunity blow-
ing in the wind." For a crisis not to endanger the survival of a social system,
it is important that there be present some capacity to handle contradictory
information and conflictual situations. Indeed, many aspects of social life
are ridden with contradiction. In a way, this is proof that society has that
"survival" potential.
Some resolutions of conflict and crisis can tend toward oversimplification,
like those resolutions described above. The political tendency may have been
to cover up the negative aspects of nuclear energy, thus playing to and rein-
forcing the individual's needs for protection against fundamental anxieties that
can be triggered by nuclear energy (see Jaques, 1955). On the social scene,
oversimplification was apparent in the superficial opposition of two groups:
those seeing only positive aspects of nuclear energy, and those seeing only
the negative. Such a dramatic, visible polarization limits the possibility of
accepting a more complex vision of the object in question.
8.4.2 Positive consequences of the credibility crisis
Another type of outcome of a crisis can be a better grasp on reality and on its
complex nature. One positive consequence of the Chernobyl accident may be
that the image of nuclear energy becomes more complete for all involved - for
all of us. A more complete image would retain its contradictory characteristics:
nuclear energy has both positive and negative sides.
This type of more complex and less reductive cognition in the public may
not alter much the probability of a nuclear accident. I have argued elsewhere,
though, that nuclear operators with a better grasp of the complexity are bet-
ter equipped to handle system crises (Poumadere and Guinchard, 1986). If
the need to deny or to see lowered probabilistic evaluations of risk could be
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reduced, though with a more complex view on things, the basis of institutional
decision making about nuclear operations would be altered, perhaps for the
better. Experts in systems reliability (e.g., Villemeur, 1988) try to include
these dimensions of human factors and decision making in their reliability
methodology.
A more complete and complex image of nuclear power could indicate, too,
a better preparedness of the public for the eventuality of an accident. We
would be less vulnerable to the psychological trauma that occurs when the
possibility of destruction we worked so hard to repress suddenly surges forth
in reality. Less vulnerable psychologically, we might be able to respond better
to the physical trauma implied by a nuclear accident: with community evac-
uation planning, medical preparedness, and overall solidarity with those who
are closest to our energy production. All in all, the ability to consider the risk
associated with nuclear power would keep us in contact with all the realities
incumbent on this social and economic energy choice.
For such a realistic attitude to be developed, it is highly important to talk
about Chernobyl. This accident should not become taboo, an isolated freak
occurrence that never should have happened and that should be ignored. Such
social amnesia is a risky outcome of the credibility crisis. To reduce this risk,
effort should be made to ask important questions: Can we realize all the
implications of the accident at Chernobyl? Can we be better prepared for the
next occurrence?
Whatever decisions are made to maintain, slow down, or end nuclear energy
programs in Europe as a result of Chernobyl, more social solidarity toward
nuclear workers is essential. It is only just to recognize the contributions of
these members of society. Justice, though, may not be sufficient motivation
for an evolution of public attitude.
If nuclear energy remains a social issue debated in a conflictual, unrealistic
atmosphere, whereas concrete reality continues to be characterized by a high
level of nuclearization, as in France, nuclear workers could be too psychologi-
cally mobilized by the reduction of this cognitive dissonance. The cost of this
psychological and social defense effort within the plant is likely to be too. high,
leading to augmented stress and risk of error.
Risk communicators should work toward social solidarity as an outcome
of the credibility crisis: this can be a favorable factor for nuclear workers in
carrying out their jobs, thus reducing the probabilities of another Chernobyl
occurring soon. This communication task is not simple: we can expect resis-
tance on all sides, given the strength of social distances that divide labor and
distribute roles in our societies.
Another level of positive consequence of a credibility crisis is that it forces
individuals and groups to face the reality of nuclear disasters. Although this
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"face to face" is painful and traumatic, it is a necessary step to help organize
society to cope with such undesirable reality.
Although the mythology surrounding nuclear energy will not disappear
overnight, the occurrence of nuclear disasters might have the paradoxical ef-
fect of revealing the down-to-earth dimension of this creation. Moreover, this
should lead to better appreciation of its place and role in society, both when
it works and when it does not.
8.4.3 Organizing primary prevention in nuclear disasters
Evacuation plans for areas neighboring nuclear power plants and provisions
for medical assistance are necessary. The Chernobyl accident has stimulated
efforts in this direction. Those who insist upon improving coordination and
decision-making effectiveness within the networks involved are to be encour-
aged. However, these lifesaving plans may not be enough.
Two strong implications for policy response to large accidents emerge from
this study of the Chernobyl accident. The first issue is that of defining victim
groups. Traditionally, victims of a catastrophe would be defined as those who
were physically touched by its effects. We have tried to demonstrate that the
definition of victim might need to be extended to all those who received the
bad news.
The second issue involves minimizing the damage caused by a credibil-
ity crisis and related mental and social turmoils, once a nuclear disaster has
occurred.
An extended definition of victim leads to the realization that no one cen-
tralized organization, however perfectly coordinated, can deal with hundreds
of millions of victims. This points to the need to decentralize primary preven-
tion far below the national government level.
In a very interesting study, Deicher et al. (1988) report on a decentralized
risk-management action in the Constance region in southern West Germany.
This is an area where no nuclear emergency plans existed. The action de-
scribed took place in response to Chernobyl and involved multiple initiatives.
Radiation levels of milk and vegetables were monitored; more than 100 public
talks were organized with graduate students presenting radiation risks infor-
mation. The local newspaper offered a forum for inquiry (500 letters were
received from the public); scientists responded to these questions and con-
tributed other articles. A telephone hot line was also set up. The authors of
the study report that the individuals involved in the measurement and com-
munication processes did not overreact (thus refuting a common argument in
favor of centralized action) and that the local population benefited from the
establishment of effective local countermeasures.
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A decentralized approach was effective in designing more appropriate coun-
termeasures and in providing needed specific information. Such a decentralized
process has other positive aspects as well. We believe that this direct commu-
nity involvement was intrinsically helpful, helping citizens to cope with and
master the traumatic event. The decentralized action met some of the mental-
health needs of the local population in a way that a distant campaign could
not achieve.
In a study of primary prevention in aircraft disasters, Williams et al. (1988)
point out that as early as World War I some basic principles had been discov-
ered in the treatment of "shell shock": treatment effectiveness was a function
of immediacy, proximity, and expectancy. Effective treatment included imme-
diate response to emotional problems, close to the place where the person was
victimized, and expectations by the caregivers that the victim would recover
completely. Treatment characterized by these dimensions led to fewer long-
term psychiatric casualties than among victims who were evacuated from the
front and treated closer to home.
In the event of a nuclear disaster, the implication is that victims will require
mental-health care in the local community. The type of emotional or psycho-
logical problems we have evoked might ideally be treated where they occur: at
work, at school, within the family. Such a prevention strategy is very different
from present disaster response strategies, which favor centralized control and
give no attention to the emotional trauma of the victims.
Policymakers who do not believe that Chernobyl will be the last nuclear
disaster must take numerous and challenging steps. For example:
• Encouraging and unifying community-level risk management initiatives.
• Assessing specific training needs for health service professionals and oth-
ers who provide immediate local help; this assessment should access all
resources in rural, urban, and organizational or institutional settings.
• Identifying individuals and groups who can offer help immediately; Deicher
et al. (1988) gave the example of university science faculty and graduate
students; university psychology departments among others could also be
solicited.
The distance between current disaster resources and such a decentralized
network is tremendous. These goals might help focus policymakers' attention
on the issues that must be addressed.
8.5 Conclusions
Society is not ready to cope with a nuclear disaster. This type of human-made
disaster plus the special social characteristics of nuclear technology trigger
unique deep reactions.
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An issue raised in this chapter is that the notion of "victimized popula-
tion" might best be extended to include all the populations that receive the
"bad news." Each population has been subjected to the worse effects of the
accident, and suffers from a credibility crisis - the dimensions of which are
little understood by the public at large.
At present, the greatest policy need may be for help to adjust to the extent
of the victimization. This adjustment can be based upon more knowledge of
the crisis phase each population is coping with at a given time.
At this point in the credibility crisis, a generalized state of conflicting
cognitions is probably prevalent, along with possible individual and social
pathologies. These cognitive conflicts and emotional traumas are linked to
both the characteristics of Chernobyl as a human-made disaster and the spe-
cific nature of Chernobyl as a nuclear disaster. I have identified three major
elements as constituents of this nature: the rupture of a social contract, the
loss of a socially valued object, and the sudden removal of established dis-
tances. Further research and basic information are needed in this area where
little specific observation is reported. A better grasp of the impact of nu-
clear energy on our societies can lead to better adapted policy, increased local
and social solidarity, more decentralized initiative and risk management, and
better organized primary prevention in nuclear disaster.
Without concerted effort, though, this better understanding could stay
out of reach. Social amnesia may well cover up Chernobyl as if it had not
happened. Some researchers report that public opinion in Europe is regaining
its pre-Chernobyl position. This eventuality should not be regarded by anyone
as good news; it may signify that social amnesia is developing. In this case,
Chernobyl will have served for little in terms of learning, preparedness, and
social solidarity.
Note
[1] This chapter was written in summer 1988; in June 1990 the author participated in
a WHO Working Group on the "Psychological Effects of Nuclear Accidents," held
in Kiev at the All-Union Scientific Center for Radiation Medicine. Part of the data
presented at the meeting unfortunately confirms our hypothesis: an estimated 10
million people in Byelorussia, the Ukraine, and Russia are judged to suffer from
the indirect effects of Chernobyl.
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Appendix: Concepts, Units,
and Terminology
Radioactivity and Radiation
Both radioactivity and the radiation it produces existed on earth long before life
emerged. Radioactive materials became part of the earth at its very formation. Even
human beings are slightly radioactiv~, for all living tissues contain traces of radioac-
tive substances. Toward the end of the last century humanity first discovered this
elemental and universal phenomenon.
By far the greatest part of the radiation received by the world's population comes
from these natural sources. People are irradiated in two ways: externally and inter-
nally. Radioactive substances may remain outside the body and irradiate it from the
outside or they may be inhaled or ingested, and so irradiate the body from the inside.
Over the last few decades man has artificially produced radioactive substances,
several hundred types of radionuclide. And he has learned to use them for a wide
variety of purposes from medicine to industry, from detection of fires to illuminating
watch dials. All these increase the radiation sources to which both individuals and
mankind as a whole are exposed.
The unit of radioactivity
A few naturally occurring substances consist of atoms which are unstable - that is,
they undergo spontaneous transformation into more stable product atoms. Such sub-
stances are called radioactive, and the transformation process is known as radioactive
decay.
The decay of radioactive material is statistical in nature, and it is impossible
to predict when any particular atom will disintegrate. The time, however, that is
required for one-half of the nuclei in a sample of a particular radioactive isotope
to decay is constant and characteristic of the radioactive species given. Until the
introduction of the International System of Units (SI), the unit of radioactivity was
the curie (Ci). The curie was originally related to the activity of one gram of radium,
but the definition was later standardized as 3.7 x 1010 nuclear disintegration (dis) per
second, which is almost the same.
A disintegration usually involves the emission of one or more charged particles,
such as alpha particle or beta particle. These may be accompanied, though not
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Table l. Relationship between curie and becquerel.
Amounts Surface activity levels
Ci (old) Bq(new) j.LCi/cm2 Bq/cm2
1 pCi 37mBq 10-6 0.037
27 pCi 1 Bq 3 X 10-6 0.1
1 nCi 37 Bq 10-5 0.37
27 nCi 1 kBq 3 x 10-5 1.0
1 j.LCi 37 kBq 10-4 3.7
27 j.LCi 1 MBq 3 x 10-4 10.0
1 mCi 37 MBq 10-3 37.0
27 mCi 1 GBq 3 x 10-3 100.0
1 Ci 37 GBq 10- 2 370.0
always, by one or more gamma photon emissions. Some radionuclides emit only X or
gamma radiation.
The Sl unit of radioactivity is the becquerel (Bq), which is defined as one nuclear
disintegration per second. Compared with the curie, the becquerel is a rather small
unit. In practice, it is often convenient to adopt the usual multiplying prefixes, for
example,
1 becquerel (Bq) = 100 dis/s
1 kilobecquerel (kBq) = 103 dis/so
The relationship between the old unit and the new Sl unit is illustrated as follows:
1 Ci = 3.7 x 1010 Bq = 37 GBq,
1 Bq = 2.7 X 10- 11 Ci = 27 pCi.
This relationship is clarified in Table 1.
Radiation units
Just as heat and light transfer energy from the sun to the earth, so does ionizing
radiation transfer energy from a source to the absorbing medium. The source of
ionizing radiation may be radioactive atoms or equipment such as X-ray machines.
Ionizing is the removal of one or more orbital electrons from the atom. The atom
and the electron, so separated, are known as an ion pair, that is, a positive ion (the
atom) and a negative ion (the electron). The absorption of radiation in a medium
results in ionization, i.e., the production of ion pairs.
In materials, such as the human body, ionization can lead to the breakdown
of molecules and the formation of chemical substances that are damaging to the
biological material. The harmful effects of radiation on the human body are largely
attributable to such chemical reactions.
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Exposure
The first widely used radiation unit, the rontgen (R), was based on the ionizing effect
of X and gamma radiation in air, and corresponds to the production of ions carrying
one absolute electrostatic unit of charge. In SI units the exposure is expressed in
coulomb per kilogram (C/kg) of air.
Although the rontgen is still in use to a limited extent, it is inadequate as a
universal radiation unit, since it applies only to X rays and gamma radiation and to
their effect in air. In practice, the human tissue is the medium of interest and the
energy deposition is usually higher in tissue than in air. Therefore, the concept of
absorbed radiation dose has been introduced to overcome these difficulties.
Absorbed dose
Absorbed dose is a measure of energy deposition in any medium by all types of
radiation. In SI units, the absorbed dose unit is called the gray (Gy) and defined as
an energy deposition of one joule per kilogram (1 J /kg). The original unit of absorbed
dose was the rad and was defined as an energy deposition of 100 erg/gram, i.e., 0.01
J /kg. Accordingly,
1 Gy = 1 J/kg = 100 rad.
An exposure of 1 R is equivalent to an absorbed dose in air of 0.00869 Gy or to an
absorbed dose in tissue of 0.0096 Gy.
Dose equivalent
Although the quantity of absorbed dose is a very useful concept, the same absorbed
dose of different types of radiation does not necessarily produce the same degree
of damage in biological systems. For example, 0.01 Gy of alpha particles can do
as much biological damage as 0.20 Gy of gamma radiation. This difference in the
biological effectiveness must be taken into account if we wish to add doses of different
radiations to obtain the total biologically effective dose. To do this we must multiply
the absorbed dose of each type of radiation by a quality factor (Q), which reflects the
ability of the particular type of radiation to cause damage. The quantity obtained
when absorbed dose is multiplied by a quality factor is known as the dose equivalent,
the unit of which is the sievert (Sv). This is related to the gray as follows:
dose equivalent (Sv) = absorbed dose (Gy) xQ x N,
where N is a further modifying factor which might take into account such characteris-
tics of exposure as absorbed dose rate and fractionation of dose. For the present, the
International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) has assigned a value of
one to N.
The unit of the dose equivalent was originally the rem, which is 100 times smaller
than the new SI unit called the sievert (Sv). Thus:
1 Sv = 100 rem.
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Table 2. Radiation dose equivalents.
Rem (old) Sievert (new)
0.10 mrem 1.00 j1.SV
0.25 mrem 2.50 j1.Sv
0.50 mrem 5.00 j1.SV
0.75 mrem 7.50 j1.SV
1.00 mrem 10.00 j1.SV
2.50 mrem 25.00 j1.SV
10.00 mrem 100.00 j1.Sv
100.00 mrem 1.00 mSv
500.00 mrem 5.00 mSv
1.00 rem 10.00 mSv
5.00 rem 50.00 mSv
10.00 rem 100.00 mSv
50.00 rem 500.00 mSv
100.00 rem 1.00 Sv
The value of the quality factor is found to depend on the density of ionization
caused by the radiation in the biological tissue. A value of one has been assigned
to the quality factor of X and gamma radiation. Beta radiation and electrons cause
ionization of a similar density to gamma radiation and so the quality factor is also one
for beta radiation and electrons. The Q for protons is 10, and for fast neutrons, alpha,
and other multiple-charged particles it is 20. An alpha particle produces about one
million ion pairs per millimeter of track in tissue, whereas a beta particle produces
about ten thousand per millimeter.
In terms of occupational radiation exposure, the gray and sievert are large units.
It is often convenient to have smaller units, and this is done by using the prefixes milli
(one-thousandth, m) and micro (one-millionth, j1.). The relationship between rem and
sievert is shown in Table 2.
Effective dose equivalent
Some organs or tissues of the body are more vulnerable than others. A given dose
equivalent of radiation is more likely to cause fatal cancer in the lung than in the
thyroid gland, and the reproductive organs are of particular concern because of the
risk of genetic damage. The different organs and tissues of the body are therefore
also given weighting factors. Risk-weighting factors recommended by the ICRP are
as follows: gonads (ovaries and testes) 0.25; breast (for both sexes) 0.15; lungs 0.12;
red bone marrow 0.12; thyroid 0.03; bone surfaces 0.03; remainder 0.30; total body
1.00.
Once it has been weighted appropriately, the dose equivalent becomes the effective
dose equivalent, and is also expressed in sievert. Effective dose equivalent is the dose
equivalent weighted for the susceptibility to harm different tissues and organs. The
effective dose equivalent has been defined to ensure that the risk is equal either when
the whole body is irradiated uniformly or when there is only partial nonuniform
irradiation.
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Committed effective dose equivalent
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Committed effective dose equivalent resulting from an intake of radioactive material
into the body is the effective dose equivalent that will be accumulated during the 50
years following the intake, i.e., over the future life span of an individual - "lifetime
dose." For the public, it may be appropriate to extend the lifetime beyond 50 years
to assess the "lifetime" dose conservatively.
Committed dose equivalent to a given organ or tissue from an intake of radioactive
material into the body can also be defined; it is the dose that will be accumulated in
the given organ or tissue over 50 years.*
Dose rate of radiation
The gray and sievert are units expressing the total dose of radiation received over
any period of time. In controlling the radiation hazard in an environment (workplace
or nature), it is usually necessary to know the rate at which radiation dose is being
received. Accordingly, absorbed dose rates are expressed in GyIh and dose equivalent
rates in SvIh. The relationship between dose and dose rate is
dose (Gy) = dose rate (Gy/h) x time (h).
Collective doses
The previous definitions, however, describe only individual doses. If we add up all
the individual effective dose equivalents received by a group of people, the result is
called the collective effective dose equivalent, and this is expressed in man-sieverts
(man-Sv) or person-sieverts (person-Sv).
One further definition must also be introduced, because many radionuclides in
the environment decay so slowly that they emit radiation far into the future. This is
the collective effective dose equivalent that will be delivered to generations of people
over time, and it is called the collective effective dose equivalent commitment.
Note
*In everyday practice, the term dose is often loosely used to mean one of the following
quantities: absorbed dose, dose equivalent, effective dose equivalent, or committed
dose equivalent.
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Absorbed dose: Amount of radiation energy absorbed per unit mass of a given tissue.
It is measured in grays (1 Gy =joule/kg) or rads (1 rad = 100 ergs/g).
ALARA: As Low As Reasonably Achievable. The effects of radiation and levels of
exposure should be kept as low as possible with due regard to economic and social
factors.
ALI: Annual Limit on Intake. The activity of a radionuclide that, taken into the
body during a year, would provide a committed effective dose equivalent to a
person equal to the annual occupational effective dose equivalent limit (0.05 Sv
or 5 rem) or, in some cases, the organ dose equivalent limit.
Bq: becquerel. The SI unit for the number of radioactive disintegrations per second:
1 Bq = 1 radioactive dis/s; 1 Bq = 27 X 10- 12 curies.
BWR: Boiling water reactor. Nuclear power plant that has a core cooled by water
that is allowed to boil in the pressure vessel. It is a thermal reactor that uses
water as both a coolant and a moderator.
Ci: curie. Old unit of radioactivity: 1 Ci = 3.7 x 1010 dis/s (27 Ci = 1012 Bq).
Collective dose commitment: Sum of the doses to all individuals in a population.
Collective effective dose equivalent: The product of the average effective dose equiv-
alent and the number of persons exposed to a given source of radiation, expressed
in man-sievert (man-Sv) or person-sievert (person-Sv).
Committed dose equivalent: The dose equivalent accumulated in the 50 years after
intake of a radionuclide, often to age 70.
Dose equivalent: The quantity obtained by multiplying the absorbed dose by a qual-
ity factor to allow for estimated differences in effectiveness of the various ionizing
radiations in causing harm to humans, measured in sieverts (1 Sv = 100 rem).
Dose rate: Absorbed dose per unit of time (e.g., Sv/year).
Effective dose equivalent: The quantity obtained by multiplying the dose equivalents
to various tissues and organs by the risk-weighting factor appropriate to each and
summing the products.
Fallout: Radioactive debris from a nuclear detonation, which is airborne or has been
deposited on the earth.
Fast reactor: A nuclear reactor where fission is brought about by fast (high-energy)
neutrons.
Fuel cycle: The sequence of steps, such as mining, milling, fabrication, utilization,
and reprocessing, through which nuclear fuel passes.
Genetically significant dose: The dose that, if given to every member of a population,
would produce the same genetic harm as the actual doses received by the various
individuals, expressed in sieverts.
Gy: gray. SI unit for absorbed dose: 1 Gy = 1 joule of energy absorbed per kilogram
of tissue; 1 Gy = 100 rads.
Half-life: The time for the activity of a radionuclide to lose half its value by decay.
Ionizing radiation: Radiation that can deliver energy in a form capable of removing
electrons from atoms and turning them into ions.
Mean dose equivalent: The dose equivalent in each organ or tissue to which the ICRP
dose limits for nonstochastic effects apply.
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Negligible individual risk level: A level of risk of death (10- 7 ) that can be dismissed.
This risk is that associated with an annual effective dose equivalent of 0.01 mSv.
PWR: Pressurized water reactor. A type of nuclear power plant that has a core
cooled by water kept under pressure. It is a thermal reactor that uses water as
both a coolant and a moderator.
R: rontgen. Old unit of exposure. 1 rontgen = 2.58 x 10- 4 coulomb per kilogram of
aIr.
Rad: Old unit of absorbed dose. One rad is 0.01 joules absorbed per kilogram of any
material.
RBMK reactor: A type of nuclear power plant that uses low-enriched uranium as
fuel, is graphite moderated, and is cooled by light water. It is a channel-type
reactor where the water boils in the channels and has a direct steam cycle to the
turbine. These reactors are refueled during operation and usually do not have
containment buildings.
Rem: Old unit for dose equivalent. The absorbed dose (rads) is multiplied by the
quality factor for the particular type of radiation: 100 rem = 1 Sv.
Source material: Uranium or thorium or any combination thereof and ores that con-
tain at least 0.05 % uranium, thorium, or any combination thereof.
Special nuclear material: Plutonium, uranium-233, and uranium enriched in the iso-
topes U-233 or U-235.
Stochastic effects: Random effects, the probability of which is a function of radiation
dose without threshold.
Sv: sievert. The SI unit of dose equivalent. The absorbed dose (in grays) is multiplied
by a quality factor for the particular type of radiation: 1 Sv = 100 rem.
Teratogenic effects: Effects occurring in offspring as a result of insults sustained in
utero.
Thermal neutrons: Neutrons that have been slowed to the degree that they have
the same average thermal energy as the atoms or molecules through which they
are passing. The average energy of neutrons at ordinary temperatures is about
0.025eV.
Thermal reactors: A nuclear reactor where fission is brought about by thermal neu-
trons.
Whole body dose equivalent: The dose equivalent associated with the uniform irradi-
ation of the whole body.
Abbreviations
ALARA: As Low As Reasonably Achievable
ALI: Annual Limit on Intake
BWR: Boiling Water Reactor
GEG: Commission of the European Communities
GMEA: Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
DAG: Derived Air Concentration
EG: European Communities
EURATOM: European Atomic Energy Treaty
FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization
GSD: Genetically Significant Dose
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IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency
ICRP: International Commission on Radiological Protection
IIASA: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
fLO: International Labour Office
INSAG: International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group
MWe: Megawatt-electric
MWt: Megawatt-thermal
NEA: Nuclear Energy Agency
NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PWR: Pressurized Water Reactor
TMI: Three Mile Island
UNEP: United Nations Environment Programme
WHO: World Health Organization
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Chernobyl: A Policy Response Study reports on how
regions, countries, and Europe as a continent responded
to the Chernobyl accident.The responses of society to
traumatic disasters which change the whole pattern of life
on a continent for an extended time period are discussed.
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should not become taboo, an isolated freak occurrence
that never should have happened and that should be
ignored. Such social amnesia is a risky outcome of the
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made to ask important questions: Can we realize all the
implications of the accident at Chernobyl? Can we be
better prepared for the next occurrence?"This scientific
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